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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores Percy Shelley’s ethical commitments in several of his
major works. Its primary claim is that Shelley’s poetry is involved in the regulation and
education of desire. As a fundamentally antinomian poet, Shelley grapples time and again
with how moral progress will be guided absent the regulatory influences of law and
religion. My dissertation offers an answer to this central impasse affecting scholarship on
the ethical world Shelley imagines and attempts to realize through poetry. It argues for a
dialectical movement observable in Shelley’s work of the programmatic breakdown,
rather than fulfillment, of hope. This study reconsiders the process of how Shelley’s
notion of the liberated self, best represented in Prometheus Unbound, overcomes what he
calls in “Mont Blanc,” “Large codes of fraud and woe.” I claim that Shelley’s poetry
tends toward the enlargement of human agency by addressing the constraints of volition
and passion. Consumed with self-interest and human passion, what Shelley names in
Laon and Cythna the “dark idolatry of self” runs athwart the aesthetic and political telos
of his poetry—the collectivization and inclusiveness of the self.
Yet I argue that such a self-conversion from exclusionary self-interest to inclusive
self-liberation becomes possible only through failure and limitation, humility and
forgiveness. My aim is to show how Shelley speaks in his poetry from the end of history
in order to translate the political and social abstractions of utopian discourse into a “vital
alchemy” of living poetry. The immanent moment when selfishness converts to altruism
marks some of the most powerful events in Shelley’s work as well as some of the most
bleak. In this study I reveal the dialectical process behind them. The retreat to the self, a
frequent narrative trope of the Romantic period, becomes in Shelley a re-treatment of the
self’s relation to desire and society.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION Apart from the Law: The Structure of Freedom in Shelley’s Poetry………………..1
CHAPTER ONE From “Silent Eloquence” to a “Swoon of Joy”: History and Futurity in Queen Mab
and Laon and Cythna…………………………………………………………………………………….26
Laon and Cythna and the Wake of Broken Progress…………………………………………………….60

CHAPTER TWO Lyrical Morality……………………………………………………………………...87
“Ode to the West Wind” and the Moral Limits of the Poem…………………………………………...109

CHAPTER THREE Self and Love in The Cenci and Prometheus Unbound…………………………135
Prometheus Unbound and the Necessity of Love’s Wreck…………………………………………….164

CHAPTER FOUR As Yet to Come: Beginning Again at The Triumph of Life……………………….183
CONCLUSION The Future of Shelley………………………………………………………………...217
WORKS CITED……………………………………………………………………………………….224
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………………………..234

vi

INTRODUCTION
Apart from the Law: The Structure of Freedom in Shelley’s Poetry
He tramples upon all received opinions, on all the cherished luxuries and superstitions of
mankind. He bids them cast aside the chains of custom and blind faith by which they
have been encompassed from the very cradle of their being, and become the imitators and
ministers of the Universal God.
—Shelley, Essay on Christianity
The following study examines several central notions in the work of the English
Romantic poet, Percy Shelley. Chief among these are notions of history, the future,
ethics, love, poetry and the self. This study began when I started to explore the different
ways that Shelley uses temporality in his poetry. As I attended to how time worked in his
major poems, it became clear that his sense of history and the future, while always
exerting significant formal and thematic pressures, was often inconsistent and at odds
with his system of ethics and theory of the self. It was as if in his prose writings on
politics, love, and the self he was saying one thing that in his poetry could never become
audible, at least not for very long. How was this possible? I realized my struggle to
answer this question was indicative of a decision that all scholars of Shelley must make
regarding the privileging either of his poetry or prose. While each chapter of this
dissertation addresses major Shelley poems, I derive from his letters, biographical
accounts of his life, and the intellectual and moral system he outlines in his prose,
valuable evidence and contributions to my argument.
Whether Shelley’s poetry or prose offers us a better centerpiece for his thinking, I
choose not to distinguish. Each in my view illuminates the other. Yet the contradictions
in how Shelley tries to understand historical and individual progress are less an effect of
the genre through which he explores these challenging issues than they are a more
troubling sign of the impossibility of progress itself in his poetry and this period.
1

Furthermore, a trajectory can be traced from his early to later works in which his vision
of future good for individuals and communities undergoes significant changes.
Convictions of gradualist social improvement eventually give way to dreams of
apocalyptic change.
What ultimately constituted the most difficult challenge of this dissertation was
trying to get to the core of Shelley’s thought in spite of its persistent avoidance of any
stable core. Ironically, it was this desire to pluck out the heart of Shelley’s mystery that
led me to formulate the thesis of this study. For Shelley the aim of progress is freedom,
the idea of humanity liberated from all past and present, moral and political, impasses,
what he calls “Large codes of fraud and woe.” The problem with this goal is that a
paradox ensues, because what Shelley names “codes of fraud and woe” are the very laws
and values binding together the culture he critiques and the morals he derides. If the fraud
and woe disappear, then the culture, along with its historical justifications and future
promises, dissolves. As some scholars have argued, Shelley’s desire for freedom and
equality was essentially utopian.1 In order to make history and ethics meaningful, he was
hoping for the annihilation of both—apocalyptic, indeed. However, the process of
discovery to which Shelley directed his reform efforts involved the creation of a social
order where law was inspired by loved.
1

See Michael Scrivener’s Radical Shelley: The Philosophical Anarchism and Utopian Thought of Percy
Bysshe Shelley (Princeton UP, 1982). He argues that Shelley is ultimately an ethical idealist who grounds
his notion of a perfect society in socioeconomic equality. According to Scrivener, Shelley is a utopian “in
the sense that it [what is socially possible] is thoroughly beyond the confines of the established order” (xii).
See also Steven Goldsmith’s Unbuilding Jerusalem: Apocalypse and Romantic Representation (Cornell
UP, 1984) for a discussion of Prometheus Unbound’s linguistic utopianism and its effects on democratic
politics. pp. 209-61. For treatment of Utopianism in the context of ‘the body and the natural world,’
Timothy Morton’s Shelley and the Revolution of Taste (Cambridge UP, 1994) discusses Shelley’s
vegetarianism and proto-ecopolitics. In “The Transgressive Double Standard: Shelleyan Utopianism and
Feminist Social History” (Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), Annette Cafarelli explores how the radical political
agendas of Shelley’s time were influenced by gender, taking particular note of the women in Shelley’s
immediate circle. pp. 88-104.
2

Yet an important critical need that I address in this dissertation is taking poets like
Shelley, and their often transcendent claims that softly echo in our contemporary world of
critical immanence, at their word. He means something of profound trans-historical
moment when he says that “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world,” so
rather than writing off the paradox as a utopian wish, I want to answer the following
question: In the absence of coercive and fraudulent sources to shape human progress,
what drives this rejuvenated vision of the future and offers hope to the present?
The main objective of this dissertation is to show how Shelley’s dialectical
understanding of human freedom through love emerges from his earlier and more
teleological convictions; and, secondly, to show how there is a mutual entailment in
Shelley’s poetry between social and individual revolution. In the following chapters I
explore these issues from different angles, through different figures and concepts in
Shelley’s poetry; such as metaphor, the circumference of self, Love, history, or even
“Poetry” as an abstraction. Rather than give a definitive answer, I will claim that the
absence of a master-framework that would stabilize Shelley’s future-oriented politics and
aesthetics is itself a deliverance from such codifying structures. Love is the master-trope
of Shelley’s poetry and faith, affording the possibility of the Promethean individual, the
world that has not yet arrived but which Promethean change might bring about;
Promethean becoming marks the birth pangs of Love and Shelley’s many representations
of vernal restoration.2

2

The readings of Prometheus Unbound run the gamut from seeing in the poem a complete renewal and
integration of the human and material world to a drama that enacts the impossibility of this restoration. See
C. S. Lewis’s essay on Shelley in Rehabilitation and other Essays (Folcroft P, 1939), pp. 1-35. See also
Carol Jacob’s deconstructionist reading of Prometheus Unbound in Uncontainable Romanticism (Johns
Hopkins UP, 1989), pp. 19-61. Combining these two antithetical ways of reading Shelley’s most famous
long poem, Stuart Curran understands Prometheus Unbound as enacting the perfection of love and desire
3

The answer, therefore, to the question of what will guide the newly transformed
self when all oppressive social institutions and ideologies have been removed from the
path to enlightenment, is dialectical. To paraphrase Shelley at the end of Lines written
among the Euganean Hills (1818), the world will never really grow young again. We
always already live in a fallen world, yet we might begin to grow young in it. The
solution is a form and methodology rather than a specific content. The rhythm and
harmony of the spell is given, but not the words to be chanted.3 “To hope, till Hope
creates/ From its own wreck the thing it contemplates,” Demogorgon exhorts at the end
of Prometheus Unbound. Shelleyan Love mediates the moral spell to be cast. Hope is
both the form and content through which the future is visible, generating itself out of
what it cannot look away from, the fallen present. Because Shelley writes toward futurity,
he wants his poetry to be able to resist the vagaries of historical chance. In a sense the
moral content of his message becomes the form, allowing for the possibility of a poetry
that can pass through the ages until the “graves from which a glorious Phantom may /
Burst, to illumine our tempestuous day.”4
Shelley’s dialectical vision of reform is closely connected to his antinomianism.
Greatly agitated by the possibility of genuine progress becoming codified into either
static dogma or tyrannical oppression, Shelley tries to balance the appeals of
enlightenment reason and apocalyptic enchantment. The two primary antitheses in his
poetry, reason and imagination, self-esteem and self-contempt, the songs of Apollo and
the songs of Pan, law and freedom, do not always merge into a fully reconciled synthesis;

for “apocalyptic renewal” (297). See his essay “Lyrical Drama: Prometheus Unbound and Hellas” in
Oxford Handbook of Shelley (Oxford UP, 2013), pp. 289-97.
3
Significantly, the Latin word for poetry, carmen, means charm, enchantment, song or prophecy.
4
“England in 1819.” Lines 13-14.
4

sometimes they hang in abeyance beside each other, while at other times they are
indistinguishable from one another, as is the case when Prometheus curses Jupiter.5 Yet
taken collectively, Shelley’s poetry seeks just such a synthesis, and however paradoxical
its outcome appears, the motive remains constant: to ensure the freedom and autonomy
for an individual caught between self-dissolution on one hand and self-isolation on the
other. Each outcome is insufficient for the kind of social and spiritual reform Shelley
wants to bring about.
At the heart of Shelley’s dialectical understanding of self-creation and becoming
is his conception of love—its forms, motives, and effects. Freedom for Shelley consists
not in self-sovereignty or self-determination as a condition or cause in its own right, but
as a force directed toward the twin aims of breaking down or beyond the present meaning
of things (whether these forms are the result of laws, customs, culture or language), as
well as restoring human relations to a morality based on love and equality. As Shelley
attempts to demonstrate in Laon and Cythna (1817), the mere explosion of revolutionary
impulses will, without the guiding principles of liberal reform and virtuous action,
succumb to violence and chaos.6 In the preface to that poem Shelley makes a case for the

5

“Song of Apollo” and “Song of Pan,” each composed in 1820, embody contrary impulses of the human
mind and Shelley’s poetry. Thomas Frosch argues that the opposition in Shelley’s poetry between reason
and imagination, embodied in the figures of Apollo and Pan, constitutes a dialectic of defense against selfdissolution into either one. He claims that “Shelley creates a rich and flexible dialectic of defense, in which
he is able to express, if not fully to satisfy, four conflicting motives: to defeat Apollo, to sustain him as an
ideal, to keep both gods safe from contamination by each other, and still to bring them together” (117). See
“Psychological Dialectic in Shelley’s ‘Song of Apollo’ and ‘Song of Pan.’” Keats-Shelley Journal.
45(1996): 102-17. Frosch suggests that Shelley’s failure to fully satisfy the ideals of the opposing figures
allows for both individual desire and social responsibility. I agree with Frosch’s analysis of these
representative figures in Shelley’s thinking, yet I question just how rich and flexible this dialectic of
defense is, since Shelley always seems to privilege Pan over Apollo.
6
In his recent study of Romanticism and Orientalist political rhetoric and aesthetics, Gerard CohenVrignaud makes the point that Laon and Cythna (though he prefers The Revolt of Islam because “Unlike a
revolution that completely upends political structures, “revolt” suggests a circumscribed reaction to
disputed policies rather than an attempt to install a wholly new order”) is everywhere intent on containing,
guiding and grounding insurrectionary excesses in the principles of liberal reform (80). The effort to
5

reasons behind the democratic failures of the French Revolution and its aftermath; in the
poem’s narrative Shelley offers a corrective to that historical event through the actions
and words of his two rebel heroes. There is an identifiable analogy in the work between
the ecstasies of French liberatory truth evolving back into tyranny and self-autonomy
evolving into self idolatry, the principle of poetry turning into the principle of self.7 I cite
Laon and Cythna as an exemplary representation of this process, but the threat of selfisolation or even self-dissolution disguised or desired as freedom occurs throughout
Shelley’s poems. Shelley’s notion of love unmasks the difference between the individual
who is deluded in an egocentric self-awareness and the one who understands that being
free means the continual cultivation of an identity sympathetic to and aware of the
realities and sufferings of others.8 Achieving such a rarified mode of autonomy, which is
at once a union with the greater whole of people and things, means relinquishing one
form of freedom for another. By examining the relationship of Shelleyan love to each,
Shelley’s distinction of a divisive versus a self-affirming and social-oriented identity
emerges, making clearer the ways in which Shelley’s political and aesthetic rhetoric
oscillates between reform and revolt.

“kindle” the right kind of truth and freedom is evidenced, Cohen-Vrignaud argues, even by the Spenserian
stanza Shelley employs: “By adhering to the poetic customary, Shelley refuses the consolations of an
autonomous self – what Keats famously termed Wordsworth’s “egotistical sublime” – disengaged from
dialogue with the community” (84). Radical Orientalism: Rights, Reform, and Romanticism. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2015. The “consolations of an autonomous self,” as Cohen-Vrignaud phrases it, are for
Shelley no consolations at all; they represent the siren call of a disastrous solipsism that corrodes human
sympathy and love.
7
Cythna laments, “It is the dark idolatry of self, / Which, when our thoughts and actions once are gone, /
Demands that man should weep, and bleed, and groan” (VIII.192-94). In Defence of Poetry, Shelley
distinguishes “Poetry, and the principle of Self, of which money is the visible incarnation, are the God and
Mammon of the world” (Norton, 531).
8
In Alastor (1815), Shelley presents just such a contrast of perspectives. The Poet sees the world as a
reflection of his own visionary desires. His commitment to an idealistic reality cuts him off from the larger
human community. The preface of the poem, however, cautions that “Among those who attempt to exist
without human sympathy, the pure and tender-hearted perish through the intensity and passion of their
search after its communities, when the vacancy of their spirit suddenly makes itself felt” (Behrendt 5).
6

In On Love, the short prose fragment from 1818 in which Shelley attests to the
mysterious power of attraction animating each person’s yearning after their own likeness,
on view is a split between love’s presence and absence. What is noteworthy about
Shelley’s remarks has to do with their insufficiency to account for the ideas and images
he wants to describe. Perhaps it would be commonplace to suggest that in On Love
Shelley is searching after himself or that in On Love love is his object (and subject) of
desire, but a frequent theme for his works is the overcoming of the mind’s fevered
projection of its own reality. For example, the epigraph to Alastor from St. Augustine’s
Confessions translates to “Not yet did I love, yet I was in love with loving;…I sought
what I might love, loving to love.”9 Furthermore, Shelley’s famous note to the manuscript
copy of On Love, “These words are inefficient and metaphorical—Most words so—No
help—,” which immediately refer to the piece’s most awkward and vague description,
“Not only the portrait of our external being, but an assemblage of the minutest particulars
of which our nature is composed,” speak to the inexhaustible void Shelley tries to fill
with his helpless words.10 Even the first definition of love that Shelley offers is
syntactically ambiguous, repulsing the attraction that informs it.
It is that powerful attraction towards all that we conceive or fear or hope
beyond ourselves when we find within our own thoughts the chasm of an
insufficient void and seek to awaken in all things that are a community
with what we experience within ourselves.11
Though what Shelley means here is by no means self-evident and transparent, I read the
final, most semantically challenging clause as “and seek to awaken in all things that are a
9

Norton, p. 74, note 2.
Norton, p. 504, note 3.
11
Ibid., p. 503.
10

7

community with what we experience within ourselves.” Reading “are” as a full stop
aligns with the thematic progression of the sentence from union to separation to union.
The object love, “it,” unites with the subject love, “ourselves.” According to Shelley’s
definition, love is only possible after a temporal turn toward the negative, “when we
find…the chasm of an insufficient void.” At its bottom, so to speak, the powerful and
repeated image in Shelley’s work stands for unobtainable desire. It is this impossible
desire that both causes a divisive self and gives birth to a self-affirming one.
The desire to reach the “invisible and unattainable point to which Love tends”
involves a poetics more complicated than discovering an “antitype” for the “ideal
prototype” that exists within the self-aware individual “in” love (Norton, 504). Figures in
Shelley’s poetry accomplish this frequently through perverse idealizations and dream
hallucinations. But the poetry that describes the false wisdom of a world-unto-the-self
always betrays it as such. As Shelley’s manuscript note attests, words themselves might
inevitably fail, yet the revolutionary power of metaphor, poetry (and for Shelley poetry is
by definition the language of love), or as Cythna remarks, “A subtler language within
language,” succeeds in reflecting and realizing the law of desire (VII.xxxii.4). “We are
born into the world and there is something within us which from the instant that we live
and move thirsts after its likeness,” broods Shelley (Norton, 504; my emphasis).12 But
notice how the “something” is not us, but exists within us “deprived of all that we
12

The line recalls how in Mont Blanc “Power in likeness of the Arve” (16) affected the speaker’s
observation. Further, the principle of love Shelley describes as that which “thirsts after its likeness,” a
primal lack, recalls Plato’s Symposium, specifically Socrates’s exchange with Diotima of Mantineia.
Diotima tells Socrates that Love is a daemon, who “interprets between gods and men, conveying and taking
across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he
is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and
through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all
prophecy and incantation, find their way” (Trans. Benjamin Jowett). “When we find within our own
thoughts a chasm of an insufficient void,” as Shelley says, there is love. Love modulates, mediates and
interprets the essential relationship of self to world. Love suffices the “insufficient void.”
8

condemn or despise” and composed of “everything excellent or lovely that we are
capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man” (Norton, 504). I argue that in
the context of “likeness,” it speaks to the dream of a master language or body of
enchanted words that when spoken do not merely refer to the world but create and sustain
it, signs or symbols that the poet looks through in order to see that which, without them,
never could have existed otherwise.13
We see evidence of speaking a language that enlarges rather than circumscribes
human sympathy in Prometheus Unbound. Shelley’s lyrical epic withstands against and
dispels the curse that begins it. At the beginning of the narrative, Prometheus is a
symbolic figure for divisive self-idolatry, bound to his hate and literally chained to a
mountain. Shelley makes clear, however, that Jupiter is not responsible for Prometheus’s
suffering. The hate that sustains Prometheus’s curse on Jupiter becomes implicated in the
language derived from the principle of the self. Based on a morality of materiality, the
cost-benefit nexus “of which money is the visible incarnation,” Prometheus’s vengeance
affords him a kind of freedom from the world, which now stands in ruins. Three-thousand
years tied to a rock also affords him ample opportunity for “self-anatomy,” Shelley’s way
of describing the process by which we hate and torture ourselves by worshiping the
resentments of the past. When Prometheus revokes his curse, the “chasm of an
insufficient void” appears in the form of the Phantasm of Jupiter and he begins to create a
new world and identity. Prometheus, in other words, unbinds himself and his language;
13

Allen Dunn, remarking on Shelley’s description of the ideal perfection that inhabits each soul, argues that
“Such self-contemplation courts disappointment in the form of narcissistic collapse,” which suggests
whether love is not the idolatrous self mistaken for the creative energies of poetry. “Out of the Veil of
Ignorance: Agency and the Mirror of Disillusionment.” Southern Humanities Review 25.1 (1991): 1-21. A
deep struggle resonates in Shelley’s poetry between productive and pernicious modes of “selfcontemplation,” as Dunn writes. I would argue that it is more rewarding to emphasize the moments when
this struggle erupts instead of the moments when these two modes seem distinct.
9

what follows is a vision of society where “None talked that common, false, cold, hollow
talk / Which makes the heart deny the yes it breaths / Yet question that unmeant
hypocrisy / With such a self-mistrust as has no name” (3.4.149-52). This kind of
language is disengaged from and disastrous for social harmony. Described as “hollow,”
no adequation obtains between word and thing, self and world; it is neither poetic nor
moral.
Shelley ends On Love with a similar image: “So soon as this want or power [the
desire to discover reflected without the image of perfection within] is dead, man becomes
the living sepulchre of himself, and what yet survives is the mere husk of what once he
was.—” (Norton, 504.) The “husk of what once he was” is nicely juxtaposed against the
heart that breathes yes not only by the shadow and substance dichotomy but also the
discord of a “husky” voice over and against the eloquence of a heartfelt “yes.” Driving
the image home, again in Prometheus Unbound, Shelley writes in the preface that “until
the mind can love…reasoned principles of moral conduct are seeds cast upon the
highway of life which the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would
bear the harvest of his happiness” (Norton, 209). This is impassioned rhetoric from
Shelley, who never lightly invokes “reasoned principles of moral conduct.” That these
principles are metaphorized by Shelley into the biblical husks of barren seeds suggests
that the force of their law is helpless against “unconscious” self-idolatry. Until we are
capable of love, the passage suggests, there is no hope for the future. Through poetry,
love, not only can we discover the “chasm of the insufficient void” but we can also
overleap it into the future, moving beyond the oppressive reproach of the past. “The great
secret of morals is love,” Shelley says in the Defence, and the contradictions that inhere

10

within a moral system not grounded in love are exactly those that inhere in a utilitarian
culture that worships the “calculating faculty” (Norton, 517 and 529). As Shelley
conceives them, those very inconsistencies by which “man, having enslaved the elements,
remains himself a slave,” arise from a self-autonomy that denies an affirmative projection
of the larger and intersubjective community from which it draws its breath.
Every contradiction that emerges in Shelley’s poetry is not a dialectical push
toward a future state of harmony. There are moments when Shelley wants simply to
account for and describe those moral evils that prevent progress or the building of a
mutually beneficial community. A great part of Queen Mab is dedicated to this aim of
representing the inadequacies of custom to liberate human potential from past errors. Set
against this litany of historical falsehoods are the later scenes of the poem that depict a
future guided by reason, self-esteem, and brotherly love.14 But by depicting both the past
and present errors of society as well as its future utopian restoration in the powerful
lyrical utterance of the dream vision, Shelley unites, as Ianthe’s soul returns to her body,
natural and moral law into a cohesive design. A similar conflict between the limits of
rational discourse and the potential of imaginative freedom occurs in A Defence of
Poetry. When first discussing how poets were once identified as “world legislators,”
Shelley next insists how poets “behold the future in the present.”15 Thus, as Shelley
articulates the most inclusive conception of poets and poetry, legislators of the world,
built into this declaration is an explicit formulation of law. As legislators, poets enact

14

This is not to say that Queen Mab does not move dialectically toward its moment of spiritual restoration
because I think that it does; yet the terms of its progression have more to do with how the past and future
are represented in poetic language than with what is described.
15
Norton. p. 513.
11

laws, yet their “thoughts are the germs of the flower and fruit of latest time.”16 In other
words, they enact the very laws that in the future will be broken by other poets.
By creating the political, moral and aesthetic conditions that demand their
presence both to fulfill and change them, poets create the future. Poets order the temporal
appointments that can only be met by other future poets. In this sense poets are the
“mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present” (535).17 Poets,
according to Shelley, do not predict the future so much as they embody the future, just as
the “first acorn, which contained all oaks potentially” (528).18 The dialectic progression
of Shelley’s conception of moral agency, therefore, consists in the paradox of legislating
freedom.19 Absolute freedom for Shelley leads only so far; it leads to a particularly height
and not further, “Pinnacled dim in the intense inane,” the conclusion of the third act of
Prometheus Unbound. A sheer transparent vacancy of neither desire nor satiety, the
inanity Shelley describes requires direction, because it cannot form the basis of a society,
politics, or model of self-representation.20 In Prometheus Unbound the fourth act of the
drama emerges from and satisfies this inadequacy, but in the greater context of Shelley’s
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language as code.” See “Nature’s Silent Eloquence”: Disembodied Organic Language in Shelley’s Queen
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Shelley’s message similar at such an early stage in his career but also his poetic deployment of it.
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I give in Chapter Three a fuller account of the relationship of the final act of Prometheus Unbound to its
whole.
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moral vision the collectivization and inclusiveness of the self is impossible without
legislative action.21
The self-transformation of egotism into altruism occurs by an imaginative act of
love that unites the mutually exclusive yet conflicted ways of thinking between divine
Apollonian seclusion and sublunary Pantheistic brotherhood. As a “going out of our own
nature,” Shelley’s conception of love concedes to the mutual, communal, and whole, the
interests of the individual (517).22 In this way the individual achieves a freedom that is
greater than freedom from law or those forces, natural or social, he cannot control;
namely, freedom from self-idolatry by paradoxically perceiving “within [his] own
thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void” (503).23 The self’s greatest need is a desire for
something and someone not itself, and the hope is that this fulfillment of desire will meet
with a real rather than idealized object, a law enacted poetically from within rather than
imposed from without.
What connects Shelley’s dialectical understanding of human freedom to the
individual is his figure of the circumference surrounding each self. The Romantic ideal
was an individual fully integrated into the world through the imagination.24 Self and
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Donna Richardson convincingly demonstrates Shelley’s dialectic of self-becoming in her reading of
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world would constitute not only authentic reflections of each other but also, during
fleeting states of consciousness, become the same, undifferentiated yet greater than the
sum of their discreteness. The power of lyrical poetry, its use of metaphor, selfprojection, and prosopopoeia, is a defense against the threat of self-dissolution or selfisolation. This was the dream of many Romantic poets, regardless of whether the world in
question was nature itself, cities and monuments, or other individuals. Shelley’s idea of
integration is an idea of self-transformation in which the narrow self becomes an
inclusive self. A more comprehensive circumference around the self allows for wisdom
and virtue, which, by extension, allows for more pleasure and for more interactions with
other people. The virtuous self becomes a community of selves, literally and figuratively,
and love grows stronger. This is the dream and ideal, yet it is also a necessary step in the
journey of self-liberation that culminates in the dissolution of all laws, conventions, and
customs that keep a narrow circumference around the self, which keeps people enmeshed
in what Shelley calls the “dark idolatry of self.”

My critical methodology took its initial point of departure from deconstructionist
readings of Romanticism and Shelley. Shelley’s agitated relationship with the limits of
poetry to make meaning and access truth has made him an ideal poet for deconstruction.
Scholars such as Paul de Man, Stuart Curran, Carol Jacobs, Hugh Roberts and Orrin
Wang have analyzed Shelley’s use of language in diverse and revealing contexts. What
Romantic literature. See Northrop Frye’s study of William Blake, Fearful Symmetry (Beacon P, 1962), in
addition to his Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton UP, 1957). See also Harold Bloom’s Shelley’s Mythmaking
(Yale UP, 1959) in which he applies Martin Buber’s I-It and I-Thou philosophy to Shelley’s mythopoetic
perception of suffering, experience and relation. M. H. Abram’s Natural Supernaturalism (Norton, 1971)
seeks to explore the major Romantic poets concerns with the connections between nature and mind.
Abrams conceives of Romanticism as a radical form of Western humanism the values and forms of which
derive from and often parallel those of Christianity. For an examination of Shelley’s adoption of Christian
scripture see Bryan Shelley’s Shelley and Scripture (Oxford UP, 1994).
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has emerged is greater knowledge of how Shelley is relentlessly preoccupied with, as
Paul de Man puts it, the “madness of words.”25 As Shelley says in a late prose piece, “we
are on that verge where words abandon us, and what wonder if we grow dizzy to look
down that dark abyss—of how little we know.”26 De Man’s conception of Romanticism,
and Shelley’s poetry specifically, as an allegorical struggle between the poet’s quest for
meaning and the positional power of the event of language, still holds true. But this is by
no means the whole story, and I use de Man’s reading practices as a beginning and not as
an end. Geoffrey Hartman, a critic sympathetic, if not devoted, to deconstructionist
principles, concluded that for de Man “Language rather than politics is fate; politics is
part of a counterfeit Great Tradition that arrogates to itself the impositional strength of
performative language.”27 I agree with Hartman’s assessment and also with his view that
de Man’s project is “too absolute.” The ultimate aim of Shelley’s ethical convictions,
human freedom in the fullest sense, cannot be derived from the indeterminacy of
language. Similarly, neither does the indeterminacy of language consign humanity to a
prison-house of rhetorical speech acts. Both the style and effect of Shelley’s poetics are
inextricably bound to his ethical idealisms.
25
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Deconstructive readings of Shelley’s skeptical relationship with language were
built on scholarly attention paid to Shelley’s interest in philosophical skepticism and
idealism. These two broad narratives that drive Shelley’s poetry toward imagining moral
and political freedom can be traced to C. E. Pulos and Earl Wasserman.28 Their work on
how the skeptical and idealist strains in Shelley’s poetry ground his epistemological and
ontological claims about Christianity, materialism, Platonism and the poet’s relation to
poetry, has been immensely influential to contemporary debates on the author. For a long
time Shelley was, rather offhandedly, described as a skeptical idealist because of Pulos
and Wasserman’s reevaluations of Shelley’s work and his philosophical source material.
Pulos examines the majority of Shelley’s prose pieces that outline his intellectual
philosophy, as well influential thinkers like Sir William Drummond and David Hume,
who greatly influenced Shelley’s skepticism.29 Wasserman’s impressive examination of
Shelley’s conception of the One Mind entails close readings of all his major works and
many of his relevant letters and prose treatises. It is the two conceptual methods of
debate, skepticism and idealism, from which emerge my own examination of Shelley’s
dueling narratives of reformism and revolutionism, prediction and prophecy. I see
Shelley’s thinking and writing as both skeptical and idealist. He frequently sets his
idealist notions of the mind, universe, and human destiny beyond a veil of human tears,
awful silence, and unredeemable suffering.
Jerome McGann’s New Historicist project can be understood as an outgrowth of
the kinds of skepticism that engaged both deconstructionists and earlier scholars
28

Pulos, C. E. The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley’s Skepticism. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1954.
Wasserman, Earl R. Shelley: A Critical Reading. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1971.
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Terence Allan Hoagwood’s Skepticism and Ideology (Iowa P, 1988) picks up where Pulos and
Wasserman leave off, and provides an invaluable resource for understanding how Shelley’s skepticism is
more a method for suspending judgement and upending dogma than arriving at conclusive claims either for
poetry or politics.
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committed to revealing Shelley’s source material. Instead of the indeterminacies of either
Shelley’s poetic figures or philosophical influences, McGann is highly suspicious of
scholars’ ideologies. I examine in the first chapter his groundbreaking socio-political
reading of Romanticism The Romantic Ideology (1983), which is both the manifesto of
New Historicism and a revisionist attack on what he claims constitutes a pervasive
romantic ideology blinding many Romantic scholars. He offers his project as a “critical
meditation on the recent history of Romantic scholarship insofar as that history may
provide an example, or perhaps a case study, of how literary criticism, is involved with
ideology, and how it might find the means for achieving a critical distance, however
provisional, from its own ideological investments.”30
I find nothing controversial or incorrect with McGann’s intentions; after all,
achieving critical distance is essential to all effective hermeneutics, particularly in fields
such as religion and literature, where the object of study has often greatly influenced the
perspective and consciousness of the studying scholar. I disagree with McGann about his
claims for poetry generally, and for Shelley’s poetry, specifically. Examining past artistic
productions through a socio-historical framework in an effort to isolate and emphasize
their historical difference from the ideas and attitudes of our own present moment reveals
McGann to be a brilliant and farsighted reader of Romanticism. But to do so because the
very ideas and attitudes of these past artistic productions express “idealized localities,”
indifferent to everyday human suffering, and on the basis that old ideas are reactionary,
30

McGann, Jerome J. The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983. p.
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reveals McGann’s own ideologies. My purpose is to insist that the moral and intellectual
value of some ideas transcend socio-historical frameworks, that some values, and the
realities they support, are trans-historical. We should first evaluate the worth of an idea
by whether it serves the good, not by whether it serves our own ideological commitments
or whether it can be easily integrating into a historical context. My own purpose here is
undoubtedly subject to a historical critique as well, which testifies to the influence of
McGann’s thesis.
McGann’s book set in motion a generation of historicist Romantic scholarship.
James Chandler is one critic who inherited this legacy and whose reading practices and
ideas about Shelley’s historical consciousness inform this dissertation. England in 1819
(Chandler adopts his title from a Shelley Sonnet) attempts to “show how our
undertheorized concept of the ‘historical situation’ can be situated in a history of
Romanticism” (xiv).31 Much of Chandler’s book examines Shelley’s unique role during
the special year 1819 within the special period Romanticism to bring about a new
understanding of how we understand history and ourselves as historical subjects. My
argument for how Shelley tries to recuperate from seeming impossible social conditions a
truly moral individual subject capable of negotiating the regulatory impositions of the
law, was influenced by Chandler’s concept of how terrible conditions, political and
social, become the “source from which the illumination will spring” (30). I also share
Chandler’s commitment to understanding figures such as history and psyche to be both
material and immaterial in Shelley’s poetry, thus allowing the poet to actually impose
change on the world his poem’s respond to and intervene in. In addition, Chandler’s
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reading of Shelley and my own each offer ways in which the potential historical effect of
the poetry on the present is distinctly antinomian.
Although Chandler is a New Historicist, he applies many deconstructionist
principles to his close readings of Shelley’s work, particularly in the shorter lyrics. It is
not surprising then that Orrin Wang, who along with Chandler looms large in this study,
reaches many of the same conclusions, in particular about Shelley’s “Ode to the West
Wind.”32 As I sought to isolate a distinct and consistent notion of historical consciousness
in each of Shelley’s major works, Wang’s insistence on the close relationship between
ideology and history, prophetic utterance and present anxieties, brought me nearer to the
claim I make in Chapter Two that Shelley’s historical consciousness is always seeking to
awaken innumerable and as yet to be known historical contexts; or as Wang concludes, a
history without context. Wang says in his chapter on Shelley’s “Ode” that ultimately the
poem teaches that history is a wager, which is the same lesson I argue Prometheus
Unbound teaches. History as chance, not randomness but possibility, the opening up of
the future because it is, like history, everywhere and nowhere.
Finally, my reading practice and methodological framework owes a great deal of
inspiration both to James Rieger and Hugh Roberts, each Shelleyans who wrote uniquely
brilliant and comprehensive studies on Shelley’s thinking and poetry.33 As it resists
comfortable pigeonholing in most critical movements, Rieger’s meandering and
digressive book takes seriously Shelley’s obscurantism, replete with allusions to various
early Gnostic sects and the creation myths of Christian heresies. Rieger argues that
32
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Shelley’s antinomian devotion to love and poetry is always threatened by his equally
skeptical view of metaphor. What I took to be Rieger’s most compelling and valuable
conclusion was the centrality of the Wandering Jew both to Shelley’s psychology as a
poet who knew he possessed posthumous fame and Shelley’s unresolved anxiety about
whether desire is a life-giving or death-dealing force of the human heart. The figure
negatively inhabits many of the same characteristics as Prometheus, as one who was
unjustly rejected, subjected to inexorable suffering, yet who rebels against all authority as
history unfolds.
Hugh Robert’s Shelley and the Chaos of History (1997) offers a new politics of
poetry through examining Shelley’s works as staging a contest between two modes of
self-representation, what he calls the “representative” and “evolutionary” ideal. These
opposing characters are best dramatized in Shelley’s “Song of Apollo” and “Song of
Pan” (1820). Apollo’s song dramatizes the self-consumed subject, searching after totality
and rational certainty in a world of flux. Pan’s song, in contrast, sings in a voice of
inclusiveness and accepts life’s uncertainties as well as death’s inevitability. Roberts,
through an impressive and detailed account both of Shelley’s poetry and present and past
debates in philosophy, history, and science, finally arrives at his thesis: Shelley’s poetry
and the politics it makes possible is the “power of privation-within-memory, the creative
power of the perception of vacancy” (485). I align Robert’s conclusion with my own, that
Shelley’s revolutionary politics and theory of the self maintains a self-generating cycle of
emergent possibilities for freedom. I suggest that the poetry’s teleological orientation
toward the as yet to come future conforms to a teleological process without being one
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itself. The historical and individual program being realized is the very possibility of
possibility, a future.
Having addressed the major sources of my methodological approach and some of
the central issues of Shelley’s poetry that have preoccupied certain critics with whom I
both align and diverge, I now want to discuss the ways in which this dissertation
distinguishes itself from similar studies of Shelley. First and foremost, my claims for
Shelley’s sense of history are inextricably aligned to my claims for his sense of the self.
The selfish self and the self that seeks fullness in human sympathy and collective destiny
generate tension because they cannot be completely distinguished. History and psyche are
two sides of the same critical coin. If we allegorize one in order to reveal the actual
material conditions of the other, then all we have done is reinforce their interdependence.
This is what happens in Prometheus Unbound. The poem stages an allegory of the human
mind integrated into perfect relation with all other minds. My explicit claim regarding
this is that there are only individuals when we try to answer how Shelley tries to imagine
human freedom; societies, on the other hand, are many individuals working out their
shared and opposing interests. The model of self-becoming that Prometheus sets in
motion is conditioned by the moral takeaway of how far from Promethean humanity
remains; yet while freedom begins with one, it should end with all. Too often in books on
Shelley the individual subject is only discussed as a way to make broader claims for this
or that radical political outcome. If the reverse were true, then we would have a clearer
picture both of Shelley’s unique politics and unique poetry.
This brings me to my second point. Because this study is committed neither to
deconstructionist nor historicist interpretations of Shelley’s poetry, and neither announces
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itself as a formal nor a material examination of his aesthetics and politics, my absorption,
as McGann would say, of different critical movements and their ideological selfrepresentations is both absent and present. It is absent because I have no ideological axe
to grind, whether Marxist, Freudian, feminist, formalist, or deconstructionist; it is present
because I cannot avoid absorbing, in the process of writing a single author study on a
poet for whom I have a great deal of admiration, many of Shelley’s own selfrepresentations. Though my predominant interest is Shelley’s ethics, all modes and forms
of discourse partake in evaluative claims, or they should. I feel announcing this anxiety of
critical distance at the beginning of the dissertation better serves my readers, which I
think addresses a sore need in scholarly publications as a whole.
A third way in which my study distinguishes itself is its emphasis on how the
relationship of past to present functions in Shelley’s work, in addition to our critical
reception and assessment of this relationship. It is not new to say that Shelley is a futureoriented poet or that his work is deeply invested in representing a philosophy of historical
change. I try to call attention to the ways in which Shelley’s poetry is literally speaking to
us, the ways in which, even as scholars, we fail the objects of our critical gaze when we
do not chant aloud “Ode to the West Wind” or do not more urgently ask ourselves what
happens to such inspired poetry when we repeatedly reify it in academic discourse.
Though clearly this is a question for a much larger cultural debate on the purpose of
poetry in life, questions of how better to participate in and realize the struggle of the
work.
Lastly, most studies of Shelley’s revolutionary and utopian politics end with an
explanation and simple assumption of what might come next when Prometheus is
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unbound into the world or Rousseau partakes in the manic dance of The Triumph of Life.
I attempt to offer a practical solution to the individual who is freed from the constraints of
the law with its large codes of fraud and woe, the individual who is as free as the west
wind. How to give shape to the wind? I address this question in my concluding remarks.

In the first chapter, “From ‘Silent Eloquence’ to a ‘Swoon of Joy’”: History and
Futurity in Queen Mab and Laon and Cythna,” I briefly survey the influence of William
Godwin on Shelley’s thinking, examining the ways in which Godwin offered Shelley a
first glimpse of a society free from the limitations of tradition, custom, and convention.
Godwin provided Shelley a picture of human life guided by reason and justice. I discuss
how the radical Enlightenment influenced the design and ideas of Queen Mab, and how
this first major poem of Shelley’s is guided by a necessitarian view of natural and moral
law. Human freedom in this poem requires less effort on the part of the individual than in
Shelley’s next major effort, Laon and Cythna. I argue that Laon and Cythna’s selfreflexive aesthetics make it more attuned to the idolatrous self than Queen Mab’s
referential historicity and representation of successful self-realization. Further, the
relationship of the individual to the collective destiny of humanity is conceived in terms
that comprehend the necessity of a continuously deployed revolutionary politics.
The second chapter, “Lyrical Morality,” makes the case for Shelley’s moral
imperative, that the narrow self must become the inclusive self if the human mind is to be
used for anything more than self-projected phantasies. “Mont Blanc,” I suggest, teaches a
moral lesson in spite of its final uncertain lines. The power made manifest in the
mountain becomes the unacknowledged legislator of the world through Shelley’s
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apostrophic lyrical poetics. This power is applicable to human agency. The large codes of
fraud and woe are only as real as that which binds past to present. I claim the mountain
has the power to sever these bonds. In my examination of “Ode to the West Wind” I
incorporate James Chandler and Orrin Wang’s understanding of Shelley’s historical
consciousness in order to show how Shelleyan love, influenced by his reading of Christ,
consists in the chance of impossible beginnings freed from all context and determinates.
The liberated self is free to the extent that she can call forth an upsurge of her own
becoming from an event of suffering, a season of winter.
“Self and Love in The Cenci and Prometheus Unbound” most directly addresses
the organizing question of this dissertation. In both poems, the “Large codes of fraud and
woe,” Law generally, is incarnated in figures of tyrannical evil. I argue that both Cenci
and Beatrice perform the behaviors and express the attitudes that comprise the “dark
idolatry of self,” the narrow self. They are each afflicted with Satanic rather than
Promethean impulses. I incorporate into my discussion Shelley’s concept of “selfanatomy.” My claim for Prometheus Unbound is two-fold: first, the poem dramatizes the
truly moral individual’s response to injustice through a gesture of forgiveness; and,
secondly, the poem’s singular fourth act parallels historically and universally the
liberated self’s journey to love in the political present.
“As Yet to Come: Beginning Again at the Triumph of Life,” my concluding
chapter, attempts to show Shelley’s anxieties about the reification of thought, how
“thought’s empire over thought” might upend any Enlightenment project or liberated
spirit. At stake in the poem is Shelley’s inheritance of the Enlightenment belief in
progress, in addition to Shelley’s lifelong commitment to love’s unchanging power to
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defeat all threats against the possibility of freedom. I argue that The Triumph of Life,
ironically, is a poem of love, in that it aspires to go outside itself as poetry. Although the
title The Triumph of Life refers to the triumph of law and external legislations for the
human spirit, the triumph of the immanent world, Shelley once again presents the darkest
reality, a descent into hell, as the source for immense moral beauty and knowledge. I
suggest that the fragmented status of the poem, inevitable because of Shelley’s death,
only serves to affirm the teleological dialectic that constitutes the guiding form of moral
freedom. We can never get to the end of the poem because the poem never ends. Moral
freedom begins in suffering the never-ending beginnings of history, the recognition that
the present moment must become an eruptive dance in order to derive a redemptive form
within the unanswerable chaos of the question, what is life.
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CHAPTER ONE
From “Silent Eloquence” to a “Swoon of Joy”: History and Futurity in Queen Mab
and Laon and Cythna
It appears that circumstances make men what they are and that we all contain the germ of
a degree of degradation or of greatness whose connection with our character is
determined by events.
—Shelley, Hellas
To the pure all things are pure.
—Shelley, Laon and Cythna
Critics of Shelley’s Queen Mab;A Philosophical Poem (1813) have frequently
commented on its failures as an integrated work of art that realizes the poet’s ambitious
intent of representing a spiritual and political restoration of society. This opinion is
attributable not only to Shelley’s age at the time of its composition but also to claims that
the poem’s lyrical dream vision and philosophical notes do not quite cohere and the result
is a poorly wrought fusion of Enlightenment doctrine and Romantic posturing.34 In recent
years the question of whether Queen Mab is a success or failure as a poem has become
moot as trends in criticism have opened the poem up to more contemporary interpretive
concerns, but the debate is worth emphasizing because it highlights the most striking
aspect of the poem, its duel structure as lyrical poem and prose treatise. Furthermore,
Queen Mab remains one of Shelley’s most accessible and easy to read poems, despite its
complicated movements and digressions, as well as constituting his first effort at what
was eventually to mark his mature style, the cosmic dream vision that pits the barren past
against a fecund future struggling to overcome the chaotic present. I want to argue that
while Queen Mab does lack the power and unity of Shelley’s later poetic efforts, the
poem first showcases how Shelley brings together two disparate cognitive modes in order
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to dramatize a possible social transformation. The dialectic of reason and imagination,
Enlightenment discourse and High Romantic poetry, comes to occupy a central concern
as well as method for Shelley, as the dilemma of how poetry might “legislate” without
codifying life becomes one of his most troubled aims as an artist.
In Defence of Poetry, Shelley offered an analogy of reason to imagination:
“Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the
shadow to the substance.”35 I claim the same analogy operates for the nine cantos of
poetry in relation to the poem’s end notes. One cannot exist effectively without the other,
yet by themselves they run either toward excess or aimlessness. As I argued in the
Introduction, imaginative poetry is the language of love, and love motivates the expanded
self’s drive toward reconciliation with the external world. What sets Queen Mab’s
dialectical structure apart from Shelley’s later attempts to reconcile different ways of
thinking about the world is the immense presence and pull of how Necessity works in the
poem. The materialist doctrine Shelley espouses throughout the poetry and prose of the
work suggests that speaking “Nature’s silent eloquence” is the desired telos of the
species: “The Universe, / In Nature’s silent eloquence, declares / That all fulfill the works
of love and joy,— / All but the outcast man” (3.196-99). Queen Mab belies the more
intense struggle to come in Shelley’s work between the idolatrous and expanded self
because it takes for granted that love conquers all. The sharp distinction between an
inclusive, healthy notion of individual freedom and one that is based on the delusions of
self-contempt has yet to emerge. Instead, the poem becomes a play of perspective in
which Necessity, the impartial yet beneficent Spirit of Nature, which persists throughout
the whole of Queen Mab, allows for the ideal perspective from which to understand the
35
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past, present and future. Unveiling natural law through the use of reason is the first step
toward aligning the perspective of mind with Sprit of Nature. But this remains inadequate
because the laws of civilization become rigid and “blunted by reiteration” (Defence 533),
the result of the principle of calculation, a too heavy reliance on scientific and
technological ways of controlling nature, as Shelley explains in the Defence of Poetry. I
argue that the poem’s solution to this inadequacy is poetry, imaginative and inspired
creation, through which Ianthe’s vision, a language that “creates anew the universe”
(Defence 533) becomes a rebellious disjunction that threaten the social order of things.
The narrative whole and historical thesis that Shelley imagines in Queen Mab
mirrors the Enlightenment dream of progress in which volition and law achieve synthetic
harmony:
Then, that sweet bondage which is freedom’s self,
And rivets with sensations softest tie
The kindred sympathies of human souls,
Needed no fetters of tyrannic law:
Those delicate and timid impulses
In nature’s primal modesty arose,
And with undoubted confidence disclosed
The growing longings of its dawning love,
Unchecked by dull and selfish chastity,
That virtue of the cheaply virtuous,
Who pride themselves of senselessness and frost. (9.76-86)36
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“That sweet bondage which is freedom’s self” names also Shelley’s utopian paradox of
moral life, when the laws “Poets” legislate liberate the self from its own idolatry. By
articulating the “silent eloquence” of nature’s necessitarian law through the vital
language of poetry, Shelley in Queen Mab adequates to the body of rational
instrumentality a spiritual restoration of history.

Queen Mab is a poem that is shadowed by the radical Enlightenment of the
eighteenth century and whose myriad influences run the gamut from Lucretius and
William Godwin to the French philosophes. In it Shelley reveals his concern with
changing the world for posterity, which will continue to be a characteristic feature of how
he views his relationship and non-relationship to the poetry reading public. In a letter to
his publisher Thomas Hookham dated March, 1813 he writes of Queen Mab, “I am
determined to give it to the world—I shall know at what a low level to scale my future
literary worth & probably how to erase the memory of its deficiencies” (Letters I; 361).
Other than when referring to the various juvenilia composed and published between
1808-1811, Shelley is rarely so modest and at the same time negatively critical of his
poetry, at least not proleptically so. 37 Yet he uncannily judges future generations’ critical
assessment of Queen Mab, their likewise desire not to erase but to dismiss it from the
body of major works as immature. In yet another self-diagnosis of the poem that shows
Shelley’s future hope and present understanding of the reality in which his work is
received, he says in the same letter to Thomas Hookham, “I expect no success.—Let only
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Zasrtozzi, a Romance and St. Irvyne, or The Rosicrucian, the two Gothic romances published in 1810 and
1811 respectively, and Shelley’s first and second books of poetry from 1810, Original Poetry by Victor and
Cazire and Posthumous Fragments of Margaret Nicholson, and The Wandering Jew of the same year, are
all significant for the role their principle figure and theme would play in many different aspects of Shelley’s
life and poetry.
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250 Copies be printed. A small neat Quarto, on fine paper & so as to catch the aristocrats:
They will not read it, but their sons & daughters may” (Letters I; 361). This attempt to
“catch” the aristocracy is mirrored in the way Queen Mab is constructed as both poem
and philosophical essay. Shelley implies that its material glittering will solicit the interest
of a materialistic class of society. The hope is that their reading of the poem will belie its
appearance as a sort of fool’s gold, and “catch” or indict their very covetousness.
Shelley’s wish for an expensive and elite edition of the poem allegorizes the institutional
structures that are the target of its critique, the economic, religious, political, and social
ideologies that the poem diagnoses and tries to cure.
The irony of the poem’s popularity and singular political influence in the decades
following his death has been noted before, notably its identification as the Chartist Bible.
Besides sensational biographical accounts of Shelley’s life and circle, Queen Mab; A
Philosophical Poem with Notes was perhaps the most read of Shelley’s works in the
nineteenth century. In light of the poem’s didactic title, its wide readership contradicts the
early critical reception of his poetry; for example, Matthew Arnold’s famous
identification of Shelley with an ineffectual angel who beats his wings in the void. Queen
Mab is also Shelley’s most teleological work, the one that derives its authority and social
reformism from the doctrine of Necessity, and so his poem most consistently labeled as
Godwinian. As such, contrary to Shelley’s comment about erasing the memory of its
deficiencies, it aims not to erase memory and context in ungrounded negativity but rather
to build on and recuperate the law of change into a total vision of social reality. Further,
the principle of self that Queen Mab displays is never under threat of self-isolation or
self-dissolution. As long as the mind can shift its perspective to that of the natural
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harmony of Necessity, freedom is in a sense guaranteed. Yet any freedom that is
guaranteed comes too easily, as Shelley’s later poetry attests.
Shelley’s first direct reference to Queen Mab is in a letter to Elizabeth Hitchener
on December 11, 1811, in which he writes “I have now my dear friend in contemplation a
Poem. I intend it to be by anticipation a picture of the manners, simplicity and delights of
a perfect state of society; tho still earthly. […] I design to accomplish it and publish.
After t{hat} I shall draw a picture of Heaven” (Letters I; 189). “Tho still earthly” is
Shelley’s way of emphasizing an actual and realizable “perfect state of society,” one that
adheres to the precepts of rational thought and is predicated on the moral precepts
demanded by a necessitarian perspective and commitment to reality. Shelley will draw a
picture of heaven after writing Queen Mab because the society the poem constructs
obviates the drawing of pictures of heaven.38 Earlier in this same letter, Shelley
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When discussing Queen Mab, which contains Shelley’s most vitriolic attack on revealed religion and
Jesus Christ, it is important to note that contrary to both popular and academic understandings of his
religious beliefs, he was not an atheist, not in our modern understanding of the word, at any rate. Gavin
Hopps convincingly demonstrates through an analysis of Shelley’s letters and prose writings on religion
that Shelley is never consistently or wholly atheistic. Hopps contends, “What we can see here, then, is the
poet yearning in spite of himself for something he can’t quite allow himself to believe in, which in turn
won’t allow his disbelief sovereignty either” (“Religion and Ethics,” 129). Numerous letters of Shelley’s
can be quoted which suggest an individual who rather than simply not believing in God does not believe in
any virtuous or beneficent effect resulting from attributing to the name God that which denotes human
ignorance of the cause and origin of life, misery or the universe. As Shelley admits to Elizabeth Hitchener,
“In this sense I acknowledge a God, but merely as a synonime [sic] for the existing power of existence”
(Letters I; 101). Furthermore, close reading of Shelley’s letters and poetry reveal that he professed a faith in
human destiny and consciousness that can best be described as religious, in addition to having its ultimate
source in the religious impulse of humanity. His frequent nihilistic bouts were often directed at the failure
of metaphor or mind to conceive of or penetrate to the truth of things. This is evidence not of a rational
atheist but a spiritual acolyte. If Shelley truly was one who denied all efficacy of supernatural appeal, then
his “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” and “Mont Blanc” (1816) represent two of the most devout atheistic
prayers ever to make a sincere appeal to a supreme and unknowable entity. Gavin Hopps concludes his
argument, “Attempting to separate the ‘evil’ from the ‘cure’ is the underlying, heroic aim of Shelley’s
major prose writings on religion—a project which, however baffled by his own prejudices, cannot
legitimately be described as ‘atheistic’” (131). There is also Edward Trelawney’s anecdote, impossible to
verify, of the occasion when he asked Shelley why he calls himself an atheist. Trelawney claims Shelley
replied, “It is a word of abuse to stop discussion, a painted devil to frighten the foolish, a threat to
intimidate the wise and good. I use it to express my abhorrence of superstition; I took up the word, as a
knight took up a gauntlet, in defiance of injustice. The delusions of Christianity are fatal to genius and
originality: they limit thought” (Recollections of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron, 40). I emphasize and
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breathlessly declares to Elizabeth Hitchener in a tone characteristic of Shelley’s early
letters, his resistance to what he calls “annihilation.” He says, “every day makes me feel
more keenly that our being is eternal—every day brings the conviction how futile how
inadequate are all reasonings to demonstrate it” (Letters I; 201). Queen Mab becomes for
Shelley a demonstration of the eternality of human goodness and perfection, a way to
allegorize through a deified Necessity historical progress as the great narrative of the
species. In all its capaciousness there is no room for either a process of becoming or the
frequent cyclic shatterings of the rules governing society. The Kingdom of God will open
to humanity as soon as Ianthe opens her eyes at the poem’s end.
In one of the poem’s notes on religion, Shelley remarks that miracles,
martyrdoms, and prophecies are universal religious characteristics. He says of miracles
that they constitute an “infraction of nature’s law, by a supernatural cause; by a cause
acting beyond that eternal circle within which all things are included” (Ingpen & Peck,
154; my emphasis). The “eternal circle within which all things are included” is what
Queen Mab represents for Shelley’s development not only as a thinker indebted to the
radical Enlightenment but also as a poet. The individual can be, is, and finally will be,
fully integrated into the larger Absolute because there is no threat of disjunction if there
is nothing outside the circle, if there is no possibility of a radial break in the circle’s
circumference. It is important not to confuse the spatial and temporal metaphors that
might be derived from Shelley’s comment. Queen Mab is not a poem that emanates
insist on disabusing ourselves of Shelley’s “atheism” not only for its inaccuracy but also because by
persisting in believing it we reduce to the simple and singular Shelley’s immensely complex and
unresolved response to the interpenetration of empirical facts and spiritual principles. In denying ourselves
the critical power and value of suspension and, what Shelley names in “On Life” a “vacancy” (Norton 507),
we forget that what Shelley identifies as the delusions of Christianity, or the delusions of any other revealed
religion, are the delusions of the poet also, and are born in and sustained by the imagination. Saying that
Shelley is an atheist is like saying that Blake is a Christian. Clearly both statements meet a relative test of
truth, but clearly both surrender to an uncritical simplicity.
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potential in the sense of its later reconfiguration as Prometheus Unbound (1820); Queen
Mab is not potentiated toward the oak as the acorn is, not a “winged seed” that “lie[s]
cold and low” (“Ode W. Wind” 7), but rather makes up both roots and tree: “The Past,
the Present, & the Future are the grand & comprehensive topics of this poem” (Letters I;
324). Shelley attempts to present an organic and hermeneutical whole in the poem, one
that mirrors the narrative whole of progressive history.
The image of the eternal circle is not indicative, at least not in this poem, of
history as a cyclic repetition of growth and decay, monument and ruin; it is, to the
contrary, indicative of the part never fully separating from the whole, of chaos being an
illusion of human perception, not a cosmic truth derivable from scientific rationalism.
The poem’s primary narrator, the Fairy Mab, relates a tale that formally coheres and
thematically reassures. Significantly, and as a point of direct comparison to Shelley’s
later poetry where the subject is not so easily reconciled to the object, Ahasuerus, the
Wandering Jew, who in different poems Shelley renders as a representative figure of
rebellion, implacable will, poet-revolutionary-errant, and abject outcast (a figure with
whom Shelley personally identifies, in other words), concludes his long speech with the
following words:
Thus have I stood,through a wild waste of years
Struggling with whirlwinds of mad agony,
Yet peaceful, and serene, and self-enshrined,
Mocking my powerless tyrant’s horrible curse
With stubborn and unalterable will,
Even as a giant oak, which heaven’s fierce flame
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Had scathèd in the wilderness, to stand
A monument of fadeless ruin there;
Yet peacefully and movelessly it braves
The midnight conflict of the wintry storm,
As in the sunlight’s calm it spreads
Its worn and withered arms on high
To meet the quiet of a summer’s noon. (Major Works 7.255-266; my
emphasis)
The Wandering Jew speaks from a deceptively impassive and ataraxic
perspective. The landscape Shelley places him into is draped with natural imagery. The
analogy of a fully formed oak tree is characteristic of the acorn seed’s progressive
chronological development and the eternality that is associated with Ahasuerus’s myth.
The resulting picture renders an image of unity rather than the chaotically fragmented
potential of the seed which might or might not grow into an oak tree. The image and the
poem constitute the promised entelechy offered by both. Seven years later in Hellas
(1821), when the Turkish sultan Mahmud hallucinates Ahasuerus in a vision, the
temporal and political implications of Shelley’s identification with the Wandering Jew
will register radically different outcomes. But in Queen Mab Ahasuerus mocks his divine
punishment in a world where things act on one another in conformity to the laws of
Necessity. “History, politics, morals, criticism, all grounds of reasoning, all principles of
science, alike assume the truth of the doctrine of Necessity” (Ingpen & Peck, 144), the
notes to Queen Mab proclaim, and yet there is something too unreasonable and defiant
about Ahasuerus’s struggle with God’s “whirlwind’s of mad agony.” If Ahasuerus’s
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“unalterable will” is eventually to become Promethean, then at this point it has a far way
to go, since the tale he tells of God’s injustice and sadism is identical to Jupiter’s
treatment of Prometheus. Mab dissolves Ahasuerus from the poem before he can forgive,
before he can “unsay his high language.”39 In fact, Ahasuerus seems to have been
bequeathed a historical inheritance absolutely contrary to Shelley’s ideals of
revolutionary liberty. In these his last words of Queen Mab, he identifies with a
“monument of fadeless ruin,” “stands” and weathers a revolutionary storm. In a reversal
of conventional Shelleyan imagery, fire is associated with the tyrant rather than the
emancipatory agent, and the “wilderness” is of Ahasuerus’s own making, of his own
“mocking.”
Shelley is using the figure of the Wandering Jew to indict Christianity. He
therefore must to a substantial degree reproduce and adhere to the well know story, but a
psychomachian conflict emerges between Shelley’s avowed hatred of Christianity and
Ahasuerus’s immensely seductive character as material for great poetry, in addition to the
allure of offering Shelley a poetic doppelgänger. Ahasuerus’s voice takes over the poem
for several hundred lines, and, ironically, is the most convincing story the poem tells.
Canto Seven, in which his story appears, also happens to begin with the most “familiar”
and explosively anti-religious moment of the poem: “I was an infant when my mother
went / To see an atheist burned” (7.1-2). 40 This anecdotal and seemingly slight though
abrupt transition to the poem’s narrative (Canto Six is a grand and sweeping accusation
of the moral evils religion promulgates and Necessity’s subsequent usurpation of them)
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Prometheus Unbound, Norton, 206.
Anthony Howe focuses his attention on Shelley’s familiar style in his essay on Rosalind and Helen
(1817), Julian and Maddalo (1818), and “Letter to Maria Gisborne” (1820). Howe writes about how “The
possibility of reaching an audience—which relies in turn upon a capacity for the familiar—is troublingly
mixed up in the poet’s stymied reaching out to truth” (The Oxford Handbook of Percy Bysshe Shelley, 323).
40
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reveals how the trajectory of the poem’s teleology moves from one fixed moment of
historical perspective to another. Systematic and terrestrial, the poem builds monuments
out of its landscape of ruins. It does so largely through a correspondence between words
and things.
In destroying the name associated with a moral iniquity, the evil itself will be
destroyed. Here is Shelley in “Ode to Liberty” (1820):
O, that the free would stamp the impious name
Of KING into the dust! or write it there,
So that this blot upon the page of fame
Were as a serpent’s path, which the light air
Erases, and the flat sands close behind! (Norton, XV.211-15, 313; my
emphasis)
------------------------------------------------------That the pale name of PRIEST might shrink and dwindle
Into the hell from which it first was hurled,
A scoff of impious pride from fiends impure; (XVI.228-30, 313; my
emphasis)
Of course, in 1820 Shelley’s conception of the correspondence between words and things
has changed considerably from his earlier commitment to the truth revealed by science
and matter, but the urge to remove absolutely and blot from memory the faintest trace of
religion or monarchy is clearly visible in Queen Mab:
Now, to the scene I show, in silence turn,
And read the blood-stained charter of all woe,
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Which nature soon, with recreating hand,
Will blot in mercy from the book of earth. (6.54-57) 41
The “blood-stained charter of all woe,” notwithstanding its double-edged blow against
both religion and the English constitution, does not clear up the political ambiguities that
reside in the poem’s imagery. Ahasuerus is left to stand as an oak tree, assuming a
position of stability in the face of French revolutionary chaos. The representation of
chaos in Queen Mab does not, as it does in Laon and Cythna (1817), which I examine
later, blur and confuse the poem’s telos, because in Queen Mab revolutionary change
does not come about by a radical negative aesthetics of atelic empowerment; it is
achieved through Shelley’s deus ex machina, Necessity.
In the poem’s appended notes devoted to Necessity Shelley writes, “The word
liberty, as applied to mind, is analogous to the word chance, as applied to matter: they
spring from an ignorance of the certainty of the conjunction of antecedents and
consequents” (Ingpen & Peck I; 144). A considerable difference between Shelley’s early
and later poetics is the play and power that the idea “chance” holds. Liberty and chance
in Queen Mab are associated with ignorance, a somewhat startling conjunction when one
considers Liberty’s place in Shelley’s pantheon of watchwords. At this moment in
Shelley’s political system, however, liberty merely needs to be secured into the light from
the darkness of custom, tradition, and the superstitious delusions of religion. The
dialectical struggle that will result in a harmonious and perfect state of society is
conceived structurally in Queen Mab between the imaginative dream and Enlightenment
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In his Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1858) Thomas Jefferson Hogg relates that when at Oxford, Shelley
spoke of language as the study of “words and phrases, of the names of things,” yet he spoke of the
“physical sciences, and especially […] chemistry” as the study of “things themselves” (47).
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discourse of the notes. The liberty of imaginative thought requires the structure and law
of rational inquiry.
Shelley’s doctrine of Necessity teaches there is a fixed and benevolent truth that
lies within and animates the perceivable structure of natural reality. Necessity guarantees
its correspondence to moral reality; the question is only whether we willingly adhere to it:
“The precise character and motives of any man on any occasion being given, the moral
philosopher could predict his actions with as much certainty, as the natural philosopher
could predict the effects of the mixture of any particular chemical substance” (Ingpen &
Peck I, 144). Without the governing system Necessity establishes, “we could not predict
with any certainty that we might not meet as an enemy to-morrow him from whom we
have parted in friendship to-night” (144), Shelley warns. Yet it is the chance that we can
never in the first place know friend from enemy, good from bad, which will begin to
occupy a central place in later poems such as Julian and Maddalo (1818) and The
Triumph of Life (1822).
Within the allegorical technique Queen Mab employs, perfection is already
immanent; it is not imminent, waiting on the horizon; it is not a future hope or chance,
but rather is before our senses, given to us from Mab’s supernatural perspective. As such,
humanity must only “[pursue] its wondrous way”:
Below lay stretched the universe!
There, far as the remotest line
That bounds imagination’s flight,
Countless and unending orbs
In mazy motion intermingled,
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Yet still fulfilled immutably
Eternal nature’s law.
Above, below, around
The circling systems formed
A wilderness of harmony;
Each with undeviating aim,
In eloquent silence, through the depths of space
Pursued its wondrous way. (2.70-82)42
If the beauty that Shelley claims for natural law operated in corresponding measure to our
moral law, then the history of human misery that the poem narrates would cease to
continue. Although Godwin’s Necessity excludes free will, in Queen Mab Shelley’s
version of Necessity gestures toward an ideal morality similar to Kant’s notion of free
conformity to the law. In gratitude for revealing the story of human history, the spirit of
Ianthe concludes, “when the power of imparting joy / Is equal to the will, the human soul
/ Requires no other heaven” (3.11-13). Power and will emerge together in The Triumph of
Life also, yet by 1822 they are no longer coincident, intimating instead radical difference
and irreconcilability: “And much I grieved to think how power and will / In opposition
rule our mortal day […]” (Major Works 228-29).
Both Kenneth Neil Cameron and Art Young have noted unique features of
Shelley’s understanding and use of Necessity that make nearly impossible a
philosophically consistent reading of Queen Mab. The poem, almost in spite of itself,
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A similar perspective is granted to the speaker of Volney’s The Ruins (1790) by the genius who
commands, “if thy heart can comprehend the language of reason, interrogate these ruins! Read the lessons
which they present to thee!” (5). The Ruins is a primary source for Queen Mab in both theme and narrative
structure, and Shelley returns to it when he writes Laon and Cythna.
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belies an emergent idealism. 43 The issue the poem interrogates most consistently,
however, is why custom’s indoctrinations have replaced the true lessons derivable from
and read within nature’s “book.” The poem offers its reader a new and radical reading of
history and society. It presents the view that what has always been considered the natural
law of things is an artificial lie. What has thus far been written in the book of Earth (6.57)
has made positive social progress a utopian dream of the poet. Queen Mab aims at a
declaration of natural literacy. According to Shelley, Nature actually teaches in its own
language the opposite of what history teaches. Truth is not a record of human suffering
and political evils; it is that the material and moral universe compose a narrative of
perfect harmony and equality, where part and whole represent and contain one another.
Reason is the intellectual cipher necessary to decrypt the moral and social perfection that
is written in the stars.
As Mab explains it to Ianthe’s soul, the equivalence between empirical and moral
reality, far from preventing the possibility of change, in effect blesses it as the
legitimating force of progress. Progressive or regressive historical and individual change
is not reasonless and threatening, but the result of “majestic law”:
I tell thee that those viewless beings,
Whose mansion is the smallest particle
43

In The Young Shelley (1951) Cameron notes that Shelley’s theory of Necessity differs from Holbach’s in
that the latter argues the “laws of Necessity are the same as the laws of nature […]. Shelley, however,
departs from this strict materialism in his dualistic conception of Necessity as a spiritual force pervading
matter but not identical with it” (254). Cameron concludes that this shows Shelley’s emergent Platonism
(256). In his second volume on Shelley, Shelley: The Golden Years (1974), Cameron artfully renders
Shelley’s evolved understanding of Necessity: “necessity is like a flowing river, which human power
cannot do away with but can divert, one way or another” (332). Art Young in Shelley and Nonviolence
(1975) maintains, “Early in his career Shelley had believed in the doctrine of Necessity as it was
expounded by William Godwin; the doctrine was one of absolute physical, psychological, and moral
determinism. […] But by the time Shelley wrote Prometheus Unbound his view of Necessity had changed.
He no longer considered man a slave to Necessity, but a being with free will operating in a universe of
Necessarian law. Man’s will is free to make a choice between good and evil, and his act of choice will have
the inevitable consequences” (24-25).
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Of the impassive atmosphere,
Think, feel and live like man;
That their affections and antipathies,
Like his, produce the laws
Ruling their moral state;
And the minutest throb
That through their frame diffuses
The slightest, faintest motion,
Is fixed and indispensable
As the majestic laws
That rule yon rolling orbs. (2.231-243.)
Yet is the “minutest throb” the cause or effect of the immutable Laws governing affection
and antipathy? Are the “Soul of the Universe” (7.190) and the “Spirit of Nature! all—
sufficing Power / Necessity! thou Mother of the world!” (7.197-98) consubstantial with
the objects and subjects they act upon? The answers to these questions might be as simple
and cryptic as Demogorgon’s response to Asia in Prometheus Unbound, when she asks
who made Hell and all the horrors of life that seem like Hell, to which Demogorgon
intones, “He Reigns” (II.iv.29). In Prometheus Unbound the answer is enigmatic (not in
the sense that critics are bewildered by what Shelley means but that Demogorgon speaks
to our inability ever to know who or what, besides ourselves, reigns). In Queen Mab,
however, “He Reigns” would be celebratory in its indictment of God’s injustice. But the
permanent is-ness and immanence that “He Reigns” implies also parallels how Shelley’s
understanding of Necessity obviates certain philosophical questions that arise in the
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poem, questions of whether Shelley subscribes to a more Lucretian atomic or Leibnizian
monadic theory of self and society.
Clearly the coherence and perfection of the universe reveals a monadic wholeness
of undifferentiated continuity and indivisibility where each discrete part partakes of,
represents, and refers to the immense narrative entelechy of the entire system. On the
other hand, Shelley’s debt to Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura is all too evident.44 The
Letter’s excess might be a killing force in Queen Mab, but we have no access to the Spirit
which gives life, a spirit that is, crucially, indifferent to human beings, exacting neither
human servitude nor love:
all that the wide world contains
Are but thy [Spirit of Nature] passive instruments, and thou
Regard’st them all with an impartial eye,
Whose joy or pain thy nature cannot feel,
Because thou hast not human sense,
Because thou art not human mind. (2.214-19)
As Kenneth Neil Cameron helpfully reminds us, Shelley agreed with Godwin that the
“question of materialism, idealism, or dualism is irrelevant to the workings of Necessity.
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Lucretius has recently become the classical author du jour in several areas of literary studies, notably in
the long eighteenth century. He was more read in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for his
humanism than his atomic theory, however. For Shelley, Lucretius offered both an epistemological and
aesthetic view of reality that at times corresponded to his own commitment to chaos, or dissolution, as the
generating force of cosmic harmony. Several critics have written on Lucretian reverberations in Shelley’s
work. Notably Paul Turner in “Shelley and Lucretius.” Review of English Studies 10.39 (1959): 269-82.
Hugh Roberts writes, “The Lucretian clinamen […] is a point of entry for death, as loss of information, into
a system, and to that extent an assault on memory, not its unrecognized continuation. But at the same time,
its most interesting and original properties depend upon its relationship to the constant creation and
deformation of reiterative circles” (Shelley and the Chaos of History, 259). Queen Mab is not consumed by
the clinamen as Laon and Cythna is, and Lucretius’s atomic theory provides Shelley in this early poem
with a way to imbue Necessity with a flexibility and finesse, a material throbbing that mirrors conscious
being.
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The Laws of Necessity operate no matter in what medium one conceives of them as
existing” (The Young Shelley, 256). Essentially, everything is in place for human progress
to achieve its utopian destiny. The stars are aligned, but human history, and the
allegories, myths, and stories it employs to construct its ideologies, which establish and
maintain what Shelley considers to be the evil par excellence of society—custom—are
oppressive lies that keep our eyes shut. Shelley therefore tells another story to the society
immured in bad ones, an allegory of his own making: the allegorical dream-vision Mab
grants to Ianthe.45 A sort of unconscious intuition of the future’s moral condition,
therefore, affects their perspective and personality in the present. The situation is the
same for Shelley’s poetic representation of the potential for mass moral regeneration in
1813 in relation to 1820, when he writes Prometheus Unbound. And this difference
hinges on perspective. All Ianthe needs to do is open her eyes at the end of the poem. She
will thus carry the knowledge of the dream into the waking reality of the future.
A shift in how humanity perceives itself in relation to its suffering and
degradation is the panacea for hell, yet Shelley in Queen Mab does not begin to
interrogate and doubt the question of perspective itself, the question of whether the
individual subject can ever be in stable coincidence not only with the objective world but
also with the narrative of history. These are questions of reflexivity, which end up
consuming the Wandering Jew of Hellas. For the most part, however, Queen Mab is a
poem more referential than reflexive. Its referentiality is what makes it an ideal text for
New Historicism, or the critical and cultural comfort derived from buttressing a causal
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The structure and form are not wholly original, as Shelley borrows from Robert Southey, Sir William
Jones, and Volney, among others (Cameron, The Young Shelley, 244).
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relationship between context and text against the transcendent claims of literature, the
recuperation of atelic cultural forces through their unmasking of ideology.
Jerome McGann in his groundbreaking socio-historical reading of Romanticism,
The Romantic Ideology (1983), announces his project as a “critical meditation on the
recent history of Romantic scholarship insofar as that history may provide an example, or
perhaps a case study, of how literary criticism, is involved with ideology, and how it
might find the means for achieving a critical distance, however provisional, from its own
ideological investments” (ix). McGann’s desire for critical distance—and distance,
separation, perspective (but the correct perspective, of course) is the goal of most
professed critiques—ends up a mystified and ideological desire to flee from ideology,
ironically to flee from (one’s own) inheritance of history.46
I take no evaluative position on the positive or negative consequences of this
desire to flee from the supposedly ideological forces that produce it, since each individual
and culture simultaneously yearns for and shrinks from the doubleness of memory and
history, the beauty and terror of nostalgia and escape. Yet what McGann’s argument
shows literary critics, both those who are sympathetic and opposed to it, is just how
ideological ideology is, how near impossible it is to avoid the illusion of substituting one
form for another when trying to demystify false consciousness. Of course, McGann is not
unaware of this trap: “however provisional,” he cautions in the quote above. Curiously, or
perhaps not so in light of Shelley’s uncanny identification and deconstruction of ideology
(perhaps Shelley has anticipated too acutely his argument, “staining its white
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In this respect, the copious notes appended to the end of Queen Mab announce Shelley’s critical intent
literally, and the third and final epigraph to introduce the poem announces it figuratively, Archimedes’s
proclamation of a perfect perspective, “Give me a place to stand, and I will move the Earth.”
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radiance”47), McGann’s chapter on Shelley amounts only to six pages, considerably less
than that if one accounts for lengthy quotations of Shelley’s poetry. 48 Less curious is that
this chapter contains in my judgment McGann’s most explicitly ideological claim.
Unsurprisingly it refers not to Romanticism in particular but poetry in general, for
poetry’s power to extract and carry meaning independent of its “history” is what many
historicists projects argue against.49 McGann claims: “Poetry’s first obligation is to reveal
the contradictory forces which human beings at once generate and live through, and its
second is to provide the reader, both contemporary and future alike, with the basis for a
sympathetic and critical assessment of those forces” (121).50 Ironically, McGann offers
us poetry’s purpose immediately after quoting thirty lines of a famous passage from
47

Adonais (1821), 52.4.
A chapter that adheres to the critical consensus of Shelley’s futurity, which is evidence by the title,
“Shelley’s Poetry: The Judgment of the Future” (118).
49
I would be naively stepping into the role of the “priests and clerics of Romanticism” (Romantic Ideology
1) if I failed to admit this claim as powerfully shadowed by an ideology of its own. I do not think it is born
in ideology, however. McGann’s categorical denial of it proves my point. If his statement, “This idea that
poetry, or even consciousness, can set one free of the ruins of history and culture is the grand illusion of
every Romantic poet” (137), is false, then the entire historicist project, in addition to the majority of the
prevailing interpretive models and academic critical consensuses about art generally, collapse and become
contributors to and representations of the “ruins of history and culture.” The stakes are usually highest
when the claims of poetry are reduced by critics to their lowest. Therefore, rather than identifying ideology
and trying to effect its removal from critical consciousness, rather than fretting that “Today the scholarship
and interpretation of Romantic works [might sometimes be] dominated by an uncritical absorption in
Romanticism’s own self-representations” (137), perhaps a more pressing and productive concern for
academic readers of Romantic literature in the 21st century should be determining whether these very selfrepresentations of Romanticism are in themselves good or bad, emancipatory truths or imprisoning lies. Do
not some ideologies, some prejudices, some past claims emanate moral truths greater than the lies which
might from time to time sponsor them?
50
This is also about as far as one can get from a post-modern definition of poetry. It is absolutist in its
inherent interdictions, and McGann offers a very utilitarian script for poetry to follow with its emphasis on
referentiality and accessibility. The not so implicit demand that poetry must serve history, provide the
present and future with “CliffsNotes” somehow that are sympathetic to the historical future’s way of
understanding life’s contradictions, while also being representative of specifically human “adversative
conditions,” are all stipulations that echo in form if not content the obligations and requirements that the
state often exacts—a social contract emerges, in other words, between text and critic. The idea that art
ought to carry with it responsibilities to what is socially good is not new, and Shelley was often strongly
committed to it. I mention it here because it seems consistent with Historicism’s treatment of the text as a
product that is inherently limited and determined by time and place, yet at the same time fully integrated
into that specific temporal-spatial environment. Hugh Roberts critiques this interpreted model in Shelley
and the Chaos of History (1997). He concludes, “To make the state available to us, hermeneutically, as an
organic, aesthetic object, of which the parts consciously embody the whole, is the anti-utopian utopia
secretly or openly promised by all the historicisms of the last century” (28).
48
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Prometheus Unbound, which begins “And behold, thrones were kingless, and men
walked […]” (III.iv.131), a passage often equated with Shelley’s, at this point in his
career, residual, Godwinianism.51 In other words, this specific poetry is too utopian and
too future-oriented for McGann, who says it is “not an instance of Shelley’s greatest
poetry” (120). We learn the problem is that unlike the last few stanzas of Shelley’s
Adonais (1821), verses McGann designates great, Shelley’s promethean lines forget the
present; Adonais, in contrast, reveals that Shelley’s “implacable futurism is a function of
his present attachment—indeed is a displaced reflection of his immediate (frustrated)
‘hopes’” (122). The verses from Prometheus Unbound lack the “adversative conditions”
(123; my emphasis) necessary to fully appreciate and, I assume, try and combat, if not
one day resolve, the contradictions of human existence. McGann says, “what moves us in
Shelley’s poetry is his devotion to the realities of the human world he knows” (123; my
emphasis).
For the most part, I agree with McGann’s interpretive model. Maintaining a
historical critical distance is essential when reading a poet like Shelley, whose historical
consciousness drives much of his subject matter. At the same time, however, McGann’s
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Yeats remembers in his essay The Philosophy of Shelley’s Poetry (1900), “I went to a learned scholar to
ask about its [Prometheus Unbound] deep meanings, which I felt more than understood, and his telling me
that it was Godwin’s Political Justice put into rhyme, and that Shelley was a crude revolutionist, and
believed that the overturning of kings and priests would regenerate mankind” (53-54). McGann quotes the
poem’s most crudely Godwinian passage, but he is wrong I think to determine that the passage does not
speak to the present world of human suffering, that it is too removed from politics. First, he cites out of the
contextual unity of the poem as a whole a passage that is about transcending context, a move seemingly
contrary to the reading practices of historicism; second, and more significantly, he fails to see the positive
tyranny that the litany of negative images and adjectives conceals and directly speaks to. This is to say,
“thrones were kingless […], the loathsome mask has fallen, the man remains / Sceptreless, free,
uncircumscribed, but man / Equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless” precisely because Shelley has spent
the entirety of the poem committed to the dire effects and frustrations of kings, ideology, slavery,
circumscription, class systems, tribalism, and nation states. In the same year as McGann’s study, Timothy
Webb argues in “The Unascended Heaven: Negatives in Prometheus Unbound” (1983), “Shelley attempts
to realize the potential of the tale untold” (711). The untold tale and, as McGann wants to emphasize, “the
world which Shelley knows” are sharply different methodological uses of poetry.
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now commonplace historicist argument that Romantic self-representations—the power
attributed to imagination, for instance—are illusory evasions of history and politics,
frequently seems to be absorbed uncritically, so as to constitute itself a historicist selfrepresentation. Furthermore, where he is careful on several occasions to caution against
worshiping the Romantic ideology, McGann uses religious terms such as devotion in
order to divert the follower of his argument to the proper icon of religious enthusiasm, the
“Idea of a fully human world” (122).52 No doubt McGann is choosing his words
strategically here, perhaps trying to soften the hermeneutic transition from text to context
as the privileged model. For those uninitiated in reading the text as product rather than
prayer, prophecy, profession or protestation, McGann’s diction might undermine the
exorcism he wishes to perform.
I mention McGann and historicism in the context of Queen Mab because its form
and content suggest much more explicitly than poems like “England 1819” or The Mask
of Anarchy (1819) that what Forest Pyle calls the “ideology of imagination” propels us
toward history and politics, not away from them. Amid the fantastical dream of its
hallucinatory allegory, the utopianism of Queen Mab is nothing other than the
consequence of taking history and politics seriously, of it being too much with Shelley. 53
A rational Utopia grounded to reason by the law of Necessity only emerges in a visionary
52

I imagine the idea and chance that the best of ourselves and humanity might not be of ourselves and
humanity is not one that would ever occur to McGann. Its pursuit and representation, therefore, would
constitute for him an evasion of immediate human issues, problems, and adversities.
53
Pyle argues in the Ideology of Imagination (1995) the “demystifying and liberating aspect of Shelley’s
notion of the imagination is pervasive and compelling: one can in fact regard his negotiations between
idealism and skepticism as the difficult forging of a political aesthetic for which the available secular and
philosophical vocabularies are judge to be inadequate” (96). Pyle’s claim is relevant to Shelley’s strategy in
Queen Mab, where idealism and skepticism create a distortion of perspective between the poetry and the
notes, in addition to the voices of the poem, Mab’s, Ahasuerus’s, and the anonymous narrator. Pyle goes on
to argue that Shelley “breaks” from his notion of imagination in The Triumph of Life, that he becomes more
interested in its limits and the effects of a poetry that tries to incorporate an aesthetic representation of
acknowledging not only the margins of imaginative territories of consciousness but an imagination without
margins.
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poem. The world Queen Mab imagines must lend itself to the otherness it desires through
a rewriting of the history that gives birth to its dream. Thus, Shelley is both something of
a historian and historicist in this early attempt at conquering history. What is so
fascinating is the reflexive pull of aesthetics as the poem’s narrative moves along the
tracks of its allegory, and the light at the end of the tunnel is not utopia, but paraphrasing
Robert Lowell, the train coming toward us.
James Chandler brilliantly spots the centrifugal and centripetal tensions that push
and pull Shelley away from history. Even though he is speaking primarily of the poetry
composed in and around 1819, the historicism he describes is relevant to both Queen
Mab and Laon and Cythna:
His historicism is the most self-conscious and the most “unwilling,” and it
is precisely in his awareness of its unwillingness that he most recognizes it
as the product of a historicist epoch. It is not his own spirit, as he might
have put it, but the spirit of the age-of-the-spirit-of-the-age. Shelley’s
work in 1819 provokes historical awareness of the condition of being
historically aware. Shelley’s mode of historicist representation and his
concept of the historically representative are thus alike “mysterious,” in a
strict sense […]. (England in 1819, 489-90)54
Another way to concisely emphasize Chandler’s distinctive analysis of Shelley’s
historical consciousness is to say that reflexivity, self-reflexivity, is just as central to
Shelley’s historical as aesthetic mode. Reflexivity is a turning, after all, toward the past,
future, or toward one’s mind and memory in the much maligned and misunderstood
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Incidentally, Hugh Roberts notes that the “spirit of the age” was a favorite phrase of Shelley’s and that he
might have coined its English usage (Shelley and the Chaos of History, 125).
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Romantic inward turn; as such, this turning ill-uminates the future, becoming the
imaginative perspective that facilitates the reflection in “mirrors of the gigantic shadows
which futurity casts upon the present.”55 I hyphenate illuminate in order to show the
paradoxical darkness and moral ill that any process of illumination reveals.56 The future
casts shadows on the present, which is to say it casts a spell. It is not a distant loadstar
guiding the present toward the end of history or utopia. The future, as imaged in the
Defence of Poetry, reveals to the present its utter absence of light, enlightens its potential
through negation, a process repeated so often in Shelly. As Shelley will say in On Life, it
creates a “vacancy.” I will return to this idea in a later chapter, but its relevance to Queen
Mab depends upon its structural absence in the poem, that the vacancy partly emerges but
the progressive continuum of positive and absolute enlightenment prevails. It emerges
since The Fairy Mab is also the Queen of spells, and the power of the poem’s vision is its
visionary rereading of history, not the polemical prose critique the notes constitute,
however original the welding of the two are.
The necessary adjustment of visionary revisionism on which perfectibility
depends is directly related to Ahasuerus’s rewriting of history, which is a rewriting of
myth. As a result of the vision of nature and the past Mab reveals for Ianthe’s spirit, she
feels rather than logically arrives at (a response the reader of the poem is intended to
mimic) the altered and properly historiographic corrective lenses:
The Spirit,
In ecstasy of admiration, felt
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Defence of Poetry, Norton, 535.
“So fleet, so faint, so fair, / The Powers of earth and air, / Fled from the folding star of Bethlehem; /
Apollo, Pan, and Love / And even Olympian Jove / Grew weak, for killing Truth had glared on them;”
(Norton, Hellas (1821), 229-234, 439; my emphasis).
56
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All knowledge of the past revived; the events
Of old and wondrous times,
Which dim tradition interruptedly
Teaches the credulous vulgar
Were unfolded in just perspective to the view;
Yet dim from their infinitude.
The Spirit seemed to stand
High on an isolated pinnacle;
The flood of ages combating below
The depth of the unbounded universe
Above, and all around
Nature’s unchanging harmony. (2.244-57)57
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“All knowledge of the past revived” uncannily anticipates Keats’s Hyperion fragment, where Apollo is
born into death and apotheosis. The relevant lines begin with Apollo reading the face of Mnemosyne, who
is as silent as the “silent eloquence” of Shelley’s Spirit of Nature, yet in which Apollo, like Ianthe, reads
and learns a sublime lesson: “Mute! yet I can read / A wondrous lesson in thy silent face; / Knowledge
enormous makes a God of me, / Names deeds, gray legends, dire events, rebellions / Majesties, sovran
voices, agonies, / Creations and destroyings, all at once / Pour into the wide hollows of my brain, / And
deify me, as if some blithe wine / Or bright elixir peerless I had drunk, / And so become immortal”
(Norton, III.111-20). Apollo’s experience is as fecund and excessive as Ianthe’s, and the image evokes the
mind downloading infinite and crystal clear history, narrative, and myth. There is another interesting
parallel that thematically joins each passage. Mab enchants Ianthe with the revival of “true” history and
knowledge, untainted by “dim tradition” or custom, since she has the enchantresses’s power to cast spells.
Likewise, Apollo is left spellbound, drunk with a magic “elixir.” “High on an isolated pinnacle,” Ianthe
“dies into life” (Hyperion III.130) with Apollo, but more literally, since a sleeping and enslaved society
will drink from her elixir, charming it to wakefulness with the spell of just perspective, history and
knowledge; Apollo dies into the life of the mind, Ianthe into the mind of life. I will return to this notion of
“spelling” and “enchantment” in a later chapter. In yet another anticipation, in the case of Shelley’s own
work, The Triumph of Life, which has more in common with Queen Mab than many critics acknowledge,
the last four lines of the passage quoted above in the text, specifically, “[…] combating below / […]
unbounded universe / Above, and all around / Nature’s […]” foretell the beginning of the 1822 vision:
“[…] before me fled / The night: behind me rose the day; the Deep / Was at my feet, and Heaven above my
head / When a strange trance over my fancy grew / Which was not slumber […] (Norton, 26-30). Crucially,
the spatial orientations in the lines from the Triumph possess a depth and temporal dimension absent from
the tripartite positioning of Queen Mab’s above, below, and all round. In Queen Mab, Ianthe’s relative
position in space is given after the new and sublime perspective is granted; in the Triumph, however, the
unique spatiotemporal orientation seems to initiate the trance-like vision, as if historical and spatiotemporal
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Shelley puns “just perspective” in order to emphasize both the justice derived from the
moral perspective and the simplicity and always-already immanence of the proper way of
looking at things; “just,” as in only, let Nature and its unchanging harmony be your guide,
or “just,” as in it is only Nature that is your guide, the visible manifestation of which is
led forth by an invisible power; so visible renewal and regeneration will follow an altered
optics. All three epigraphs come into play at this point also: Voltaire’s “Crush the demon
[Christianity],” Lucretius’s, “[…] First, I teach of great matters, and [secondly] I free
men’s minds from the crippling bonds of superstition,” and Archimedes’s, “Give me
somewhere to stand, and I will move the earth” (Major Works, 10). As “All knowledge of
the past [revives],” this new history, which is also a prophetic luring of humanity into the
hypostatization of a new collective mind, dissolves the false pedagogy of “dim tradition”
and custom, along with, necessarily, Christianity and its hydra-headed superstitions.
As an explicit scene of instruction, this historical conversion experience calls attention to
both the cognitive subject and object of cognition, yet it seems to emphasize the former,
since the superstitions of Christianity, which must be crushed, are also its most poetic
myths. The mind is capable of generating and believing each simultaneously, a problem
Shelley solves through Ahasuerus, as he rewrites the essence of the Christian narrative in
a ventriloquism of the voice of God, whom Shelley in both his works and letters is fond
of pairing with the poet: “It justifies that bold and true word of Tasso—Non merita nome
di creatore, se non Iddio ed il Poeta.”58 Shelley was deeply absorbed in and at times
seems to have employed mythology almost unconsciously in his poetry. He understood
context knock unconscious the poet-speaker as he tries to flee into an aesthetics but, as though in
quicksand, further sinks into ideology.
58
Defence of Poetry, Norton, 533. “None deserves the name of Creator except God and the Poet.” Norton
notes, “quoted in Pierantonio Serassi’s Italian Life of Torquato Tasso (1785).” Of course, the spirit in which
Tasso refers to God and the spirit in which Shelley refers to God in Queen Mab reside together only in the
letter, so to speak.
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its power as allegory, belief system, and ethical criterion. He used it as a source for
poetry in the same way Keats did, as an allegory for what the poet, poetry, and the past
mean for the present, a method of generating new and re-mythologizing old myths to
revitalize the present. Prometheus Unbound is the most significant example, but The
Witch of Atlas (1820), Adonais, and The Triumph of Life are each laden with mythical
topoi. The list goes on, of course. It is no coincidence that Harold Bloom entitled his first
scholarly work Shelley’s Mythmaking (1959).
In A History of Gnosticism (1990) Giovanni Filoramo identifies the legitimizing
power of mythos over and against logos, the philosophical dispute between poetic
narrative and intellectual reason. What Filoramo argues has strong resonances to Queen
Mab’s representation of Ianthe’s perspectival awakening quoted above. 59 It seems almost
that, through a trick of reason, the very logos of history will reawaken, by means of an
unrealizable, utopian nostalgia, the ghosts of an irrecoverable past, to the point where ‘the
reality of myth remains and works within the very core of those narratives that are
presented as explicitly historical.’60 It is a paradoxical process of emptying, by means of
the logos, a mythical shell whose substance is at the same time continually taken up,
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The many ruins of history that Ianthe passes over and bears witness to in Queen Mab will not remain
remains, remnants, and fragments. Mab, the interpreting angel of the poem, makes whole what has been
smashed through the allegorical dream vision of the quest; Shelley, more directly, tries to do the same
through an appeal to the intellect in the philosophical end notes. Shelley’s intention in Queen Mab is to
present the reader with a self-generating whole, the telic structure and trajectory of which constitute and
arrive at Enlightenment. Jessica Smith’s argument in “The Dialogic Landscape of Shelley’s Queen Mab”
(1998) offers compelling evidence in support of reading both the poem and its competing voices as ruins,
which, contrary to my own emphasis, are never recuperated. She contends, “Queen Mab’s portrayal of the
discursive metamorphoses arising through the construction of one discourse from the fragmentary
appropriation of another enacts the production and reproduction of social attitudes (radical, conservative,
tyrannical, or otherwise) […]. Each speaker, however, demonstrates her/his unawareness of these verbal
dynamics, and therefore unwittingly implicates her or himself in contrary ideological stances” (141). I
differ only in saying that Shelley’s notes of (more than to) the poem act as the transparent ideological
stance each voice must finally speak from. The critical act of the notes is a recuperative strategy to
monumentalize the unwitting and unaware voices of ruin.
60
Quotation from Mito e storia nel pensiero greco, G. F. Gianotti, ed. Turin: 1976, 183ff.
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reread and reconstructed, as one sees in the fifth-century tragedians, who project upon
them the preoccupations and problems of contemporary society.61 In Queen Mab reason
is presented not as a useful trick, either desultory or compensatory for the failures of
superstition, but rather as the raison d’être for Being, the method of access to material
and moral laws.
In July of 1812, Shelley wrote to Godwin, “Reason (if I may be permitted to
personify it) is as much your superior, as you are mine. An hour & a thousand years are
equally incommensurate with eternity” (Letters I; 316). If in Shelley’s early metaphysics
reason inexorably paves the path toward uniform truth, in his poetry he still must use the
trick of allegorical vision to animate a past deadened by tradition, “reawaken […] the
ghosts of an irrevocable past,” as Ianthe “[feels] / All knowledge of the past [revive].”
Filoramo quotes G. F. Giovanni’s Myth and History in Greek Thought in order to
emphasize that even in “narratives that are presented as explicitly historical,” myth
locates itself at the “core” and makes up the “shell.” In one sense all history is myth,
myth untranslated by logos into history. Queen Mab does not test this theory but confirms
it. Shelley takes as his target the “historical” traditions he considers mythical, outright
61

Shelley’s “Gnosticism” is a fertile ground for study which, though much cultivated, seems only to
become richer as more is written about the author’s creative psychology, work and influences. I do not
mean Gnosticism only as the set of principles, beliefs and myths of its various accounts and texts
attributable to its diverse forms and schools in the second and third century, but also in the more modern
and comprehensive sense as a synonym for a kind of immediate intuition or extension of consciousness, the
desire for which originates in the anxieties, hopes and rebellions of a mind that knows it does not know or
knows poorly, despite ever-increasing knowledge across the ages of history and individuals—the dream not
of Prometheus Unbound, but the mind’s Promethean dream to be unbound. In fact, in the early and
unfinished narrative The Assassins (1814), Shelley equates the views of a group of Ismaili Shiite Muslims
with Christian Gnostics (Shelley and Scripture, Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, 1). Bryan Shelley explains,
“behind the complex systems of the Gnostics lay a sensibility of estrangement, a fundamental disposition to
regard the world and its established creeds as hostile to the man of enlightenment. It is in this sense that a
‘Gnostic’ Shelley may be discerned. And it is this sense of alienation from society and its orthodoxy which
informs both his idealization of Gnostic sectarian experience and his impulse to reinterpret scripture” (3).
Gnostic motifs are present everywhere in Shelley’s work, from the idea of a yearning for and recollection
of one’s celestial or spiritual home set against the misbegotten and corrupt corporeal world, to the emphasis
on an androgynous generative vitality and the revelation of spirit to take place in unequivocal image
(Filoramo 57-59).
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distortions of nature’s narrative, and reinscribes Queen Mab as a myth that logos
translates into future history. Filoramo himself cannot help but employ mythical language
in describing the relationship of mythos to logos. The “mythical shell whose substance” is
emptied out by logos to be “continually taken up, reread and reconstructed” evokes
archetypal perfection, a plenitude that in the process of being poured forth into existence
is divided, separated, ironized; it evokes a fall, in other words, in which the return to
oneness requires an obverse process of “rereading and reconstruction,” the power of a
revealer and intercessor.
Ahasuerus becomes Shelley’s revelator, a sort of antichrist who translates myth
back into history, opens the eyes of the “credulous vulgar” to the rot of custom’s
conspiracy. He both throws his voice high up into heaven and lilts it low into hell, nearer
the contemporary pulse of the present. He says:
From an eternity of idleness
I, God, awoke; in seven days’ toil made earth
From nothing; rested, and created man;
I placed him in a paradise, and there
Planted the tree of evil, so that he
Might eat and perish, and my soul procure
Wherewith to sate its malice, and to turn,
Even like a heartless conqueror of the earth,
All misery to my fame.
------------------------------------------------------Yet ever burning flame and ceaseless woe
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Shall be the doom of their [race of men] souls,
With every soul on this ungrateful earth,
Virtuous or vicious, weak or strong,even all
Shall perish, to fulfill the blind revenge
(Which you, to men, call justice) of their God. (Major Works 7.106-14;
121-26)
This version of God, a sadistic patriarchal tyrant full of self-contempt, lust and hate—
each attribute or “principle of self” (Defence) the reverse of those Shelleyan moral and
poetic precepts which are intended to nullify and transform them—reappears consistently
in Shelley’s work, notably as Othman in Laon and Cythna, Count Cenci in The Cenci
(1820) and Jupiter in Prometheus Unbound. Ahasuerus’s mockery of God is now
doubled, once the Son and now the Father. Shelley’s marks a break in the continuum of
custom by enunciating the origin of society’s self-given oppressions as the absurdity of
their credulity; people have believed and have been taught the wrong story. Bryan
Shelley’s comment on Ahasuerus’s speech in Shelley and Scripture (1993) explains how
thinkers of the radical enlightenment abhorred certain tenets of Christian history: “The
doctrine of election [was] the bane of the philosophes. In a universe governed by
universal necessity, the idea of a chosen people can stand only for bigotry […]. The
Phenomenon of the chosen few, with its corollary of the unchosen many, violated the
Enlightenment spirit of universalism and toleration […]” (45). Underlying their
protestations of what they generally considered Christianity to be, namely a reflection of
and tool for the coercions of the political state, was a deeper anxiety that struck at the root
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of how radical Enlightenment thinkers were beginning to perceive the operations of the
cosmos.
The history of Christianity that the Bible relates is purposive in the same way as
the utopian hope of Enlightenment progress, but many of its figures, images, events and
laws seem beyond the pale of scientific and moral reason; there is no necessary
justification for their existence and occurrence, besides the arbitrary whims of a maniacal
and vengeful deity, according to Enlightenment thinkers. Moral law can of course be
deduced from the laws and teachings of the Old and New Testament, but it is much more
difficult to derive them as inductions. In an epoch where science begins to adopt an
emancipatory role for humanity, believing in the mysteries of religion without being able
to put them to material or moral service is not only no longer enough but too much—
Q.E.D.62 The Necessity of atheism becomes the only chance for progress. Shelley’s views
change over time, of course, and he will come to rely much less explicitly on scientific
rationalism as a way to both recuperate political injustice and expand the discursive limits
of his poetry, but in 1813 Reason remains sacred. As I suggested earlier, Ahasuerus’s
speech in Hellas reveals Shelley’s distance from a view of the world that emphasizes
scientific rationalism and an entailment between phenomenology and cognition. What
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Shelley ends his 1811 essay, The Necessity of Atheism, which was co-authored by Thomas Jefferson
Hogg, “Every reflecting mind must allow that there is no proof of the existence of a deity.Q.E.D.”
(Ingpen & Peck V; 209). “Q.E.D.” is of course Latin for “which was to be demonstrated.” Kenneth Neil
Cameron explains that the possibilities of science attracted Shelley for two reasons: “He believed that it
afforded a way to philosophic truth. The study of languages, he once commented to Hogg, was merely the
study of “the names of things”; but by means of “the physical sciences and especially through chemistry,”
one could investigate “things themselves.” In the second place, he believed that science provided an
instrument for the amelioration of the human race” (The Young Shelley, 81). For a discussion of Shelley’s
use of science in his poetry, see Carl Grabo’s A Newton Among Poets: Shelley’s Use of Science in
Prometheus Unbound (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968). Also see Marilyn Gaull’s “Shelley’s
Sciences” (The Oxford Handbook of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Eds. Michael O’Neill, and Anthony Howe.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. 577-93). And finally Arkady Plotnitsky’s “All Shapes of Light: The Quantum
Mechanical Shelley.” Bennett, Betty T., and Stuart Curran, eds. Shelley: Poet and Legislator of the World.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996. 263-274.
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emerges is the feverish and contemplative reflexivity of the subject’s perception, where
the sun can just as easily burn as illuminate, and just as easily be the only source of Light
in the universe.
Nought is but that which feels itself to be.
-------------------------------------------------Thought
Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion,
Reason, Imagination, cannot die:
---------------------------------------------------what has thought
To do with time or place or circumstance?
Would’st thou behold the future?—ask and have!
Knock and it shall be opened—look and, lo!
The coming age is shadowed on the past
As on a glass. (Norton, 785; 795-97; 800-06)
Significantly, in this instance Ahasuerus uses the prophetic language of the New
Testament not to parody a false perspective as he does in Queen Mab, but to metaphorize
the truth of the historicized individual’s relationship to history. The key to the future in
the anti-materialist mode is not rewriting the past but properly interpreting desire in the
present. Looking into the mirror of the present reveals the future, and unless a shattering
of the image occurs, then its reflection persist. This is a significantly different temporal
perspective from the assumed correspondence between natural and human law described
in Queen Mab. The doctrine of Necessity no longer determines human agency; it is
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mentally rather than materially oriented, more of the soul than the soil. The stuff that
dreams are made on transcends “stuff.”
The final canto of Queen Mab describes the utopian regeneration of a society
functioning according to natural, and thus rational, motives. Custom itself reverses course
and makes the lion lie down with the lamb: “custom’s force had / made his nature as the
nature of a lamb” (8.127-8). Fear of death abates:
Mild was the slow necessity of death:
The tranquil spirit failed beneath its grasp
Without a groan, almost without a fear,
Calm as a voyager to some distant land,
And full of wonder, full of hope as he. (9.57-61)
Subject and object unite (“The Body and the Soul united then, / A gentle start
convulsed Ianthe’s frame” (9.232-32)) and the poem concludes with an image of human
love, as Henry gazes on Ianthe’s awakening spirit, which parallels both the love and awe
that overwhelms Ianthe during her journey with Mab as well as the newly illuminated
society awakening to its destiny. The poem can be understood as an instance of Shelley’s
reason reeling toward a utopian future, if only we could read history through the eyes of
nature’s benevolent order.
Before I turn to Shelley’s “vision of the nineteenth century,” Laon and Cythna, I
want to remark how William Hazlitt’s account of William Godwin’s “achievement”
directly applies to Queen Mab. It has such relevance perhaps because Shelley never again
wrote a poem of such uncompromising hope and certainty, and never one that would
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come back to intrude and haunt his ordinary and everyday world.63 In the Spirit of the
Age (1825) Hazlitt ironically describes Godwin’s accomplishment in Political Justice:
If it is admitted that Reason alone is not the sole and self-sufficient ground
of morals, it is to Mr. Godwin that we are indebted for having settled the
point. No one denied or distrusted this principle (before his time) as the
absolute judge and interpreter in all questions of difficulty; and if this is no
longer the case, it is because he has taken this principle, and followed it
into its remotest consequences with more keenness of eye and steadiness
of hand than any other expounder of ethics. […] By overshooting the mark
[…] he has pointed out the limit or line of separation, between what is
practicable and what is barely conceivable […] has enabled others to say
to the towering aspirations after good and to the over-bearing pride of
human intellect: ‘Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther!’ (29-30).
Queen Mab is thus the furthest Shelley ever allowed reason to carry poetry,64 and
much of the reason lies with Godwin’s influence. Shelley’s Queen Mab is not simple,
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In 1817 Shelley professed that Queen Mab “was composed in early youth, & is full of those error which
belong to youth, as far as arrangement of imagery & language & a connected plan, is concerned.But it
was a sincere overflowing of the heart & mind, & that at a period when they are most uncorrupted & pure”
(Letters I; 566). In January, 1817 John and Elizabeth Westbrook, the father and sister of Shelley’s first wife
Harriet Westbrook, who drowned herself the previous year, petitioned the Court of Chancery in order that
Shelley lose custody of his two children by Harriet, Charles and Ianthe. Queen Mab was submitted as
evidence that Shelley was morally unfit to retain guardianship. The charge was that he “blasphemously
derided the truth of the Christian Revelation and denied the existence of God as the Creator of the
Universe” (Jack Donovan, “Epic Experiments,” Oxford Handbook of Percy Bysshe Shelley, 257-58).
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In her notes on Laon and Cythna (The Revolt of Islam), Mary Shelley famously remarks, “Shelley
possessed two remarkable qualities of intellect—a brilliant imagination and a logical exactness of reason.
His inclination led him (he fancied) almost alike to poetry and metaphysical discussions. I say “he fancied,”
because I believe the former to have been paramount, and that it would have gained the mastery even had
he struggled against it” (Ingpen & Peck I; 409). Queen Mab is not Shelley’s only metaphysical poem, not at
all, and Earl Wasserman used Shelley’s “intellectual philosophy” as the interpretive key for reading all of
his poetry, but Queen Mab is after all designated by Shelley A Philosophical Poem, and in it the struggle
between what Mary Shelley calls imagination and metaphysics is better regarded as an embrace of the two
mental faculties wherein metaphysics is the more encircling and grasps more earnestly lest the note of
resistance it detects from poetry threaten the inter-discourse.
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immature or an example of Shelley’s philosophy put to verse, but for Shelley, whom
Harold Bloom often characterized as the most urbane Romantic poet, it is to a remarkably
degree sincere.65 Its progressive march toward the utopia it describes and wishes to enact
is relentless, absorptive and, most importantly, fateful. The poem describes the pitfalls of
self-idolatry as it applies to the various ruling classes of society, but the central poison
that infects the object of its critique is mankind’s refusal to confront the solution that is
everywhere present in nature. It is as if Shelley feverishly points—here, here! Open your
eyes and look at what Mab is showing us from her Hall of Spells. The spell with which
the self mystifies itself comes from within, not from without.
Laon and Cythna and the Wake of Broken Progress
Laon and Cythna; or, The Revolution of the Golden City: A Vision of the
Nineteenth Century (1817) adapts the cosmic utopian dream vision of Queen Mab to the
contingencies of specific historical and individual events. Under the guise of a Romance
narrative Shelley aims to reimagine the political and moral consequences of the French
Revolution; which is to say that he once again offers his vision of an ideal society and the
injustices and human foibles preventing one. Whereas Queen Mab’s dialectical progress
was constitutive of the antithesis between rational discourse and a Necessity inspired by
Love, Laon and Cythna’s dialectical struggle progresses from the source of individual
autonomy and freedom, staging a contest between redemptive will and the evils of human
error. The poem asks the question, How can love inspire productive political action? Like
Asia in Prometheus Unbound, Cythna embodies the idea of Shelleyan Love. And like
Beatrice in The Cenci, she experiences the depths of human depravity, yet unlike
65

Perhaps the poem’s unabashed sincerity is why it is often ignored or merely footnoted, the famous
dictum of Oscar Wilde that all bad poetry is sincere becoming something of a critical litmus test for judging
the significance of a literary work.
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Beatrice, she forgives her tormentors and overcomes the unrelenting torments of selfcontempt and hate. In this way Laon and Cythna foreshadows Shelley’s vision of the
Promethean redemption of humanity; yet unlike both Queen Mab and Prometheus
Unbound, the work wades through the muck of political and moral realities.
In a still more salient comparison, since Laon and Cythna follows Queen Mab as
Shelley’s second mature vision of subjectivity and society,66 Cythna undergoes a difficult
education of misery from which she must “wake to weep.” Whereas in Queen Mab Ianthe
is given a vision in order to perceive its perfection and rational virtue, Cythna’s vision of
the world is replete with the immediate and sustained corruptions of any sort of knowable
ideal. Amidst its fantastical romance narrative, the poem is decidedly more real than
Queen Mab, as it confronts a significant development in Shelley’s thought, the notion
that love’s liberatory force comes from its being both limiting and inclusive. The crux of
Shelley’s dialectical philosophy of human potential is love. The great impasse to his
wished-for union of individual desire and cosmic necessity is the anxiety that the
idealized perfection within the human heart is an illusion that cannot be satisfied outside
itself.67 But love’s desire is worth the risk because it enlarges the circumference of the
self beyond itself, making the greater human collective inclusive of love’s object.
Laon and Cythna takes on this theme of self-isolation and then throughout the
narrative deploys it as a generative model of both the beginning of self-autonomy and
love. In the absence of others to fulfill the vacancy inside the self, one might turn toward
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Alastor (1815) followed Queen Mab chronologically, yet that poem’s focus resembles a Wordsworthian
mind-quest and lacks the immediate political and social concerns of Laon and Cythna.
67
The “veiled maid” in Alastor whom the poet desires in a dream might, within this context of Shelley’s
moral dialectic, be understood as representing both a self projecting and consumption of its own failed
attempt to meet genuine human needs, as well as the beginning of self-esteem and authentic love, since the
“veiled maid” is an illusion, as is the internal chasm within the self, which Shelley describes as the
foundation of love.
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self-worship and self-contempt, the idolatry of the self. The poem’s two heroes fall into
literal and figural self-isolation and each escapes the trap of self-contempt. In canto three
Cythna is enslaved by a band of soldiers, some of whom Laon murders. Physical
resistance to violence or tyranny is for the most anathema to Shelley and Laon suffers for
his crime, as the soldiers chain him to a column and he goes mad before a hermit
eventually rescues him. Like Prometheus, a physical and moral bind follows Laon’s
decision to retaliate: “With brazen links, my naked limbs they bound” (III.xiv.123). With
the hermits help, Laon learns a new language of love and hope with which he will try to
redeem society: “And his soul-subduing tongue / Were as a lance to quell the mailed crest
of wrong” (III.xvii.152-3).
Cythna, likewise shut up in a cave, becomes a representative of Shelleyan love.
She overcomes the retreat to and the reality of the self, what she describes as: “We live in
our own world […] / we are darkened with their floating shade, / Or cast a lustre on
them” (VII.xxx.262-65). It is love that casts luster on the bleak condition of being
separated from one’s ideals in the actuality of real historical conditions. In the following
pages on Laon and Cythna, I suggest that Cythna’s universal command, “Reproach not
thine own soul, but know thyself, / Nor hate another’s crime, nor loathe thine own,” is a
way to avoid the corrosive effects of Shelleyan self-autonomy, a freedom cut off from the
language of love and actions of social sympathy. Cythna’s words recognize the presence
of evil in human nature while urging a kind of self-forgiveness that would prevent such
evil from inhibiting hope and political reform.
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With Laon and Cythna; or, The Revolution of the Golden City: A Vision of the
Nineteenth Century (1817)68 Shelley’s attitude toward the most effective means of social
reform and the most representative vision of historical progress changes. The poem
shares with Queen Mab a similar structure and theme,69 but differs substantially as a
work more committed to the self-reflexive aesthetic mode than the referential historical
68

In January 1818 the poem was reissued under a new title, The Revolt of Islam. The change was due to
pressures on Shelley’s publisher Charles Ollier from both customers as well as the possibility of being
charged with blasphemous liable for the poem’s negative treatment of religion and positive treatment of
incestuous love. Jack Donovan writes in “Epic Experiments” that “the consensus nowadays is that Laon
and Cythna demands primacy of attention as conforming to Shelley’s unconstrained aims, The Revolt of
Islam issuing from a set of circumstances so exceptionally coercive as to deny it both integrity and
authority” (268). Ironically, however, it is just this coerciveness which Hugh Roberts cites in Shelley and
the Chaos of History that makes The Revolt of Islam the more interesting version of the text: “Shelley’s act
of misrepresentation is itself theoretically interesting. The altered text becomes itself implicated in the
contradictions and tensions it aims to explore. A text about power and reactions to power and ‘Custom’ is
itself a product of an acquiescence to power and ‘Custom’” (160). In spite of Donovan’s claim, I have
noticed that The Revolt of Islam is becoming the preferred text for more and more scholars and editions of
Shelley’s poetry. This might be the result of contemporary interest in post-colonial studies, in addition to
the orientalizing effects and themes expressed in a work entitled The Revolt of Islam, not to mention the
strong critical purchase and pull Islam itself elicits in our current geo-political context. I choose to use Laon
and Cythna for this dissertation because it represents Shelley’s original intent for a poem that is essentially
a re-imagining of the history and events of the French Revolution, which Shelley famously called “the
master theme of the epoch in which we live” (Letters I; 504). Although I consider the aesthetic or historical
effects a poem produces or offers secure from the constraints of the author’s intention, or the intention of
any other contextual restriction, in the case of choosing Laon of Cythna I honor if not privilege intention.
This is a work Shelley could not let go of, and in February 1821, almost four years after he began
composing it, Shelley writes to Charles Ollier asking, “Is there any expectation of a second edition of the
‘Revolt of Islam’? I have many corrections to make in it, and one part will be wholly remodeled” (Letters
II; 263). Besides the central place it occupied in Shelley’s psyche as representative of the central event of
Shelley’s historical consciousness, by using Laon and Cythna I also wish to emphasize Laon and Cythna;
that is to say, the two individual characters and how their love for each other and their “genius” contributes
to the amelioration of the social chaos Shelley places them into. As Shelley said of the poem, it is a “story
of human passion” (Letters I; 557) and “speak[s] to the common & elementary emotions of the human
heart” (Letters I; 563). Both the human heart and human emotions are universalized through Laon and
Cythna’s incestuous bond. At the top of the fourth page of the MS. Shelley adds. e.14 and beneath an
absentminded doodling of bushes, Shelley has scratched out “Many shall feel who dare not speak their
feeling / Many shall […]” (The Bodleian Shelley Manuscripts, ed. Tatsuo Tokoo, 1992). Nothing else is
written on the page. Not to use Laon and Cythna as the primary text seems to me unnecessarily to
unscratch that line, and thus corrupt the spirit in which the poem was conceived.
69
Once again Shelley borrows heavily from both Volney’s The Ruins and Southey’s unfinished romance
Ahrimanes (1815). The strong Manichean struggle and Zoroastrian duality that pervades Laon and Cythna,
and is introduced in the first canto with the symbolic contest between the eagle and serpent, has its source
both in Volney and Southey. Volney identifies “Ahrimanes, or Satan of the Persians” (96), the eponymous
figure of Southey’s romance. James Rieger notes of this work, “Ahrimanes […] Zoroaster’s principle of
universal filth and darkness (angrō mainyush = evil spirit), will remain locked in nearly equal combat with
Ormuzd (Ahura Mazda), the god of light and life, until the latter triumphs at the end of history” (The
Mutiny Within, 100). Rieger reports that Shelley’s “interest in Persian dualism dates from the summer of
1813” (100). Manichean themes and narrative struggles recur in Shelley, most explicitly in The Cenci and
Prometheus Unbound.
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mode of Queen Mab, in part because it emphasizes the relationship of individual passion
and genius to collective destiny. The “influence of individual genius” to which Shelley
refers in his letter to a publishing house70 is a reference both to Laon and Cythna as the
poem’s heroes and also to himself as a poet whose genius is sharply developing. Laon is
a representative and universal figure in the poem, which is to say he also exemplifies the
kind of world-changing poet and good citizen Shelley himself aspires to be. It seems the
more sophisticated and focused Shelley’s poetry became, the “more attention [given] to
the refinement and accuracy of language, and the connection of its parts” (Letters I; 557),
the more “violence & revolution” is “relieved by milder pictures of friendship & love &
natural affections” (Letters I; 563), then the more Shelley pits individual psyche against
collective history. The contradictions and tensions that moil within this contest reflect
and are transposed into the language of his poetry.
What in Queen Mab elicits a shift in the people’s perspective on their relation to
history, in Laon and Cythna elicits a perspectival shift on perspective itself. One reason
for this paradigmatic pull toward centripetal interiority is that like in Prometheus
Unbound,71 Laon and Cythna strives for an allegorical representation of the operations of
the human mind: “The Poem […] (with the exception of the first Canto, which is purely
introductory), is narrative, not didactic. It is a succession of pictures illustrating the
growth and progress of individual mind aspiring after excellence, and devoted to the love
of mankind” (Longman; Preface 33). The narrative context, therefore, if we take Shelley
70

Shelley wrote to Longman & Co. describing the story the poem tells as “the beau ideal as it were of the
French Revolution, but produced by the influence of individual genius, & out of general knowledge”
((Letters I; 564).
71
In the preface to Prometheus Unbound, Shelley explains, “The Imagery which I have employed will be
found in many instances to have been drawn from the operations of the human mind, or from those external
actions by which they are expressed. […] My purpose has hitherto been simply to familiarize the highly
refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral
excellence” (Norton, 207).
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at his word that his intentions are to tell a story of moral excellence rather than a story
that moralizes, describes a dualistic struggle between both good and evil and individual
and history.72 From this universal psychomachia emerges a subject with a historical
double consciousness. Added to the recognition of one’s historicity is the recognition that
one’s desires aim beyond historical subjugation. Laon and Cythna must teach this
sophisticated historical awareness because they become models of self-representation.
They are able to overcome the egotistic aims of the idolatrous self. One aim of the poem,
then, becomes didactic, insofar as it becomes an exemplary application “of a liberal and
comprehensive morality” based on the “doctrines of liberty and justice” and the “faith
and hope of something good” in the face of “violence,” “misrepresentation” and
“prejudice” (Preface 32). Shelley is, along with his hero and heroine, a teacher in Laon
and Cythna, more so than in any other poem he wrote.
Constituting twelve cantos, the great majority of which are written in Spenserian
stanza (“because […] there is no shelter for mediocrity; you must either succeed or fail,”
Shelley says in the preface), the work is over 4000 lines and remains Shelley’s longest
72

Earl Wasserman is not exactly silent on The Revolt of Islam (the title and text he employs), but in his
comprehensive and influential study on Shelley’s poetry and philosophy he cites it sparingly and only in
relationship to other works and ideas. Perhaps indicative of the confused status of the poem itself, as a
compound of historiography, allegory, and romance, in addition to Shelley’s self-suppression and
revisioning of many of its passages, the poem is neither sufficiently skeptical nor sufficiently idealistic for
Wasserman’s project. However, he does introduce and comment on an early manuscript section of the
poem, which he identifies as the “rejected Introduction.” The concluded lines of Shelley’s discarded
passage read, “each human phantasy / Hath such sweet visions in the solitude / Of thought, that human
life (this drear world) like heaven wd. Be / Could words invest such dreams with immortality.” Of this
passage, which is an example of Shelley’s tendency to express intractable despair alongside of unrealizable
hope, Reiman writes: “It is clear that when Shelley extends his field of vision beyond mortal life he can no
longer speak as the reformer outlining a program of earthly perfection, or that whenever he despairs of a
durable human utopia he must seek some transcendent explanation for the mind’s ability to conceive of and
yearn for perfection but not to attain it” (188). The historical event that Laon and Cythna records and then
poetically resounds is of course just this “despair of a durable human utopia,” emitted in the breath of those
who wished that France’s republican experiment answered its purpose. The poem becomes implicated in
the same historical uncertainty. Shelley announces its purpose as “an experiment on the temper of the
public mind, as to how far a thirst for a happier condition of moral and political society survives” (Preface
32).
65

poem. No doubt due to its length, Laon and Cythna is probably Shelley’s least read major
work, and until recently large swaths of it were considered some of Shelley’s worst
poetry. Often identified as a transitional poem in terms of how it represents and acts upon
Shelley’s historical and political awareness, Kenneth Cameron’s introduction of the poem
still remains relevant today:
Of all Shelley’s major poems, The Revolt of Islam is the most neglected.
True, it is often poorly written, perhaps partly because Shelley’s sense of
“precariousness” urged him to haste, and partly because in his mood of
“sustained enthusiasm” his ideas tumbled out one after the other and he
paid little attention to the niceties of style. Furthermore, the poem is
overlong and sometimes lacks unity of structure and mood, incongruously
mixing realism and fantasy [a criticism Donald Reiman also makes].73 Yet
it is a poem of great power, giving in impressionistic form, a panoramic
picture of the age. […] The poem is, in fact, an invaluable storehouse of
Shelley’s ideas, and a touchstone for the interpretation of other poems.
(Shelley: The Golden Years, 311)
Cameron’s observations that the poem has great power and is an invaluable
storehouse of Shelley’s ideas inform and confirm each other. Lines, passages, images and
ideas in Laon and Cythna anticipate and, when returned to, shed light upon later works
such as A Defence of Poetry, the prose essay A Philosophical View of Reform (1819),
“Ode to the West Wind” (1819), and The Triumph of Life. Chief among these ideas is
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Donald Reiman unequivocally concludes, “The Revolt of Islam is not a good poem, but it is an important
one in Shelley’s development. […] The Revolt of Islam fails as a poem because Shelley tries unsuccessfully
to fuse didactic-expository passages, a romance narrative, and mythic or symbolic passages (that sometimes
descend to unsophisticated allegory)” (Percy Bysshe Shelley: Updated Edition, 1990, 42-3).
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how poetry can serve as an alternate history of the past, thus securing for the future a
stable perspective from which to reveal itself. However, this is an idealist notion (poetry
as repaired history in order to “fix” the future), one that Shelley carries over from Queen
Mab into Laon and Cythna. Yet in the latter work we begin to see the breakdown of
Shelley’s belief in an absolute integration of the individual within society, the
recuperation of history into its destined telos.
A crisis becomes discernable in the necessitarian-oriented progression of history,
a history within which the individual seems to have no say or no effective means to shape
and disrupt. But in Laon and Cythna the breakdown of progressive expectations seems
not to emerge at first sight. The opening canto of the poem evokes history as the endless
cycle of the forces of good struggling against the forces of evil:
Around, around, in ceaseless circles wheeling
With clang of wings and screams, the Eagle sailed
Incessantly—sometimes on high concealing
Its lessening orbs, sometimes as if it failed,
Drooped through the air; and still it shrieked and wailed,
And casting back its eager head, with beak
And talon unremittingly assailed
The wreathèd Serpent, who did ever seek
Upon his enemy’s heart a mortal wound to wreak. (Longman; I.x.208-16)
“Sometimes” and “sometimes,” “and still” and “who did ever seek,” a temporal language
of individual resignation, helplessness and submission to external forces, set against the
eternality of fate and the implacable circumference of repetition; this is the world the
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visionary poet of Canto One first witnesses, a consequence of the perspective described
in the poem’s first line: “When the last hope of trampled France had failed” (I.i). Failure
in the face of both crushing fate and the notion of history as a record of human misery
and defeat is the vast framework within which the drama of the poem, in addition to the
Enlightenment response to the aftermath of the French Revolution,74 enacts and realizes
itself. In the context of the deterministic dualism Shelley imagines above with the serpent
(representing good, according to several ancient Gnostic sects) and the eagle
(representing evil, perhaps aligned with the Imperial Roman standard or signet),75
pressure is placed on human will to exert itself authoritatively yet justly.
Of great help in understanding Laon and Cythna’s Manichean framework is
Shelley’s general conception of it in his brilliant and much too neglected satirical essay,
“On the Devil, and Devils” (1820).
The Manichean philosophy respecting the origin and government of the
world, if not true, is at least an hypothesis conforming to the experience of
actual facts. To suppose that the world was created and is superintended
by two spirits of a balanced power and opposite dispositions, is simply a
personification of the struggle which we experience within ourselves, and
which we perceive in the operations of the external things as they affect
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It could be argued that the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution had only just concluded three
years prior to the composition of Laon and Cythna with the Congress of Vienna, some of the political
representatives of which Shelley allegorizes later in the poem. As Shelley writes in the preface, “The panic
which, like an epidemic transport, seized upon all classes of men during the excesses consequent upon the
French Revolution, is gradually giving place to sanity” (35).
75
James Rieger notes the inconsistency with which Shelley employs his symbols in Laon and Cythna. He
writes, “Even the comparatively clear-sighted reformers of that world will launch the emblem of an eagle
into the republican dawn of which they dream [which occurs in Canto Eleven, at odds with its
representation of evil in Canto One]. Imaginal consistency is the hobgoblin of the bien-pensant poet,
theosophist, or political liberator because images may or may not be faithful to worlds outside the
sensorium of individual witness” (The Mutiny Within, 103).
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us, between good and evil. The supposition that the good spirit is, or
hereafter will be, superior, is a personification of the principle of hope,
and that thirst for improvement without which, present evil would be
intolerable. The vulgar are all Manicheans […]. (Ingpen & Peck VII, 87;
my emphasis).
Shelley goes on to say that God and Devil are mere personifications of pleasure and pain;
therefore, of course the “vulgar” wish for and mythologize the eternal victory of pleasure
over the ephemeral nature of pain. Yet the site of this struggle, as Shelley makes clear, is
the individual, how he or she perceives history, “the operations of the external things as
they affect us.” And so it is in Laon and Cythna, where to an extent that creates tensions
for Shelley’s desire to derive and differentiate human agency from the aroundness of the
tyranny-revolution-tyranny paradigm that is “unremittingly” and “incessantly”
“ceaseless,” the liberatory power of Laon and Cythna’s poetic utterances at times come
dangerously close to translating the oppressive power they want to dissolve.
Though the poem yearns for clear models of historical progress and presents its two
heroes as ideal embodiments of world-historical figures, Christ-like poets who speak the
truth of universal virtue, benevolence, and liberty, nonetheless the poem teems with
passages and imagery that contradict and problematize its “paths of high intent”76
(Dedication viii.65); Laon and Cythna betrays a skepticism opposite the “beau ideal”
Shelley names it (Letters I; 564).
Because there is no inherent predisposition within the makeup and function of
civil society toward either a state of slavery or tyranny, argues Shelley, disruptive and
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Shelley’s “paths of high intent” refers both to the considerable ambition he musters at age 25 in order to
compose an English epic in the tradition of Spenser and Milton and also to his desire to give intention to
the direction of the future, open a space for human agency within the sightless confinement of fate.
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transformative social forces, such as those that attended and propelled the French
Revolution, are to be welcomed not as portents of anarchy but as evidence of positive
change. Custom, law, authority, tradition, power, and even memory, are so many
historical bonds that lay an oppressive claim to the present, making the future a servant
to the past. In order to conceive the political state as subject to the authority of the
doctrine of Necessity, thinkers of the radical Enlightenment must divest themselves from
any attachment to the inviolate enshrinement of tradition and custom, and so sever the
servile indebtedness of the future to the past and present. As Shelley remarks in the
preface to the poem, the great error of the Enlightenment response to the French
Revolution (the error of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey, Shelley thought) was to
believe:
whole generations of mankind ought to consign themselves to a hopeless
inheritance of ignorance and misery, because a nation of men who had
been dupes and slaves for centuries, were incapable of conducting
themselves with the wisdom and tranquility of freemen so soon as some of
their fetters were partially loosened. (Longman; Preface 35)
As free and self-given expressions of will supplant political oppression masquerading as
Necessity, Shelley responds poetically with a new conception of Necessity. It appears late
in the poem, and constitutes the single instance, as opposed to the multiple instances in
Queen Mab, of Necessity as the governing assumption of history. I will return to this idea
shortly, but suffice it to explain here the flawed moral logic Shelley attacks in the above
quote.

70

If a cause is morally justified, then consigning it to oblivion when corrupted
effects follow from it only ensures a continuation of the corrupted effects. This is one
lesson the story of the poem teaches. In Canto Five the revolutionary patriots of the
poem, inspired by the example Laon and Cythna set through their passionate rhetoric of
liberty and merciful response to scorn and violence, find themselves victorious over the
forces of Othman, the Turkish tyrant. However, the cycles of history revolve in the next
canto, and Othman, whom Laon saves from the vindictive mob with the Christic words,
“What call ye justice? Is there one who ne’er / In secret though has wished another’s
ill? / Are ye all pure? Let those stand forth who hear, / And tremble not”
(V.xxxiv.2017-20), regains totalitarian control. Forgiving Othman, their supreme
trespasser, dooms the success of the rebels, and in the canto that follows the forces of evil
wreck havoc on the masses. But Shelley’s point is to show that repaying scorn with scorn
perpetuates the inexorable revolutions of good and evil, that to exact vengeance or
indulge vindictiveness, one of the most primal impulses of humanity, is to subordinate
human will to an impassive and unalterable history, making history into an alien and
unrepresentable force.
Acknowledging history as a force that cannot be aligned with liberal morality, or
aligned only with the individual and collective consequences of immorality or amorality,
is for Shelley synonymous with renouncing and abandoning humanity’s potential for
improvement. In Queen Mab the moral and material forces governing existence were
coincident with each other with the drawing of the proper perspective. In Laon and
Cythna history cannot so easily become self-identical to the enlightened aspirations of
human will, since evil enters the world as an active force. Shelley’s principle of
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forgiveness, which throughout his prose and poetry is articulated in a multitude of
different ways, conquers vindictiveness with the introduction of Necessity newly
conceived. In Canto Nine, where significantly the genesis of “Ode to the West Wind”77
occurs, laying the foundation for the seasonal structure of Shelley’s imaginal politics of
rebirth and hope, Cythna declares:
In their own hearts the earnest of the hope
Which made them great, the good will ever find;
And though some envious shade may interlope
Between the effect and it, One comes behind,
Who aye the future to the past will bind—
Necessity, whose sightless strength forever
Evil with evil, good with good must wind
In bands of union, which no power may sever:
They must bring forth their kind, and be divided never! (IX.xxvii.3703-11)
Once the like effect follows the good or evil cause, how is the “earnest of the
hope” to keep the promise of itself within the hearts of a degenerated society, and in the
face of a “sightless” Necessity which “no power may sever”? No easy answer resolves
the dilemma this question poses, but Shelley’s conception of Necessity, “sightless” and
intentionless though it may be, is at the very least manipulable at the moment prior to the
“interloping shade’s” arrival. That is, for hope to be redeemable in the future, for the
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Cameron speculates that Shelley derived the idea for his famous ode and of a revolutionary spring
generally from Tom Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791). He quotes Paine: “What pace the political summer
may keep with the natural, no human foresight can determine. It is, however, not difficult that the spring is
begun” (Shelley: The Golden Years, 331). Rieger argues that the main metaphor the ode invokes was
present in Shelley’s symbolism much earlier, specifically in his revision of Queen Mab, The Daemon of the
World: “When west winds sigh and evening waves respond / In whispers from the shore: / ‘Tis wilder than
the unmeasured notes / Which from the unseen lyres of dells and groves / The genii of the breezes sweep”
(Ingpen & Peck I; I.51-55).
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future to keep hope’s promise, the darkness of social and political ignorance must yield to
illumination. Kenneth Cameron artfully renders Shelley’s evolved understanding of
Necessity as “a flowing river, which human power cannot do away with but can divert,
one way or another” (The Golden Years, 332). In the stanza quoted above Necessity is
imagined as somewhat more implacable and imposing than a flowing river, yet Cameron
is correct that room is made for the influence of human intentions. The space that opens
up for the future requires a balance between knowledge and practice, in this case the
historical turning point of turning enlightenment thought into political action. This is
what Shelley means when he writes in the preface:
The French Revolution may be considered as one of those manifestations
of a general state of feeling among civilized mankind, produced by a
defect of correspondence between the knowledge existing in society and
the improvement, or gradual abolition of political institutions. The year
1788 may be assumed as the epoch of one of the most important crises
produced by this feeling. […] Can he who the day before was a trampled
slave, suddenly become liberal-minded, forbearing, and independent? This
is the consequence of the habits of a state of society to be produced by
resolute perseverance and indefatigable hope, and long-suffering and longbelieving courage, and the systematic efforts of generations of men of
intellect and virtue. (35-36)78
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In what is a more sharply conceived expression of this same idea, Shelley says in the Defence of Poetry,
“We want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know; we want the generous impulse to act that
which we imagine; we want the poetry of life: our calculations have outrun conception; we have eaten more
than we can digest” (Norton 530). Even in the Defence this idea of excess is expressed multiple ways. I will
return to it in a later chapter. It is a key notion of Shelley’s aesthetics and stands in ironic relation to it. In
Laon and Cythna, particularly in Canto Nine, it begins to take shape.
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It is difficult to say whether Shelley believed the revolution came too soon or too late, but
based on how Necessity is conceived in Laon and Cythna, Shelley might insist the
revolution came at its appointed time, and that “men of intellect and virtue” bear the fault
of its failure.
In an age where the “most ardent and tender-hearted of the worshippers of public
good, have been morally ruined” (Preface 37) by despair, how does one begin to
construct a politics based on hope? After over two decades of war, and the continual
brutal suppression of political dissent, where does one turn for republican ideals, signs of
justice and liberty? Contrary not only to where Shelley might turn aesthetically in poems
after Laon and Cythna but also to much of the most powerful imagery within Laon and
Cythna, apocalyptic completion gives way, at least in the preface, to “systematic efforts
of generations.” Regardless, the progressive process of political work must begin with a
sudden spark, which is the hope and belief in what Shelley calls the “reflux in the tide of
human things which bears the shipwrecked hopes of men into a secure haven” (Preface
35).79 “Methinks, those who now live have survived an age of despair” (Ibid.), Shelley
speculates. Yet these words mean more than they say in the context of “sightless”
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Shelley’s preface to Laon and Cythna shares with Immanuel Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment”
(1784) the same urgency and resonance of human action to overcome its own limitations. Kant’s essay
famously begins, “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity” (17). More
directly related to political revolutions and their failure to effect moral edification, Kant claims, “Perhaps a
revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can
never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will
serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.” Kant’s historical prescience is obvious, and Shelley
dramatizes the idea in Laon and Cythna, insisting that more must change than the mere forms with which
we recognize and understand power. Also, the notion of “reflux” appears in the Defence of Poetry, yet there
it corresponds more to the individual poet than the spirit of the age, although one inspires the other: “But in
the intervals of inspiration, and they may be frequent without being durable, a poet becomes a man, and is
abandoned to the sudden reflux of the influences under which others habitually live” (Norton 534).
“Shipwrecked hopes” is analogous to “habit,” it seems, “and secure haven” to “inspiration.” In the “Ode to
the West Wind” hope tries to inhale the power that compels the wind in order to secure and sustain a
structure and form in which a moment of hope might breathe.
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Necessity, the idea that good from good and evil from evil always springs. Art Young in
Shelley and Nonviolence (1975) reminds us:
Early in his career Shelley had believed in the doctrine of Necessity as it
was expounded by William Godwin; the doctrine was one of absolute
physical, psychological, and moral determinism. […] But by the time
Shelley wrote Prometheus Unbound his view of Necessity had changed.
He no longer considered man a slave to Necessity, but a being with free
will operating in a universe of Necessarian law. Man’s will is free to make
a choice between good and evil, and his act of choice will have the
inevitable consequences. (24-25)
If history and the eternal war between good and evil it records is merely a cyclical
repetition, then creating the conditions necessary in which appeals to the good might be
made, particularly appeals to the good made systematically over the course of
generations, threatens to become a futile enterprise for the equally futile goal of political
liberalism. However, when read in the name of Shelley’s commitment to the potential of
human agency to choose and therefore generate good, “Methinks those who live now
have survived an age of despair,” revitalizes the spirit of the present as the site of the
future, as “One comes behind, / Who aye the future to the past will bind.”
Those who live now, by their very presence and existence, have necessarily
survived an age of despair. The age of despair refers to moments pregnant with
possibility that dissolve into the past without having been absorbed by the spatiotemporal structure that is, paradoxically, both exterior to and included within it, the
future. From this perspective the present is analogous to the fragment, the potential power
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of which represents or generates the absent narrative or wholeness to which it intends and
hopefully cam exceed, according to Shelley’s futural politics. In the context of Shelley’s
comments in the preface and the way in which Necessity is rendered in the poem, the
present is always-already surviving the despair that threatens it, insofar as the future is
distanced from it. Not only the future but the present also must remain “unthought” and
“untold,” as the supernatural woman in Canto One tells the visionary poet (I.xxv.344).
The present betrays its despair when it becomes reclaimed by the known past
rather than the unknown future. It must resist historicization. Necessity in Laon and
Cythna is unconquerable, yes, but it is born each and every moment, and therefore
subject to the choices made each and every moment. In Queen Mab Necessity was
colored with a conscious and benevolent hue, waiting for when humanity’s perspective
would align itself to the natural and material law of the universe—Necessity as spirit. In
contrast, Necessity is now faceless, dead and inanimate, a blind force that provides shape
to the intentions of two immediate and animating powers, good and evil—Necessity as
form. Because Necessity is no longer a pervasive spirit that is part of the micro-andmacroscopic designs of reality but a form that is teleological only after the fact, in cause
rather than purpose, hope must emerge in its place, urgent, pressurized and demanding.
We now are in a better position to understand the ideal response to the failures of
the French Revolution Shelley offers in the preface: “resolute perseverance and
indefatigable hope, and long-suffering and long-believing courage, and the systematic
efforts of generations of men of intellect and virtue.” No longer guaranteeing for history
its eventual realization as a journey home or origin discovered, the introduction of a
different understanding of Necessity calls for a different understanding of time. In a
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footnote to his essay On the Punishment of Death (1816-17), composed around the same
time as Laon and Cythna, Shelley describes two distinct notions of time-consciousness.
Shelley says in the note:
The savage and the illiterate are but faintly aware of the distinction
between the future and the past; they make actions belonging to periods so
distinct, the subjects of similar feelings; they live only in the present, or in
the past, as it is present. It is in this that the philosopher excels one of the
many; it is this which distinguishes the doctrine of philosophic necessity
from fatalism; and that determination of the will, by which it is the active
source of future events, from that liberty or indifference, to which the
abstract liability of irremediable actions is attached, according to the
notions of the vulgar. (Ingpen & Peck VI; 189; my emphasis)
Significantly, the passage he footnotes begins with a discussion of vengeance, the
exacting of which is perhaps the first and surest way to transgress the only law that
according to Shelley both governs all morals as well as constitutes the secret to them all,
love. Shelley distinguishes the imagined debts (“abstract liability”) we owe to deeds
already performed (“irremediable actions”), orienting love-inspired action away from
notions of obligation, which for Shelley create stoicism at best and slavery at worst. In
other words, the philosopher acts in the hope of and with the chance that his actions will
plant the seeds of future events; the “vulgar” act in the hope of and with the chance that
they will uproot and impact what has already occurred. One model of conduct is
ungrounded and open; the other grounded (in the ground, so to speak, if vengeance is the
motivation) and closed.
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Robert Mitchell astutely derives the origin of Shelley’s critique of state finance
and the national debt from his digression into modes of time-consciousness in On the
Punishment of Death.80 In “The Ghost of Gold”81 he argues, “What Shelley called a
‘philosophic’ sense of necessity […] located the origin of the future in the present, rather
than the past, and sought to enable potentials, rather than plotting probabilities” (202).
Mitchell argues the “savage” sense of Necessity is located in the past. Though in Queen
Mab Necessity is akin to the immanence of Nature’s Spirit, it still carries a trace of this
“savage” rendering of it, since that poem comprehends, as Shelley claimed, “The Past,
the Present, & the Future,” a total and absolute system. A fully comprehensive system
cannot generate excessive or disruptive potentials. Only within an uncomprehending
system, or along the horizon of an incomprehensible future, does hope or will have any
purchase on “philosophic” Necessity.
“Thus the dark tale which history doth unfold / I knew, but not, methinks, as
others know, / For they weep not […]” (xxxviii.460-62; my emphasis), the supernatural
woman tells the visionary poet in Canto One. To “unfold” refers to the revelation of an
already enclosed system. Another iteration of telos, “unfold” belongs to the imagery,
thinking, and temporal poetics of Queen Mab. As such, it occurs four times in that poem,
most significantly when the Fairy declares there is no God, and “unfold” naturally
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Whenever one speaks of debt in any sense, economic analogues are inevitable. Determining the extent to
which the historical origins of the notion of debt are based in economic and socio-religious exchanges
seems like a worthy, and maybe impossible, endeavor. This is particularly true in light of Shelley’s famous
reckoning of God and Mammon in the Defence. Between the antithetical spheres of consciousness of Love
and Money, love of money appears to take shape, especially when applied to our secular modernity.
Perhaps it was always so. Shelley’s idea of love as a centrifugal going out of ourselves was always in a
similar manner threatened by a centripetal love of self. Jupiter and Count Cenci embody the failure of
love’s potential for expansiveness. They are Prometheus bound and Beatrice’s tragedy, respectively.
81
Mitchell, Robert. “The Ghost of Gold: National Debt, imagery, and the politics of sympathy in P. B.
Shelley.” Sympathy and the State in the Romantic Era: Systems, State Finance, and the Shadows of
Futurity. New York: Routledge, 2007. 163-205.
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substitutes for the supernatural revelatory acts of knowledge and truth attributed to a
deity: “let every seed that falls / In silent eloquence unfold its store / Of argument” (7.1921).82 I mention the specific way Shelley imagines “dark history” at the beginning of
Laon and Cythna because it provides an important contrast to Shelley’s imaging of the
future. The Woman whom the visionary poet meets on a seashore after having witnessed
symbolically the chaos and aftermath of the French Revolution sails him in a boat across
the sea to a “pellucid plain / Of waters” (xlviii.554-55), where the Temple of the Spirit is
located. The Temple of the Spirit is central to both Canto One and Twelve, framing and
unifying the narrative proper and the poem’s representation of history. Along the way,
she relates to him her own history, and instructs him: “Speak not to me, but hear! much
shalt thou learn, / Much must remain unthought, and more untold, / In the dark Future’s
ever-flowing urn” (I.xxv.343-45; my emphasis).
From the most provocative and polysemous images of the poem, “the dark
Future’s ever-flowing urn” and “the dark tale which History doth unfold,” multiple
critical antitheses emerge. “Flow” or “flowing,” which only occurs twice in Queen Mab,
once to indicate the transience of human life and works,83 another time to comment on
the moral degeneracy of the symbiotic relationship between church and state,84 is used
approximately three dozen times throughout Laon and Cythna. The discrepancy is
attributable to Shelley’s developing sense of both futurity and Necessity. The “dark
Future’s ever-flowing urn” incarnates what will become one of the most remarkable
features of Shelley’s poetry, the attempt to render visible and generate potentials (both
82

“Unfold” also occurs in Queen Mab, as it does in Laon and Cythna, to indicate the nature of what History
tries to hide and mystify, essentially pain and misery. Mab says: “I will not call the ghost of ages gone / To
unfold the frightful secrets of its lore” (8.42-3).
83
“And midst the ebb and flow of human things” (8.55).
84
“Then grave and hoary-headed hypocrites […] Have crept by flattery to the seats of power, / Support the
system whence their honours flow” (4.203, 206-07).
79

prospective and actual) from systems of dissolution and convergence. Laon and Cythna is
therefore the origin of this attempt, since individual genius works together with the blind
forces of history to construct liberated and liberatory futures, futures that can “swoon” the
present.85
The two86 “swoons” of the poem, therefore, must also be brought near and read
together, for they are intertwined and spirally conjoined around the axis of the historical
future and Shelley’s supra-historical axis of Love. In the first instance Laon imagines that
his own “vital words and deeds” (II.ii.681) will burst forth into history a volcanic
eruption of revolutionary freedom. The apocalyptic imagery both dissolves and
converges:
I will arise and awaken
The multitude, and like a sulphurous hill,
Which on a sudden from its snows has shaken
The swoon of ages, it shall burst and fill
The world with cleansing fire: it must, it will
85

In the fourth note Shelley appends to the end of Hellas, he says: “It appears that circumstances make men
what they are and that we all contain the germ of a degree of degradation or of greatness whose connexion
with our character is determined by events” (Norton, 463). However, it remains unclear whether a
corresponding “degree of degradation or of greatness” attached to the historical events themselves has any
influence on their determination of character. Does the Peterloo Massacre mold character in the same way
and to the same degree as the defeat of Napoleon? In Laon and Cythna Shelley claims a moral maxim that
seems at odds with what he appended to Hellas: “To the pure all things are pure” (VI.xxx.2596). Of course,
“pure” evokes an idealization that is absent from the notes to Hellas.
86
There is, in fact, a third “swoon,” but it appears in the more restricted and referential sense, denoting only
Laon’s unconsciousness when attacked by his captors: “for a stroke / On my raised arm and naked head,
came down, / Filling my eyes with blood—when I awoke, / I felt that they had bound me in my swoon”
(III.xi.1201). Denoting unconsciousness is the point in all three instances of the word, but when history and
sex, particularly the incestuous relationship of Laon and Cythna, modify “swoon,” unconsciousness
expands beyond its referent into transformative consciousness. Its final appearance is as “swound,” when
Laon, in the world between life and death (“Yet,yetone brief relapse, like the last beam / Of dying
flames […]” (XII.xvi.4585-586) glimpses, “as in a swound, / The tyrant’s child fall without life or motion /
Before his throne, subdued by some unseen emotion” (4591-593). Othman’s child was ostensibly
conceived when he raped Cythna, yet the child identifies with Laon, and accompanies Laon and Cythna in
the afterlife to the Temple of the Spirit. The child’s swoon acts as a psychological rite of passage into the
new sphere of consciousness and reality.
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It may not be restrained! (II.xiv.784-89)
The second instance is specifically individual, and marries the sexual and moral embrace
between Laon and Cythna. Although according to the plot of the romance, Cythna is
properly Laon’s sister, she is better understood as his anima, episychidion or “Soulsong,”87 the “being within [his] being” that poetry, and love, creates (Defence, Norton,
533). In a sense, she is Laon’s poetry. In the Temple of the Spirit, she sits beside Laon,
“like his shadow there” (I.lx.660). As such, the sibling love between Laon and Cythna,
“the one circumstance which was intended to startle the reader from the trance of
ordinary life” (47), as Shelley writes in the preface, is more than a mere attack on social
customs through the introduction of social taboo; it is a representation of Shelleyan love
at its most human and ideal level. Because Cythna is a part of Laon, resides within his
very blood, so to speak, his love for her cannot be perverted, in the sense that it will not
devolve into self-contempt or self-obsession. Nor will it be tainted with jealously, rivalry,
or sensuality. Ironically, the social perversion prevents the poetic one; the “crime of
convention” prevents the more serious moral one, the repression of a benevolent and
universal feeling (Preface 47). Amid their “liquid ecstasies” (VI.xxxiii.2629), Laon
describes the consummation of their love in terms of dissolution and convergence:
and then I felt the blood that burned
Within her frame, mingle with mine, and fall
Around my heart like fire; and over all
A mist was spread, the sickness of a deep
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James Rieger prefers Neville Rogers’s translation of Shelley’s title Episychidion, “Soul-song,” in Shelley
at Work: A Critical Inquiry (Oxford, 1956, 245). Rieger goes on to say of Shelley’s title and poem, “an
episychidion is to souls what an epithalamion is to bodies and bedchambers. It is a hymn for the marriage
of minds, and Shelley’s poem is the first of the genre” (The Mutiny Within, 185).
81

And speechless swoon of joy, as might befall
Two disunited spirits when they leap
In union from this earth’s obscure and fading sleep. (VI.xxxiv.2634-640)
“The swoon of ages” and “swoon of joy” join collective to individual energies,
the passing and passion of ages to the passing and passion of the instant, the “tale of
passionate change, divinely taught” (liii.603) of Canto One to the “deep and mighty
change which suddenly befell” (xxx.4719) of Canto Twelve—The swoons of Laon and
Cythna pour into and fall from the “dark Future’s ever-flowing urn.” Beyond the simple
definition of fainting or losing consciousness, the OED traces “swoon” to the Old English
swógan, which means to overgrow or choke, the condition of being overcome. It refers to
excess, in other words, severe depravation or sever overabundance, as do so many of
Shelley’s spheres of consciousness, images, metaphors, figures of polysemous
construction, and his representation of the relationship of present to future. The
contemporary American poet Michael Palmer compares this quality of Shelley’s poetry
to the gaze represented in Klee’s Angelus Novus, which Benjamin interprets in “Theses
on the Philosophy of History.” He calls it “backward-forwardness” (196).88 If the “swoon
of ages” is a backward sliding into sleep, a swoon that began long in the past, induced by
custom, superstition and moral degradation (the spell of which Laon breaks with his
sulphurous smelling salts), then the “swoon of joy” is a forward-gathering summons of
human love. It casts its own unique spell in extracting and abstracting poetry from
custom, history and the “sickness” of its own “[depth]” and “[speechlessness].” The
ennobling “swoon of joy” is thus not exempt from the same torpor and thanatic
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Palmer, Michael. “Some Notes on Shelley, Poetics and the Present.” 1991. Active Boundaries: Selected
Essays and Talks. New York: New Directions, 2008.
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imagery— “sickness,” “deep,” “speechless” and the “leap […] from this Earth’s obscure
and fading sleep”—that is clearly explicit in “the swoon of ages” as the “snows” of the
frozen multitude.
The swoon distends and overshoots its own referent, fallen into either a state of
convergence or dissolution. The condition to which the swoon refers, whether it affects
and occurs in history, love or poetry, is the condition that empowers blankness, absence
and unconsciousness. Paradoxically, by referring to itself, “swoon” refers to that which is
not itself, the unimagined and unconditional negative power that resides elsewhere than
the conscious subject, and from which Shelley claims inspiration. As a state of ecstasy, a
state of “choking,” which renders us mute and deprives us of breath, while
simultaneously restores us to the most primal communicative mode as we gasp and
convulse for a literal inspiration that only further expires us, swoon positively nominates
Shelley’s nugatory aesthetics. It is what makes an idealist or skeptical, teleological or
fragmentary, reading of Laon and Cythna impossible to resolve. If the hero and heroine
must be immolated upon a bier in a kind of swoon, and then journey in a kind of
supernatural afterlife to the hovering sphere of the Temple of the Spirit, a more isolated
and apolitical retreat into the mind’s own reality is difficult to imagine. Yet, as ever with
Shelley, what heats and harbors hope are the ashes and embers of the poets of the past,
the consumed remains of his world-historical-figures left behind in the smoldering bier.
And so the “dark Future’s ever-flowing urn” comes to contain the hope of the present in
the same negative process as Shelley’s use of “swoon.”
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Maureen McLane writes her own critical ode to Shelley’s futural urn, deciphering
its temporal structure and aesthetic significance for Laon and Cythna (She prefers The
Revolt of Islam) and Shelley’s poetry generally:
Its contents, “ever-flowing,” seem to be the vital waters of the future, and
not the incinerated materia of history and death. […] This urn both flows
and resists. […] This urn negates, as it were, affirmatively: the
“unthought” and “untold” contents of the urn present neither a defeat of
interpretation, nor a crux of decipherment […] but rather an as-yetunrealized potentiality of thought, speech, and action harbored in the dark
recesses of the Future. Shelley has found in this image, the very figure of
what may yet be figured, the as-yet-unfigured. […] What could signify the
pathos of remains (bodily, cultural, historical) instead objectifies the
structure of Futurity. (124)89
By giving form to the “as-yet-unfigured,” by objectifying it, Shelley “negates, as it were,
affirmatively”; by writing the future as if it were poetry, he is able to glimpse the future’s
89

McLane, Maureen N. Romanticism and the Human Sciences: Poetry, Population, and the Discourse of
the Species. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. In a strange but perhaps inevitable critical instance of
synchronicity, the second definition for the OED’s entry on “urn” cites the phrase in the urn, meaning “not
yet discovered, or unknown.” Its relevance to McLane’s understanding of Shelley’s futural urn is obvious,
but the example quotation the OED gives is taken from Sir Thomas Browne, from whom Shelley received
an education in renaissance skepticism, C. E. Pulos tells us in The Deep Truth (37). The quotation is from
Hydriotaphia (1658), a work Shelley must have read, if not directly turned to for inspiration conceiving the
image of the urn: “That great Antiquity America lay buried for a thousand years; and a large part of the
earth is still in the Urne unto us.” One thinks of the subterranean world of Prometheus Unbound, both
below and above us, its (and Demogorgon’s) refusal to hear us, as the poem’s epigraph suggests, its refusal
to render up its secrets. Several years later in Hellas Shelley unearths his urn. He cautions in the poem’s
final chorus, an apocalyptical appeal to spiritual regeneration, “Cease! / drain not to its dregs the urn / Of
bitter prophecy” (1098-1099). I read in these lines a profound skepticism, an anticipation of evil’s return,
since at the dregs of prophecy traces of past prophecy settle. Whether these prophecies were fulfilled or
represented merely the fevered dreams of poets, they are too near the past and present world of suffering,
frozen rather than flowing in the future’s open chance.
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light that shines forth from the dark eclipse of the present, in the same way “moonbeams
behind some piny mountain shower, / [visit] with inconstant glance / Each human heart
and countenance” (5-7).90 He renders the future sensible, in other words, so that it yields
a greater aesthetic and political payment to both the present and presence of the subject
than would inspired intuition alone.
The rendering of a sensible future grounds the correct perspective of the self. It is
the beginning of a turning away from a past, both individual and collective, that inhibits
progress. Cythna’s great utterance of the poem, which also acts as an ethical injunction
within Shelley’s moral conception of human desire, flows from an act of forgiveness.
What is forgiven necessarily occupies the past, but it also clears a path for future hope. In
Canto Eight she speaks to the mariners who have rescued her from a lonely crag in the
sea:
Reproach not thine own soul, but know thyself,
Nor hate another’s crime, nor loathe thine own.
It is the dark idolatry of self,
Which, when our thoughts and actions once are gone,
Demands that man should weep, and bleed, and groan;
O vacant expiation! be at rest.—
The past is Death’s, the future is thine own;
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“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” (1816), Norton, 93. The subject of the “Hymn” appears in stanzas three to
five of the dedication to Laon and Cythna. In both cases, Shelley (perhaps not Shelley in the “Hymn” if we
are to avoid the biographical fallacy), relates in what reads like a religious (perhaps better understood in the
sense of the word’s root, “consciousness”) conversion the transformative moment of his life as an artist and
man devoted to the good. Shelley details the account in several letters also. In the dedication “To Mary
” of Laon and Cythna, the poet says, “‘I will be wise, / And just, and free, and mild, if in me lies / Such
power, for I grow weary to behold / The selfish and the strong still tyrannise / Without reproach or check.’ I
then controlled / My tears, my heart grew calm, and I was meek and bold” (4.31-36). More poignantly yet
controlled, the speaker of the “Hymn” intones, “I vowed that I would dedicated my powers / To thee and
thine—have I not kept the vow?” (61-2).
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And love and joy can make the foulest breast
A paradise of flowers, where peace might build her nest. (xxii.3388-3396)
A repellant act not only within Shelley’s moral code but also within his conception of an
inclusive and collective self, vengeance narrows even further the narrow circumference
of the unimaginative and idolatrous self. Cythna’s words make it clear why this is the
case: The past is death. The autonomous self lives in the delusion that the past justifies
present and future emotional pain, when in reality the past justifies only the self-contempt
that feeds on pain. The moral challenge that Cythna issues the mariners appears
extraordinarily difficult because it calls for a new reading of self-regard, a radical
selflessness in which knowledge of the self means giving oneself over to the vacancy
love creates. In the next two chapters, I explore in more detail how love generates hope
from a vacancy that can be both isolating and inclusive.
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CHAPTER TWO
Lyrical Morality
Is there an imagination that sits enthroned
As grim as it is benevolent, the just
And the unjust, which in the midst of the
summer stops
To imagine winter? When the leaves are dead,
Does it take its place in the north and enfold
itself,
Goat leaper, crystallized and luminous, sitting
In highest night?
—Wallace Stevens, “The Auroras of Autumn”
“Mont Blanc” (1816) and “Ode to the West Wind” (1820) portray and enact
Shelley’s conception of moral agency, which offers us a glimpse of the possibility of
Promethean subjectivity. By reading the two poems as allegorizing the poet-narrator’s
relationship toward “Power” and “Love,” the significance of these ideas in terms of
Shelley’s conception of the expanded, inclusive self can be better recognized. The
consequence is a more profound, and practical, critical apprehension of Shelley’s
comprehensive, and often cryptic, claims for poetry. I argue that trying to understand how
Mont Blanc teaches virtue and how the west wind carries human happiness is vitally
important when reading two of Shelley’s most canonized and written about poems. In
doing so, I contend, “Mont Blanc” and “Ode to the West Wind” offer the reader more
than the pleasure of experiencing a purely aesthetic achievement; instead, the poems
reveal themselves as ethical instruments that posit and apply a set of moral principles, the
political impact of which most of Shelley’s poetry tries to realize. I argue in this chapter
that “Mont Blanc,” rather than presenting a solipsistic meditation on the mind and reality,
one which offers no definitive answers for the poet-speaker, is actually a much more
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emphatic articulation of Shelley’s moral philosophy and the affirmative lessons that
nature can teach the individual and society. In an unpublished fragment, Shelley names
the knowledge these lessons carry the “religion of eternity.”91 It is the perspective of
virtue that comes with meditating on nature’s tremendous forms, when we see beyond
ourselves. The end of the poem might question the availability of this lesson, but the
journey to Shelley’s famous question plants along the way positive signposts of moral
knowledge. Moreover, “Mont Blanc” generates a narrative of the human mind in the
context of historical natural change, attempting to reconcile both existential and political
consciousness.
I argue that “Ode to the West Wind,” in thematic contrast but moral continuity,
imagines and actuates the real world consequence of “Mont Blanc’s” moral knowledge.
The poem functions as a sort of Promethean pamphlet on effective political action, yet
once again the lyrical address to the wind ends with a question, disrupting the
accessibility of its effect. Rather than constituting an invocation to the seasonal cycles of
birth, death, and re-birth, which allegorically parallel the potentialities of political and
moral revolution, “Ode to the West Wind” defines, directs, and enacts immediate moral
action. In the “Ode” the poet-speaker makes claims for universal moral and political
regeneration under the guise of a subjective quest for annihilation and transformation.
Even though these claims are made from the self-isolated perspective of a lyric, the poem
is not about the seductions of self-dissolution; instead, the quest the poem describes
involves the struggle of individual love expanding into the possibility of universal love.
The leap from the individual to the universal is in part possible because of Shelley’s
adherence to the moral philosophy of “virtue is its own reward” (230); therefore, the
91
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smallest individual gesture of good is as vernal, and reverberates, as the largest collective
one. 92 Finally, I argue that the two poems are dialectically related. What unites them is
the poet-speaker’s submission to the “Power” of which Mont Blanc is the visible
manifestation, and her mastery of the “Love” that the omnipresent wind, itself compelled
by the same “Power” named in “Mont Blanc,” makes felt. In my final analysis, the
mastering of Love becomes a submission to Power as the poet-speaker implores the spirit
of the wind to destroy in order to preserve. Yet what happens instead can be read as a
reinscription of the limits from which the poet-speaker tries to free himself. As a result, I
try to offer an answer for how Mont Blanc can “repeal / Large codes of fraud and woe”
(80-81), and how a poet’s “dead thoughts” (63) can “quicken a new birth” (64).
Earl Wasserman argues that “Ode to the West Wind” represents a “full
exploitation of the implicitly religious character of Mont Blanc and is Shelley’s prayer to
the divine Power corresponding to his prayer to Intellectual Beauty” (238).93
Wasserman’s reading of the relationship between the two poems is not radically different
from my own, insofar as he sees in the “Ode” a “release into Existence of the Power that
will effect man’s moral regeneration” (239), yet I want to emphasize a more explicit
moral framework within which both might be understood. In the two fragments On
Christianity (1820) and Speculations on Morals (1816), Shelley outlines moral and
aesthetic principles that make possible such an understanding of the two lyrics. I will
begin by discussing Speculations on Morals and “Mont Blanc,” since in the former
Shelley asks the fundamental question of why someone should be good in the first place,
and in the latter the possibilities, affirmations, and influence for goodness seem few. I
92
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will then transition to a more in depth reading of the connection between morality and
divinity in On Christianity and “Mont Blanc.”
Shelley’s reason why virtue, of which benevolence and justice are the two
principle attributes, should be an object of desire rests on utilitarian arguments influenced
by William Godwin’s thinking. After postulating that “when a human being is the active
instrument of generating or diffusing happiness, the principle through which it is most
effectually instrumental to that purpose, is called virtue” (73), Shelley argues that virtue
promotes human happiness because it produces the greatest amount of pleasure, which is
good. 94 Any amount of pain is necessarily evil, and we desire its cessation to the degree
that we can disinterestedly imagine and perceive our own sufferings in another.
Understanding and desiring the good becomes tantamount to a highly cultivated sense of
pleasure and pain. “Pain or pleasure,” Shelley argues, “if subtly analysed, will be found
to consist entirely in prospect. The only distinction between the selfish man, and the
virtuous man, is that the imagination of the former is confined within a narrow limit,
whilst that of the latter embraces a comprehensive circumference” (75). Virtue or vice are
thus differences of degree, separated according to the degree of force the active
imagination works on the sensory perceptions. And it is crucial to begin readings of
“Mont Blanc” and “Ode to the West Wind” with a clear conception of the
interconnectedness between sensory perception and virtue, since the lyric mode presents
the poet-speaker in “savage solitude” (76), cut off from the cultivating influences of
society. Shelley writes that “selfishness […] is the portion of unreflecting infancy, and
savage solitude, or of those whom toil or evil occupations have blunted and rendered
torpid” (76). Standing before and below Mont Blanc provides the poet-speaker with
94
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“disinterested benevolence,” the “product of a cultivated imagination,” rather than the
dark musings or narrow affections of “savage solitude” (76). This is because nature,
“And this, the naked countenance of earth, / On which [the poet-speaker] gaze[s], even
these primeval mountains / Teach the adverting mind” (“Mont Blanc,” 98-100); they
teach virtue by preparing the mind for receiving truth through the sense perceptions. In
On Christianity Shelley argues that “truth cannot be communicated until it is perceived”
(243), and it cannot be perceived until the mind is in a “favorable disposition” (243)
toward it. Mont Blanc fosters this disposition because, as natural object, it communicates
virtue with “entire sincerity” (243), as “naked countenance” (98), without the confused
perversions of meaning that often accompany rhetorical figures of speech and writing.
The section on virtue in Speculations on Morals begins with the condemnation of
“[a] common sophism, which, like many others, depends on the abuse of a metaphorical
expression to a literal purpose” (74). The sophism alluded to is a consistent refrain in
Shelley’s poetry and prose; namely, that “[d]uty is obligation” (74), the idea that moral
behavior is motivated by some reward, and, conversely, immoral behavior is avoided
because it brings about punishment. More than any other concept of moral law that
Christianity or organized religion teaches, it is this one Shelley attacks most rigorously.
He calls it the “philosophy of slavery and superstition” (74). As I stated above, the only
true moral philosophy for Shelley is that virtue is its own reward, and this is the case
primarily because he understands human nature to possess an inherent tendency toward
goodness and principles that are benign, benevolent, beneficent and compassionate
(which are also his favorite descriptors of the ruling Principle, Power, Agent, or Spirit of
the universe). His argument for why we should choose good over evil if good does not
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always bring reward derives from his claim that “benevolent propensities are […]
inherent in the human mind. We are impelled to seek the happiness of others. We
experience a satisfaction in being the authors of that happiness” (77; my emphasis).
Pleasure inheres in goodness, pain in evil. We are impelled toward good and benignant
principles because for Shelley thoughts and things are constituent of the same force or
power that impels the moral and material universe. The Power named four times in
“Mont Blanc” is the “secret strength of things / Which governs thought, and to the
infinite dome / Of heaven is as a law” (139-141). This power is necessarily good; though
our responses toward it might make us experience “awful doubt” (77), it is in no way an
evil principle. It is the same power that Shelley describes multiple times in On
Christianity when he renders different impressions of God. It is the “interfused and
overruling Spirit of all the energy and wisdom included within the circle of existing
things” (230). Christ, according to Shelley, “represents this power [God] as something
mysteriously and illimitably pervading the frame of things” (230), as the “benignant
visitings from the invisible energies by which [one who has seen God] is surrounded”
(231). 95 And, in direct support of the claim for a universal Power that is inherently good
and impels our own inherently “benevolent propensities,” Shelley argues:
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In every case the human mind enjoys the utmost pleasure which it is
capable of enjoying. God is represented by Jesus Christ as the Power from
which or thro [sic] which streams of all that is excellent and delightful
flow; the Power which models, as they pass, all the elements of this mixed
universe to the purest and most perfect shape which it belongs to their
nature to assume. (234-35; my emphasis)
It is difficult to interpret this claim otherwise than as the affirmation of a ruling
necessity that is also necessarily good. When reading “Mont Blanc,” however, the Power
seems very far from distributing good across “The works and ways of man” (92); at best
it is imagined as indifferent, removed, alien, and absent a will or intention. There is an
earlier corollary to the lines quoted above from On Christianity, which applies the
modeling of “elements of this mixed universe” to more specifically human ones, and
which might account for the impassive tone pervading “Mont Blanc.” After discounting
as ridiculous and fanatical the doctrine of a “peculiar Providence,” the idea that God will
“punish the vicious and reward the virtuous,” Shelley counters that God is not one who
exacts vengeance and consigns to hell “the most venerable of names [Shelley is referring
to the great Poets of the past]” (232). Rather, he writes, God is representative of “that
merciful and benignant power who scatters equally upon the beautiful earth all the
elements of security and happiness, whose influencings are distributed to all whose
natures admit of a participation in them, who sends to the weak and vicious creatures of
his will all the benefits they are capable of sharing […]” (232-33). Just as vice and virtue
are largely matters of degree rather than kind, denominators of how capacious or narrow
the circle of self becomes, the “weak and vicious” might see God in proportion as they
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“are capable,” to the extent they “admit of a participation” in the freely given “elements
of security and happiness.” Whereas in “Ode to the West Wind” we see full admittance to
participation in this Power, or at the very least a prayer for such admittance, “Mont
Blanc” is yet a beginning or an end; the senses are still awakening, or, conversely, they
are retrospectively imagining the hopes and promises of Mont Blanc’s “mysterious
tongue” (76) in the face of a failure, a failure to, as Wasserman put it, “release into
Existence […] the Power that will effect man’s moral regeneration” (239).
Moreover, the Power of Mont Blanc is rendered visibly by the senses, and though
this is also true of the materiality of the text “Mont Blanc,” the Power in the poem is
further rendered positively in metaphorical language—“awful scene, / Where Power in
likeness of the Arve comes down” (15-16). The actual, the essential Power, the thing-initself remains invisible, muted, unknowable and impermanent, “Remote, serene, and
inaccessible” (97), “still, snowy, and serene” (61). The Power reveals itself and is
experienced as darkness and light, “shadows and sunbeams” (15), and the poem and
mountain are “some faint image” (47) of it, outward manifestations of Shelley’s universal
benignant principle. James Rieger argues that “Power is inscrutable except through its
outward emblems. But ‘This, the naked countenance of earth’ and ‘these primeval
mountains’ suggest the force informing them even as the experiential accidents of bread
and wine lead ‘the adverting mind’ to bleeding flesh, the substance they conceal from
taste and eyesight (98-100)” (90).96 But how is one lead from bread and wine to bleeding
flesh, Mont Blanc to “a faith so mild” (77) and the “repeal / [of] Large codes of fraud and
woe” (80-81)? Interpreting Christ’s declaration that man does not live by bread alone,
Shelley writes, “[p]ermit, therefore, the spirit of this benignant principle to visit your
96
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intellectual frame, or, in other words become just and pure” (On Christianity, 248). Yet
how does the mountain impel justness and purity?
One response to this question begins with the confusions of meaning that often
accompany rhetorical figures of speech and writing, and nature’s own special
communicative method regarding them. I mentioned above that in Speculations on
Morals Shelley argued how the “philosophy of slavery and superstition,” or moral duty
being bounded to an obligation, was a sophism attributable to the “abuse of a
metaphorical expression to a literal purpose” (74). His thoughts on correct interpretive
modes occur twice in On Christianity. He says Jesus Christ “attributes to this power
[God] the faculty of will. How far such a doctrine in its ordinary sense may be
philosophically true, or how far Jesus Christ intentionally availed himself of a metaphor
easily understood, is foreign to the subject” (235). If it is foreign to the immediate subject
at hand in this section of the essay, since he continues to show how the will attributed to
God becomes reflected in humanity’s selfish will, thus perpetuating the notion that God
intentionally inflicts pain on beings whom he has “endowed with sensation” (239), it is
certainly salient to my larger point that reading rightly the character of an expression,
whether word or image, is essential for Shelley’s notion of developing the right character.
Later on in the essay, Shelley again cautions against the trap of literalism, where he
interprets Christ’s expressions of moral philosophy: “If we would profit by the wisdom of
a sublime and poetically mind [Christ’s] we must beware of the vulgar error of
interpreting literally every expression which it employs” (247).
This claim above concludes one of the more sophisticated and revealing sections
of the essay, where Shelley admits that Christ, like all great reformers, employed a
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refined and highly developed rhetorical method not only to communicate his message but
also, more significantly, to prepare and essentially model his audience’s mind for the
truth. In order to do so, argues Shelley, Christ, or any great reformer, must clothe his
language in the familiar images and metaphors, values and prejudices, of his audience.
Shelley admits that this entails deception and insincerity, and laments the fact, but “this
practice of entire sincerity towards other men would avail to no good end, if they were
incapable of practising it towards their own minds. In fact, truth cannot be communicated
until it is perceived” (243). And the truth must be perceived with the clarity of a “precise
and rigid image which is present to the mind” (243), which cannot occur until the senses
are sharply attuned to its timely reception. The proper disposition toward the truth readies
and prepares the individual for a particular moment of sensory experience, a new vision
in the most comprehensive sense, one where understanding, knowledge, desire, and
action converge. Rereading Christ’s message, Shelley enumerates specific ways of living
and thinking that prepare the individual to see God and know the truth. “Who dares to
examine and to estimate every imagination which suggests itself to his own mind, who is
that which he designs to become, and only aspires to that which the divinity of his own
nature shall consider and approve,” Shelley breathlessly exhorts, in reality playing the
role of the rhetorically sophisticated reformer, delivering Christ’s teachings in a manner
suited to his own emphasis on the moral consequences of imaginative creation.
Shelley’s critique is at once his interpretation of Christ’s teachings and his own
experience with Intellectual Beauty and its Power. There is a clear analogy between the
poet-speaker hearing the voice of Mont Blanc and those who hear the true message of
Christ. As imagined and read by Shelley, Christ experiences and embodies divine
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visitation; they both “have seen God, have, in the period of their purer and more perfect
nature, been harmonized by their own will to so exquisite [a] consentaneity of powers as
to give forth divinest melody when the breath of universal being sweeps over their frame”
(232). 97 In both this and the context o f “Mont Blanc,” seeing God is “consentaneously”
feeling God; or, somewhat more in line with the process by which Shelley composes
“Mont Blanc,” feeling God precedes the harmonizing Power through which the “divinest
melody” of the poem manifests in language. Just as Shelley makes clear at the conclusion
of On Christianity, that the “system of equality which they [Christ’s apostles] established,
necessarily fell to the ground, because it is a system that must result from, rather than
precede the moral improvement of human kind” (251-252), so too must the poetspeaker’s sensory perceptions improve to the point of a “consentaneity of powers” in
order to understand, and make others understand, the voice of the mountain, the
wilderness’s “mysterious tongue” (76). Another look is required at the lines “And this,
the naked countenance of earth, / On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains /
Teach the adverting mind” (98-100) to make explicit nature’s communicative powers in
effecting virtue.
The this, the “naked countenance of earth,” reveals an instance in which nature is
entirely bereft of metaphor by the poet-speaker’s gaze. There is no longer any possible
misunderstanding attributable to confused literal or metaphorical interpretations of the
text. This is because, in effect, there is no more text, only a “naked countenance.”
However, and I will return to this issue momentarily, of course a text remains present,
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one which refers to its very absence as “naked countenance,” and, moreover, there is a
subject “I” reading, or “gazing,” on it. At this moment of the poem too, the poet-speaker
both suffers and recognizes the specific knowledge that nature teaches; namely, that
“Power dwells apart in its tranquility / Remote, serene, and inaccessible:” (96-97), lines
immediately preceding the “naked countenance of earth” that teaches this knowledge.
There is also a truth about the relationship between nature and history revealed in “even
these primeval mountains,” that nature is endowed only with our own histories, that it
possesses none of its own, that time itself appears not to be one of its inherent
attributes—“the strange sleep / Which when the voices of the desert fail / Wraps all in its
own deep eternity” (27-29); “all seems eternal now” (75); and the beginning line, of
course, “The everlasting universe of things” (1), of which we are a part and separate.
The encounter with the naked countenance of earth reconfirms that, like some
pure primeval language which would parallel primeval nature, like a language entirely
bereft of metaphor and coincident with all referents, would dissolve history and memory.
One can hear this in Shelley’s letter to Thomas Love Peacock when he and Mary visited
Chamouni: “I never knew I never imagined what mountains were before” (Letters I; 497).
In other words, I never knew I had no memory of mountains until I gazed on mountains
so imposing that I forgot the memories of mountains that obviously I had imagined. The
italicized this is actually a struggle to metaphorize a faceless face that will not return the
poet-speaker’s gaze, to mark the “primeval mountains” as the beginning of history rather
than beyond history. It is an attempt to inscribe a face onto the blankness of an
unrecognized “other” in order to create a community. Yet Mont Blanc is always there in
its absence—“the power is there” (127) might be read as both reassuring mantra and
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emphatic declaration—in its literal metaphorization of the Power that, like itself, “dwells
apart,” inaccessible to human knowledge, but profoundly affecting human sensory
perception, which for Shelley is the source of truth. The lesson nature teaches the
individual who rightly interprets its voice is not the naturalization of solitude, but the
solitary nature of acquiring its moral knowledge, which the “wise, and great, and good /
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel” (82-83). “This” is the moral knowledge drawn
from the realization that nature is the extreme Other, yet as such nature most animates
individuals in solitary encounters. Because nature carries no memory or history, it is free
to teach the solitary and “adverting” mind the moral imperative of community.
Within this sphere of essential difference between individual and social existence,
Shelley lays down his most powerful claim for moral science. Through a surface/depth
analysis of human behavior, Shelley constructs two distinct “classes of human agency,
common in a degree to every human being” (Speculations on Morals, 82). The image he
conveys of human society is extensive and merits extensive quotation.
To attain an apprehension of the importance of this distinction, let us visit,
in imagination, the proceedings of some metropolis. Consider the
multitude of human beings who inhabit it, and survey in thought the
actions of the several classes into which they are divided. Their obvious
actions are apparently uniform: the stability of human society seems to be
maintained sufficiently by the uniformity of the conduct of its members,
both with regard to themselves, and with regard to others. The labourer
arises at a certain hour, and applies himself to the task enjoined him. The
functionaries of government and law are regularly employed in their office
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and courts. The trader holds a train of conduct from which he never
deviates. The ministers of religion employ an accustomed language, and
maintain a decent and equable regard. The army is drawn forth, the
motions of every soldier are such as they were expected to be; the general
commands, and his words are echoed from troop to troop. The domestic
actions of men are, for the most part, undistinguishable one from the
other, at a superficial glance. The actions which are classed under the
general appellation of marriage, education, friendship, &c., are perpetually
going on, and to a superficial glance, are similar one to the other.
But, if we would see the truth of things, they must be stripped of this
fallacious appearance of uniformity. In truth, no one action has, when
considered in its whole extent, an essential resemblance with any other.
Each individual, who composing the vast multitude which we have been
contemplating, has a peculiar frame of mind, which, whilst the features of
the great mass of his actions remain uniform, impresses the minuter
lineaments with its peculiar hues. (81-82; my emphasis).
This passage is striking for several reasons, not the least of which is the moral
corollary of stripping false uniformity to “naked countenance of earth,” or gazing on
“primeval mountains” (original and ancient mountains, without comparison) to the
absence of “essential resemblance” each person has to one another. The mountains
Shelley imagined prior to Mont Blanc and its “subject mountains” (62), prior to his never
knowing he never imagined, were obvious, uniform, superficial, and “such as they were
expected to be.” The naked countenance and blank expression of Mont Blanc’s whiteness
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is ironically what “impresses the minuter lineaments” of each individual’s relationship
toward one another with its “peculiar hues.” The sui generis aspect of Mont Blanc and the
poet’s disposition toward it teaches the “adverting mind” because the mind is now in a
receptive mode, a passive though critically alert form of consciousness in which “Large
codes of fraud and woe” no longer can be inscribed through a uniform, predictable,
conventional, and uncritical life.
William Keach concludes his reading of the poem by noting that its final word,
“vacancy” (144), in its ambiguous relationship to the overall rhyme sequence, suggests
Shelley is responding to David Hume’s argument that “the mind’s attempt to make sense
of them [the operations of the phenomenal world] as necessity are nothing more than
arbitrary impositions” (200).98 Keach then quotes, in fact, a passage from Hume’s An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that might have been at the forefront of
Shelley’s mind when he claimed “no one action […] has an essential resemblance to any
other.” Hume claims that “[e]very effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not,
therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori,
must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the
cause must appear equally arbitrary” (19). Thus, the invention and imaginative leap of
faith we engage in when we ascribe any determinism to the physical laws of nature is as
illusory and superficial as deriving moral knowledge from the general “proceedings of a
metropolis.”
Paul de Man has constructed an entire reading practice centered on a similar idea,
the “positing power of language” (116).99 Shelley’s language, according to de Man, acts

98
99

Shelley’s Style. Methuen, 1984.
“Shelley Disfigured.” 1979. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. Columbia UP, 1984.
101

with such force that whatever determinism can be ascribed to it is interpretable only in
the very act of its occurrence; it imposes itself like a freely occurring catastrophic event:
“The positing power of language is both entirely arbitrary, in having a strength that
cannot be reduced to necessity, and entirely inexorable in there is no alternative to it. It
stands beyond the polarities of chance and determination” (116). Like the sun, de Man
insists, it appears “detached from all antecedents […], of its own related power” (116).
Because “language cannot posit meaning” (117), according to de Man, meaning and
sense follow from our imposing it onto the senseless positings of language. Language is
natural and we impose its positivity in order to construct ideologies, histories,
philosophies, any system of knowledge. We pretend, in other words, or else never gain
the insight that we are the blind products of mad words. De Man makes his case for the
positional power of language specifically, and argues Shelley’s power as a Romantic
poet coincides with it alone, not Shelley’s historical role and place within the larger
revolutionary spirit of his time. He and other deconstructionists have therefore been
criticized for too great a concern with the “sheer power of utterance” or the destabilizing
cultural conclusions that ensue when “language cannot posit meaning” (117).
These criticisms are merited, but as we have seen, Shelley’s argument for moral
knowledge anticipates de Man’s claim that “nothing […] ever happens in relation,
positive or negative, to anything that precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere” (122). The
Power of Mont Blanc is positional in that it imposes itself, like the snow that deposits
there, on the mind that recognizes it. Recognition of that Power partly consists in
knowledge of the moral freedom of random acts independent of the past. Within the
superficial mode of moral perspective it is the past that for Shelley informs the behaviors,
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values and beliefs acculturated by custom and convention. The past is what makes us
homogenously superficial in our relations with other people and with institutions. Shelley
describes it as the power of what we might call ideology, its influence and compass is
that pervasive:
Almost all that which is ostensible submits to that legislature created by
the general representation of the past feelings of mankind—imperfect as it
is from a variety of causes, as it exists in the government, the religion, and
domestic habits. Those who do not nominally, yet actually, submit to the
same power. The external features of their conduct, indeed, can no more
escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream of the wind; and his
opinion, which he often hopes he has dispassionately secured from all
contagion of prejudice and vulgarity, would be found, on examination, to
be the inevitable excrescence of the very usages from which he
vehemently dissents. Internally all is conducted otherwise; the efficiency,
the essence, the vitality of actions, derives its colour from what is no wise
contributed to from any external source. (Speculations on Morals, 82-83;
my emphasis).
The distinction is between the power of the world, which imposes itself on us from
without and without our even knowing it, making us ventriloquize the opinions,
behaviors and values of others, and the Power of which Mont Blanc is the worldly
emblem. The twin effects of the wilderness’s “mysterious tongue” (76), which are “awful
doubt” or “faith so mild” (77), disclose themselves according to our ability to interpret
and read morally. The one remains tethered to the past, the other grounds itself in nothing
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but the spontaneously free occurrence of the moment, from which the future begins. If,
according to Shelley, we refuse to visit “[t]he deepest abyss of this vast and
multitudinous cavern,” the source of our internal goodness, and only rely on that
“legislature created by the general representation of the past feelings of mankind,” then
we are imprisoned by perpetual reference to a false law. The past is death, as Cythna
declared in Laon and Cythna, so virtue begins with self-forgiveness and the prospect of
future pleasure. Jerrod Hogle’s reading of “Mont Blanc,” as does his reading of all
Shelley’s poetry, relies on the endless transformation and concealment of the referent. He
sees in “Mont Blanc” a “desire to penetrate every complex to ‘something’ deeper or
higher and a need to divert every glance at any target (outward or inward) toward some
different point, some resemblance, where that something might possibly lie.”100
I understand Hogle’s claim to be Shelley’s moral problem in the poem, one his
moral theory seeks to solve. The ‘something’ to which Hogle refers has too many
referents. The need for a moral theory follows from rather than founds itself in the
endless multiplication of referents, their displacements and transformations. An act of
goodness must be self-contained and free from the “inevitable excrescences” of the past.
Otherwise, “The secret strength of things / Which governs thought, and to the infinite
dome / Of heaven is as a law” (139-141) becomes a vacant placeholder for more finite
worldly “codes of fraud and woe” (81), rather than the love which penetrates the healthy,
Promethean self-consciousness.
It is not by chance that Shelley quotes Wordsworth twice in these two pieces on
morality, once in Speculations on Morals and once in On Christianity. In each instance
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Shelley chooses “Tintern Abbey,” a poem of excessive memory that demands recovery
and integration. Toward the conclusion of Speculations on Morals Shelley names
Wordsworth’s “—‘those little, nameless unremembered acts / Of kindness and of love’”
which exert the “vital influence on the happiness of others […] so much the more are
they distinct from those of other men”101—“Unremembered” and so separate from the
“legislature created by the general representation of the past feelings of mankind.” They
constitute the actions of the moment in their quotidian steadfastness. They make life
worth living and represent a well lived life. These acts are “nameless” because to name
them would systematize and narrativize them into both abstractions and memory. They
work outside the contiguities of legislated laws and the external relationships between
members of a community. These are the vital actions of our humanity or inhumanity “so
that hemlock continues to be poison, and the violet does not cease to emit its odour in
whatever soil it may grow” (Speculations on Morals, 83). As I have been arguing, freed
from the locks of custom, a self freed from the past is free to act from the difference that
confers dignity, rather than the conformity that prevents it.
The second quotation from “Tintern Abbey” occurs in On Christianity in the
section on God. Shelley imagines the emotional impact that Job and Ecclesiastes
produced on Christ’s “youthful hope,” concluding that it “made audible to his listening
heart ‘The still, sad music of humanity / Not harsh or grating but of ample power / To
chasten and subdue’” (229, “Tintern Abbey” 91-93; my emphasis).102 In Wordsworth’s
poem, nature plays the music of humanity, or nature makes it heard, when once the poet-
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speaker matures from the sensuous excesses of youth and enters a more deeply felt
relationship toward the natural world. The “faith so mild, / So solemn, so serene” is
Shelley’s version of “still, sad music of humanity,” except that Tintern Abbey does not
seem to offer the poet-speaker Mont Blanc’s potential for “awful doubt.” This makes
sense considering “Tintern Abbey” is a more particularized rendering of poetic
meditation than the representative “Mont Blanc”; ironically, the mood of Wordsworth’s
poem feels more like his “own separate fantasy” (“Mont Blanc” 36) than Shelley’s allencompassing monologue. Yet the “ample power” of the “still, sad music of humanity,”
like the Power of Mont Blanc, chastens and subdues in the context of society. It makes
empathic those who translate and those who hear its melody. Wordsworth is certainly one
of the elite, one of “Mont Blanc’s” “wise, and great, and good” (82) whose role it is to
“Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel” the voice of the Mountain. And although
according to “Mont Blanc” this process begins with a sort of revelatory decryption by
individual genius of “Large codes of fraud of woe” (81), the desired aim is at its core
social, communitarian and egalitarian. What is at stake is the moral being of humanity.
The “adverting mind” of “Mont Blanc” reveals a tension, or rather irony, of how
the “wise, and great, and good” (82) translate the mountain’s power, how the virtue of the
few can become that of the many. Critics often mention the difficult syntax of “The
Wilderness has a mysterious tongue / Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild, / So
solemn, so serene, that man may be / But for such faith with nature reconciled” (76-79;
emphasis mine),103 but few critics have paid attention, perhaps ironically so, to the
ambiguous meaning of “adverting,” and what this means to a poem whose speaker is
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alone both in nature and, as the final lines suggest—“And what were thou, and earth, and
stars, and sea, / If to the human mind’s imaginings / Silence and solitude were vacancy?”
(142-144)—possibly all alone by virtue of thought itself. The choice of “adverting” to
describe “the mind” (my emphasis), significantly not my mind or minds, seems like a
curious choice at first, if only for no other reason than Shelley never used the word again
in any of his published poems. “Advert” of course means to pay attention to or take heed
of, to refer someone to something. “Adverting” entails a turning like troping, and its
placement as a modifier for “mind” at this moment of the poem, when “this, the naked
countenance of the earth” (97), that which the poet-speaker can hardly name or adopt the
proper stance toward, marks a crisis of reference, since the blank peak of Mont Blanc will
not return the gaze of its beholder.
Further complicating the relationship of gazer to the object of gaze is the syntax
of “On which I gaze” (99). Does this mean that the “naked countenance of earth” is the
object of the poet-speaker’s gaze, or is the “naked countenance of earth” the place from
which the poet-speaker gazes? That is, does the poet-speaker refer to standing literally on
the earth, the ground, thus erasing any possibility of inscribing a face onto the “naked
countenance”? Does the earth become the ground of the poet-speaker’s reference; does
nature become the grounds for all possibility of reference, and, if silence and solitude are
vacancy, if the gap between the mountain and the man is irreconcilable, then what does
that say about the reality of the man?
These questions inevitably present themselves to readers of “Mont Blanc” but I
am more interested in how the “naked countenance of the earth” teaches the “adverting
mind” its specific lesson of moral being. Sublimely impressed by the scenery and
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landscape of the Chamouni valley, the Arve and Mont Blanc, Shelley writes in his letter
to Thomas Love Peacock: “All was as much our own as if we had been the creators of
such impressions in the minds of others, as now occupied our own.—Nature was poet
whose harmony held our spirits more breathless than that of the divinest” (Letters II;
497). Here the mountain defaces Shelley, renders him breathless, certainly not dead but
near that state where life approaches death in the blank awe of its impassiveness. Shelley
reads the poem that the mountain is writing. It then becomes not a matter of the
“adverting mind” turning toward and taking heed of the voice of the mountain, but
“a()verting” the mountain, that is to say turning away and avoiding it, so becoming the
ground or the “creators of such impressions in the minds of others.” The blank
placeholder of a single letter, a vacancy, in other words, since Mont Blanc can only write
vacant characters as the “naked countenance of the earth,” turns the author of it into the
gazer and Shelley into the object of the gaze. The otherness of nature passes into the
nature of others by virtue of Shelley’s interpretation of its face. In this sense the power
made manifest in the mountain remains the unacknowledged legislator of the world.
When it comes time for Shelley himself to compose the poem that he reads in
Mont Blanc, the inverse occurs and it is the poet-speaker’s face that gazes on and adverts
to the blank whiteness of the mountain. Yet Mont Blanc retains something of this
interchange in the neutral “adverting mind.” A considerable portion of this mind is the
Power of Mont Blanc, which is why the line does not read “Teach my or man’s adverting
mind or minds.” 104 Though the “naked countenance of earth” will not return the poetspeaker’s gaze, the “this” which tries to name it recognizes the possibility of the double
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turn carried within “a()verting,” a turning away from the mountain and toward the social,
as well as a turn toward the mountain and away from the social. The vacant character that
Mont Blanc presents to the beholder of it becomes something entirely different at the end
of the poem: “[N]aked countenance” is now thee and thou: “The secret strength of things
/ Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome / Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!”
(139-141), and “what were thou […]” (142). The “adverting mind” of the poet-speaker,
far from alienated or terrified by the nothingness that seems to lurk just beyond the limits
of the final lines, breaches through the vacancy by paying excessive attention to the
Power that inhabits Mont Blanc. If the poet-speaker continued the poem, continued
heeding the fantasy of his own imaginings in the face of the mountain, then silence and
solitude might only be vacancy. Yet Mont Blanc and the poem teach the moral
imperative that the “wise, and great, and good” must avert their minds from the faceless
mountains to begin their moral work among human faces, to begin a community of
people rather than primeval mountains, earth, stars, and sea. Through its perceived
indifference of, and distance from, us, the mountain teaches love by making accessible
the sympathy that interpenetrates the human community.
“Ode to the West Wind” and the Moral Limits of the Poem
In “Mont Blanc” the power was there (127); yet in “Ode to the West Wind” the
power, or rather the wind, moves everywhere (13). In the “Ode” there are no “wise, and
great, and good” to translate, interpret and communicate moral truth to others; yet there is
an “I” that “fall[s] upon the thorns of life” and “bleed[s]” (54). “Mont Blanc” represents
the morality of the head; the “Ode” represents the morality of the heart. The immense
form that so shocked Shelley’s senses at Chamounix becomes flesh in the “Ode,” its
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“incantation” (65) aspires to incarnation. 105 Even an analogous vacancy carried over into
the “Ode,” the subterranean “chasms,” cannot escape the wind, as the “Atlantic’s level
powers / Cleave themselves in chasms” (37-38). The cosmic indifference that “Mont
Blanc” speculates careens into a manic engagement with the wind, echoing a divine
afflatus that seeks effect outside the world of the poem. Insofar as “Mont Blanc”
meditates on what is real, questioning even the reality of its own meditation, Shelley
presents “Ode to the West Wind” as the real thing, as the this at the heart of change, a
poem so invested with moral and elemental transformation that the driving hope of both it
and its speaker is metamorphosis by wind and fire. The “Ode” tries to move beyond its
structure as a poem, just as the speaker of it tries to move beyond the limits of selfconsciousness.
But the problem is that “Ode to the West Wind” remains the petition—an
apostrophe seeking the immediate address of presence—of a poet at a particular time and
place in history, even as the speaker commands the wind to generate the future from the
remains of the poem, spring from winter. By remains I refer not only to the regenerative
cultural and moral nourishment attributed to the “dead thoughts” (63) and combustible
“words” (67) of the poet-speaker, but also to how Shelley sees himself proleptically as
poet, as he imagines himself in the posthumous future, “like a corpse within its grave”
(8). More than just the west wind is petitioned in this text; a plea is also made for an
afterlife for both poet and poem, and this imagining of a posthumous future accounts,
along with the “Ode’s” ritualistic and incantatory overtones, for the strong solicitation of
the reader’s response. “[H]ear, O, hear! O, hear! O, hear!” (14, 28, 42), the exclamatory
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refrain, is part of the poem’s magic, a way for the reader to re-invoke “the breath of
Autumn’s being” (1) through the simple homophonous command of presence and prayer.
And it is this comprehensive democratic participation in the spell of the poem106 which
informs its moral imperative: Love.
The poem’s straining beyond its own textuality to become one with the wind has
its moral equivalent in Shelley’s definition of Love: “The great secret of morals is Love;
or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful
which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own” (Defence, 517). Several
sentences later in the Defence of Poetry the imagination is named as the “great instrument
of moral good.” Shelley asserts that “[p]oetry administers to the effect by acting upon the
cause. Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it […]”
(517). If the “Ode” is conceived as an imaginative circumference, then clearly an
eruption occurs that breaks its boundary, an eruption both temporal and social. This
eruption entails a loss, a sacrifice of the present self for the future, expansive self. Beyond
the Orphic myth of self-dissolution/dismemberment, the destruction that precedes and
predicts regeneration, the process of self-transformation that the “Ode” describes is a
selfless act of love for the social (and future) good. The fear and promise of the final
famous question, “O Wind, / If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?”, issues forth
from the leap of faith it implies. As I quoted earlier, Shelley wrote, “Pain or pleasure, if
subtly analysed, will be found to consist entirely in prospect.” The imaginative individual
sees further than the selfish one. In the “Ode” the poet-speaker cannot see far enough. In
essence, he thus blinds himself so that others might see. The self-dissolution that the
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poem seems to offer as a path toward social renewal is necessary to transport the poem’s
audience from a state of slumber to wakefulness.
Therefore I want to argue that “Ode to the West Wind” is an instrumental instance
of Shelley’s future-oriented politics, aesthetics, and, not often assigned under this familiar
temporal category for Shelley, morality. First, the poem’s heavy reliance on the reader’s
participation in the orphic ritual it enacts promotes a transhistorical moral communion
between poet and audience; and, secondly, the poem relies on the anticipation of both the
poet-speaker’s death and the death of the historical context everywhere present in the
poem as sacrifices for the moral good of society. Yet the power of the west wind is
transferable to whoever recites the words of the “Ode.” The speaker inhales the wind in
order to exhale a regenerative breath, inflaming in the process the ashes and sparks of
history’s fading coals. This explanation is not necessarily a novel interpretation of the
reader-response element of the poem,107 yet by reading “Ode to the West Wind” in
conjunction with critical debates about the poem’s historical consciousness, the urgent
and expansive moral case that the “Ode” presents becomes clearer.
In the seminal biography Shelley: The Pursuit (1975),108 Richard Holmes details
several of the unorthodox methods Shelley employed after returning from Ireland in 1812
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for distributing his radical political writings. Holmes describes how Shelley threw bottles
filled with what he called “vessels of heavenly medicine” (his Declaration of Rights and
the “The Devil’s Walk”)109 into the sea, constructed miniature boats laden with his
political pamphlets which he set sail, and, as the sonnet “To a balloon, laden with
Knowledge” (1812) attests, attached his early seditious writings to fire balloons. 110
Notwithstanding the brash naiveté and romantic aspirations of these youthful
attempts to incite political and moral change, anticipated perhaps by the insomnia-fueled
distribution of The Necessity of Atheism on the grounds of Oxford University over a year
earlier, we get the sense of absence and mediation in Shelley’s relationship toward his
public, even at this early stage of his career. His ideal reader and his ideal time have not
come yet; they are, in fact, “far behind” him. This literal send off of his writings into the
ocean, consigning his words both to possible death yet also to possible rebirth in an
unknown context with an as yet unknown audience (readers everywhere and nowhere, all
future readers and no future readers), mirrors the desire for annihilation that gives the
“Ode” its power. One must also read the lines “If I were […] / A wave to pant beneath
thy power, and share / The impulse of thy strength” (44-46) in an entirely new light. The
message in a bottle metaphor, the moral tenor in the poem’s vehicle, becomes
compounded and problematized by the fact that Shelley previously had literally
committed a portion of that “I” into the contents of the bottles tossed into the sea, the
Bristol Channel fed by the “Atlantic’s level powers” (37); but the image in the poem and
the biographical fact speak to the relentless identification of the poet-speaker with the
west wind. The same comparison can be made of Shelley’s fire balloons “spread / On the
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blue surface of thine airy surge […] from whose solid atmosphere / Black rain, and fire,
and hail will burst” (18-19, 27-28). The point of departure for these literal speech acts,
the “going out of our own nature,” is the moral spirit of nature, whether air, water, or
earth. Shelley’s actions in 1812 intentionally resign and cede control of his words to their
natural end in an effort to “share / The impulse of thy strength, only less free / Than thou,
O, Uncontrollable!” (45-47).
In the context of the poem this constitutes the paradox of religious humiliation.
Whereas in “Mont Blanc” sublimity substantially informs both the poet-speaker’s
perception of the external world and the moral lessons derivable from it, in the “Ode” the
wind’s descent into the poet-speaker carries him toward a condition of decomposition and
annihilation.111 But of course the symbolic sundering of the poet-speaker’s self through
the inhalation of the wind is a sublime elevation in its own right. James Rieger argues
that the “Ode” is a completely Christian poem, citing the apostle Paul as the germ of the
metempsychosis that the poem describes: “Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not
quickened, except it die […] So also is the resurrection of the dead. 112 It is sown in
corruption; it is raised in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is
sown in weakness; it is raised in power” (I Cor. 15.36, 42-43). The way down as the way
up is an ancient conceit (“Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth” (64)) but we must
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question what or who dies in the poem and what or who is resurrected. As I mentioned at
the beginning of the chapter, a dialectic between submission and mastery joins together
the moral moods of “Mont Blanc” and “Ode to the West Wind.” Submission to the
mountain’s power redounds with mastery of the west wind’s love; and to master love is
to submit to power. The implicit dialectic operating at the end of the poem’s first stanza,
“Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere; / Destroyer and Preserver” (13-14) becomes
translated in the last as a direct and desperate plea to overcome the limits of self and
poem: “Be thou, Spirit fierce, / My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one!” (61-62).113 The
poet implores the spirit to destroy him in order to preserve him; yet this occurs in the
context of a curious grammatical substitution. In one sense “My” and “me” refer directly
to Shelley himself, since in the previous fourth stanza we read:
If even
I were as in my boyhood, and could be
The comrade of thy wanderings over Heaven,
As then, when to outstrip the skiey speed
Scarce seemed a vision; (47-51)
And then the fourth stanza’s final couplet reads: “A heavy weight of hours has chained
and bowed / One too like thee: tameless, and swift, and proud” (55-56). “Tameless, and
swift, and proud” are both positive and negative attributes of Shelley, the wind, and the
reader. Their qualities merge into the dialectic of submission and mastery. However, if
the poet is already too much like the wind he calls on to transform him, tameless, swift,
and proud, then there is little chance of being reborn as that wind. Yet if the wind is
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“Uncontrollable” (47) and, as “less free” (46), the poet is in fact qualitatively different
than the wind, then the chance of material and moral regeneration “by the incantation of
this verse” (65) seems only a rhetorical hope, because the grounds for renewed life would
always remain a condition of servitude, of being “less free”—to incant the poem would
always reinscribe its limits as poem.
This is part of the paradox that occupies the space of the poem’s possible moral
efficacy. If we turn back to the explicit and emphatic use of pronouns toward the end of
the poem, the “If I” (43-44) repetitions, “I fall” and “I bleed” (54), “too like thee” (56),
“Make me thy lyre” (57), “Be thou […] My,” “Be thou me” (61-62), and “my words” and
“my lips” (67-68), then determining who they ultimately refer to, poet, wind, or reader,
becomes an impossible task, but this is the point. Their confusion and “vacancy” call
attention to Shelley’s claims in On Love (1818) and On Life (1819). At the very
beginning of On Love, Shelley admits, “I know not the internal constitution of other men,
or even of thine whom I now address” (Norton 503).The next paragraph begins in an
oddly accusatory tone: “Thou demandest what is Love” (503). We do not know who
Thou is, anymore than Shelley knows who he now addresses with his words. In On Life
Shelley probes even further into the literal and metaphorical unknown:
The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting
between the assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks
employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind. […] The
words I, and you, and they are grammatical devices invented simply for
arrangement and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually
attached to them. It is difficult to find terms adequately to express so
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subtle a conception as that to which the intellectual philosophy has
conducted us. We are on that verge where words abandon us, and what
wonder if we grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of—how little we
know. (Norton 508; my emphasis)
In this passage, where we see a movement from “assemblages,” or a gathering together,
to abandonment, a scattering apart, an image of Orpheus appears and with it a clearer
picture of the reader’s transhistorical role in “Ode to the West Wind.”
I will first briefly comment on what might be termed Shelley’s orphism in order
to show the reader’s transhistorical role in the poem, and then secondly I will show how
James Chandler’s historicist and Orrin Wang’s deconstructist reading of the “Ode”
adhere to and are influenced by Shelley’s orphism. In Prometheus Unbound, the principal
poem of the volume in which the “Ode” was published, Shelley famously called language
“a perpetual Orphic song, / Which rules with Daedal harmony a throng / Of thoughts and
forms, which else senseless and shapeless were” (4.415-17). Orpheus, however, in the
myth as Ovid tells it in Metamorphoses (8 A.D.), eventually ends up senseless and
shapeless, having been thrashed, dismembered, and stoned to death by a mob of Thracian
women, the Maenads, devotees of Bacchus, who appear in Shelley’s “Ode.” The reason
for their murder was Orpheus’s subsequent swearing off all women upon losing Eurydice
to the underworld, to which the “Ode’s” third line, among other meanings, references:
“Like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing” Orpheus’s gaze. In the poem’s most explicit
allusion to Orpheus’s sacrifice, we see “Like the bright hair uplifted from the head / Of
some fierce Maenad, even from the dim verge / Of the horizon to the zenith’s height, /
The locks of the approaching storm” (20-23; my emphasis); or that “verge where words
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abandon us,” that verge when the myth might metamorphosize into history. Ovid’s
account of the death of Orpheus, and the spirit of the myth of Orpheus, inhabit the whole
of Shelley’s poem:
They [Maenads] hastened back
to finish off the seer, who, with raised hands,
spoke words unheeded for the first time ever,
------------------------------------------------------and past those lips—ah, Jupiter!—to which
the stones would listen and the beasts respond,
his exhaled ghost receded on the winds.
For you now, Orpheus, the grieving birds,
the thronging beasts, the sharp, unyielding rocks,
the trees that often gathered for your songs,
and which, like men who tear their hair in grief,
have shed their leaves for you—all these now wept,
-----------------------------------------------------------------His limbs lay scattered all about;
---------------------------------------Now head and lyre are borne down to the sea
------------------------------------------------------The shade of Orpheus now fled below,
and recognized all he had seen before. (Metam., XI, 53-85)114
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The poet-speaker in the “Ode” exclaims, “I bleed” (54) and shares, as his
communicant, Orpheus’s suffering and, he hopes, his fate. One might conclude that it is
actually Orpheus who bleeds: “the stones were reddened with a poet’s blood” (Metam,
XI, 27). Often read as Shelley’s high Romantic histrionic shrilling, “I fall upon the thorns
of life! I bleed!” is rather an identification with the mystery and power of ancient
Dionysiac, Orphic, and Christic sacrifice. Rieger notes the dialectic nature of the
particular ritual being invoked: “He (Orpheus) celebrates a feast in which he is at once
the minister, the eaten god, and the human devourer, fulfilling thereby the triple function
formulated by the terrible figure at the center of every Eucharist: hoc est enim meum
corpus.”115 If we begin to view the relationship between poem and reader as eucharistic,
as a shared communion of the west wind, then “this is my body,” this is my blood, would
seem to constitute the implicit utterance the wind and reader must hear, the structuring
and literal form behind the poem’s metaphorical content. “This is my body” is a
simultaneous declaration of subjectivity and objectivity, body and spirit, individual
agency and historical fate.
Reading the poem in terms of the Eucharist and Orpheus myth can, of course,
produce uncritical and supranatural interpretations of the poem’s intentions to effect a
moral spring, interpretations that adhere to and are partly informed by Shelley’s divine
claims for poetry in the Defence. For example, future readers or future poets consume
Shelley’s body in the process of incanting the poem, or, conversely, kill and dismember
Shelley’s body, becoming the hierophants of an incantatory and sacrificial ritual, thereby
assuming the moral responsibility to trumpet the poem’s prophecy. Reading the poem
under the shadow of such a Romantic ideology, however, turns out not to be as uncritical
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as it sounds, when the creative and destructive aims of these myths and ceremonies are
interrogated through the lens of contemporary debates about the poem’s historical
consciousness.
A barren winter rather than fecund spring enshrouds the poem’s historical context.
The “Ode” would not be necessary in a world where the forms of social life were as
consistent and unchangeable as the seasons. Winter might be the season of all presents
where “A heavy weight of hours has chained and bowed / One too like thee” (55-56),
where individuals and societies suffer the hope of a far off future spring. But is winter an
effect of specific historical contexts or are historical contexts themselves the cause of
winter? Both James Chandler and Orrin Wang read the “Ode” as confronting and coming
to terms with history, yet each responds differently to this confrontation. Each also avoids
reading the poem as staging a subjective redemption for the poet and his words; that is,
they downplay the mystical or religious qualities inherent in its diction, imagery, and tone
while emphasizing its political and historical complexities.
In opposition to Harold Bloom and his teacher Frederick Pottle, whose 1952
essay “The Case of Shelley”116 Chandler cites as highly influential to Shelley’s critical
reception in the decades that followed, Chandler writes that “I do not deny that the Ode is
in some sense about ‘the nature and function of the nabi in relation to his own
prophecies.’ […]117 By contrast I wish to show that Shelley’s conception of the prophetic
‘spirit’ is a good deal more Spinozist, and a good deal less, well, ‘literal,’ than Bloom’s
account would suggest.”118 Orrin Wang makes the same point when he writes that it is
“besides the point in the ‘Ode’” to “see its wager in terms of the poet’s survival or
116
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redemption. The poet is not in danger in the last portion of the ‘Ode’; the wind is, insofar
as we define the wind as an independent event or force beyond the poet’s invocation.”119
This seems to me precisely why the poet is in danger, that the wind might be beyond his
invocation, that he might stand completely separated from any influence over it. For if it
is, then the poem’s “spring” is, in fact, too far behind, and only at the mercy of chance or
the pen of the poet will it be realized as morally regenerative rather than a natural cyclical
occurrence. But Wang’s claim also suggests that though the wind is a force beyond the
poet, a power moving everywhere, it everywhere determines and conditions the poet’s
own power. The separation of poet and wind is more like a separation of individual will
and historical fate; in this light, the incarnation of wind into the flesh of poet and form of
poem is more a liberation from an uncontrollable power than the assumption of it.
The wind is constitutive of the power that for Shelley causes poetry, rendering the
poet’s role a passive effect. Hence the famous fading rather than fully engulfed image of
the coal in Shelley’s metaphor of inspired composition. If the poet was capable of
causing the wind, then Shelley’s conception of poetry as a divine descent into the
sublunary world, as an enactment and participation in the impulse behind the ancient
mysteries, would render the wind the supplicant of the poet. But Wang’s comment that
the wind is threatened by virtue of its independent relation to the poet’s will echoes
Chandler’s argument in England in 1819. Like Shelley’s claim that “even whilst they
[poets] deny and abjure, they are yet compelled to serve, the Power which is seated upon
the throne of their own soul” (Defence 535), both Chandler’s and Wang’s arguments are
structured around the logic of causality. Wang defines the wind historically and
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relationally, in much the same way that Chandler employs his concept of “the case” and
“casuistries” generally. Chandler’s treatment and conception of “the case” are nearly as
exhaustive, comprehensive, and mercurial as the effects he insists were produced by a
Romantic alteration in how “the case” was understood; but, in short, “the case” for
Chandler represents a new way of understanding the relationship between individuals and
their historical situations.
Chandler’s idea of the case is best understood in terms of its complement
“casuistry,” or case-based reasoning. Casuistry is a complicated concept used in many
different disciplines and by many different theorists, but its most basic definition of casebased reasoning describes Chandler’s use of it. The title of Chandler’s book, England in
1819, calls attention to a casuistic quality: disruption. There is something special about
the condition of the state, political and literary, in the year 1819 that leads to England,
and its literature, falling away from their normative “case.” The usual principles no
longer apply, in other words, perhaps even the relation that binds together principles and
their application. As Wang points out in his criticism of Wasserman’s understanding of
the wind as always operating in accordance with the same law, an anti-casuist
perspective, the wind is less a consistent law than a critique “about the event of relation
itself, of which the figures of cause and effect would be one category” (174). Citing the
writings of André Jolles, Chandler claims that the case is the “occurrence of an anomaly
for such a [general or normative] system or scheme. […] It is always calling for
judgment, and it is by virtue of judgment that it offers formal mediation between the
particular and the general, between instance and rule, between circumstance and
principle” (208-09). Shelley’s writings in and around 1819 become anomalous to their
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historical situations in their awareness and development of a new form of historicism,
what Chandler calls “historicist casuistry” (527), an alteration in the “concept of the case”
which alters “the concept of the cause” (527).
I read both Chandler’s and Wang’s treatment of Shelley’s historicism, specifically
regarding “Ode to the West Wind,” as equally committed to accounting for the prophetic,
self-destructive, and ritualistic qualities of the poem, yet in terms of the historical
pressures that limit, and, paradoxically, expand them. As Wang concludes, the poem is a
representative case of “A history without context—that is what Shelley’s wind inspires”
(175). And as Chandler concludes, the “Ode” dramatizes the “paradoxical encounter
between […] the Spinozist spirit of God, and a poet-philosopher who aims to represent in
words and figures the power that moves him, but who understands, by virtue of the
theory itself [that prophecy cannot be reconciled to intellectual systems], that he cannot
finally understand the power he presents” (548). These two readings of the poem, history
without context and knowledge of ignorance, both presuppose a liberation from causes
that condition and determine change. In the poem this cause takes the form of the wind,
but as a figure in a poem, it also takes on the form of an effect. One cannot but help hear
in the poem the pleas of a poet seemingly out of options and choices to change his world,
and, confronted with this situation, the poet-speaker desires to assume the form of that
power which both enables and limits choice. The prayer of the speaker, transmutation of
poet into wind and wind into poet, is a desire not only to possess the power of the wind
and wield it but also to annihilate it. In this sense the wind is threatened, but threatened
by the poet.
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The poem clearly suggests that the driving of the poet’s “dead thoughts” (63) to
“quicken a new birth” (64), the scattering of the poet’s “words among mankind” (67), and
the command to be “The trumpet of a prophecy” (69) can only occur within the breath
and body of the speaker. The wind does not do any of these things alone, but only in
relation to the inhalation and exhalation of the mouths of the poem’s speakers, those
“chasms” into which the “Atlantic’s level powers / Cleave themselves” (37-38). Hence
“cleave,” a verb the definition of which is cleaved neatly in two: to divide and adhere, to
split and stick fast to. Shelley recognizes and represents the power of the omnipresent
wind as a limitation of the future “case” of the poem itself to usher in spring. He
steadfastly sticks his hopes to the wind because there is no lesser power, but he sings to it
also to split it up for the sake of the poem’s unknown future. Like Wang’s history without
context, the “Ode” enacts an effort to particularize universality across the unknown
future, across the winters of future historical moments and events, their contexts. But
context in this “case” is the con of both history and the text; it both steers their directions
against each other and dupes those who critique one in terms of the other into believing
that the poem presents an awareness of its own historical situation. History always
mediates the historical critiques that seek to contextualize it, in the same way the wind
mediates the poet’s effort to inspire it.
But it is not the case that the poem presents an awareness of its own historical
situation; not exactly, at least. It presents the knowledge of an awareness that this
awareness is part of the dream of a redemptive history, and, as such, extraordinarily
difficult to achieve. As Chandler rightly detects, the only historical awareness that the
poem develops is a sort of casuistry, the hope and despair that we can never completely
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know our own historical moment, let alone understand it and apply the principles of the
past to adjudicate the historical events that persist to rise up before us. The causes are too
much like the effects. The wind moves everywhere, there is no isolating it and abstracting
it from any context because it is the context of context: The “heavy weight of hours
[which] has chained and bowed / One too like thee” (35-36). We are too like the external
forces that determine our relations toward those forces, which condition our actions
within the fields they define. “Ode to the West Wind” is too much like the world in which
it was borne. Its recognition of this, its “deep autumnal tone, / Sweet though in sadness”
(60-61), is a desire, a “drive,” for release across innumerable unknown future contexts.
The “heavy weight of hours,” or this heavy wait of ours, is a shared communion of the
winter that still persists.
Our historical moment, our critique of the poem and Shelley’s poetry, each
reading and interpretation of it becomes as cyclic as the seasonal analogy it employs—we
are “One too like thee.” Shelley warns that “we consider our own nature too superficially.
We look on all that in ourselves with which we can discover a resemblance in others; and
consider those resemblances as the materials of moral knowledge. It is in the differences
that it actually consists” (Speculations on Morals, 83). The “Ode” inscribes these
differences in its apostrophic address to the wind, a figure that, like the poem’s future
readers, are both accidental and intentional. The ethical response to our relation toward
the winds of history, a relation of ignorance and blindness, determines whether the wind
will blast from behind and through us toward spring, or remain a stubborn impasse
blowing against our efforts to progress forward and understand the meaning of our
specific historical moment and case. The response must only be “tameless, swift and

125

proud” in our certainty that we cannot know the historical nature of our present moment
by comparing it with our past, but only by acting as if the future will be unimaginably
different from the past.
This is true also for our ethical response to others whose differences from us, like
the difficult difference of individual from historical moment, contain the germ of moral
knowledge. But it is beginning from a stance, a source, of not knowing, the planting the
seed of a chance, that best opens up the hope and ethical possibilities of “Ode to the West
Wind.” The whole poem is just that, a chance, “O Wind, / If winter comes, can Spring be
far behind?” (69-70), the question mark constitutive of human uncertainty even in the
face of the most repetitive and certain human experience, the experience of the natural
cycle of the seasons. But the only rhetorical element about the poem’s last line is its
implicit moral imperative that we must act as if spring will not, as it always has before,
come again. Not to do so is indicative of winter-thinking and winter-acting, a hopeless
sleep at odds with one of the poem’s key images, “unawakened earth” (68). The
“unawakened earth,” the perfect description of winter, is the object of the imaginative
call toward the future; the “trumpet of a prophecy” (69) must echo back into each present
where it is made, a present that is not yet awake. It might seem intuitive to conceive of
the “unawakened earth” as the world that sits side by side in the poem’s own historical
moment, but it is actually a description of the poem’s future destiny, our own present.
With every critique of the poem, we still are living as if asleep, but with every critique
we still live in the chance it tries to offer. “[B]y the incantation of this verse” (65)
punningly suggests a versus, a contest against the history that necessitated it, a dialectical
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interplay between reader, critic, poet, individual, what have you, and the “spirit of the
age” (Defence 535) moving everywhere, inside and outside the poem, like the west wind.
This spirit of the age is an elusive and amorphous entity to invoke, much less
understand, describe, or direct. Shelley’s words say as much at the end of the Defence: “It
is impossible to read the compositions of the most celebrated writers of the present day
without being startled with the electric life which burns within their words. They measure
the circumference and all-penetrating spirit, and they are themselves perhaps the most
sincerely astonished at its manifestations, for it is less their spirit than the spirit of the
age” (535). The meaning here inevitably becomes confused, since measuring a
circumference is entirely within the realm of possibility, circumferences themselves
measure, but measuring an “all-penetrating spirit” is impossible. It is this impossibility
that the “Ode” describes, however, and instructs. The “Ode” closes when merely read,
but “by the incantation of this verse” it opens. Perhaps then the celebrated writers of
Shelley’s day are so astonished because they witness impossible things for which they are
only partly responsible. The spirit of the age ignites the “electric life which burns within
their words” and makes the impossible possible. But the “present day” to which Shelley
refers, 1821 or so, burns with such electric life because it is the effect of innumerable
antecedent causes, the electric life of Dante, Shakespeare, Calderón, Milton, Goethe,
Wordsworth, and many others. According to Shelley, each prayed to the wind, and the
wind became their breath. Each wrote with an ignorant and dim instinct of the future
compositions they were helping to create. Each created a history without context in
speaking through, in the sense of both going beyond and within, the context of their
history.
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In an 1822 letter to John Gisborne, Shelley surmised that “[p]erhaps all discontent
with the less (to use a Platonic sophism) supposes the sense of a just claim to the greater”
(Letters II; 406). In the same letter he writes: “Cypriano evidently furnished the germ of
Faust, as Faust may furnish the germ of other poems; although it is different from it in
structure & plan, as the acorn from the oak.” Hugh Roberts sees in Shelley’s analogy not
a Coleridgean organic multeity-in-unity, but “Lucretian terms of disjunctive iteration”
(314).120 He observes that “Shelley thinks of the acorn as a ‘germ’ (or ‘seed’) in the
Lucretian atomistic sense. Cyprian does not become Faust through organic necessity any
more than the ‘other poems’ to which Goethe’s play may one day give rise can be
foretold by inspecting the seeds that constitute the pépinière that is Faust. What strikes
Shelley about the relationship between oak and acorn is not their organic unity but their
striking dissimilarity in ‘structure and plan’” (315). Shelley’s “Ode” is self-consciously
aware of itself as a “disjunctive iteration,” and its ending imagery as near to a pépinière
as a poem gets without becoming fertilizer, but of course it desperately asks to be
fertilizer. The poem knows that historical context is an illusion of history, that it is, like
the wind, felt but never seen or known in any complete way. Like the “all-penetrating
spirit,” like the spirit of the age, it cannot be measured even though often referred to,
named, supplicated, and thought.
For instance, England in 1819 refers to a specifically circumscribed historical
context, but there are infinite others that stand behind, within, and in front of it, like the
relation of the west wind to the poet who invokes it. As a work that intentionally
addresses the future and is laden with figures of transformations, motion, and instability,
the “Ode’s” message mirrors the chance Shelley took in 1812 sending his writings off
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into unconceived oblivions, yet by virtue of the as yet and unknown contexts to which
they might arrive, Shelley’s actions became all the more generative and relational, all the
more contextless; or, conversely, all the more involved in one context that proliferates
into many. Moral meaning in the world the “Ode” describes, which is riven with a
“discontent of the less” that veers into a “deep autumnal tone” (60), which is nevertheless
“Sweet though in sadness” (61), its “just claim to the greater,” consists in the chance of
impossible beginnings.
How to proceed, though, in the face of what is felt and experienced as an
impossibly unconquerable winter? If, as Wang contends, “Ode to the West Wind”
inspires a history without context, it is, as I have been arguing, acutely aware not only of
its own history, but of history as a cause of historical awareness. Shelley’s comment in
Speculations on Morals bears repeating: “Those who do not nominally, yet actually,
submit to the same power. The external features of their conduct, indeed, can no more
escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream of the wind” (82-83; my emphasis).
Far from escaping the stream of the wind, the clouds, “Angels of rain and lightening!”
(18) assume the “tangled boughs” (17) of airy branches and the Maenad’s hair, finally
imaged in the “locks of the approaching storm” (23). The ideological power that Shelley
references determines both nominal and actual action, as the wind simultaneously renders
clouds as water and fire, branches and hair, even as the ambiguous two key words,
“locks” and “storm,” render access to their meaning seemingly unapproachable. Is the
storm an apocalypse, the death of the poet or poem, the difficult and violent process of
change itself, the beginning or end of the future, the final lines and images of the poem,
or the critical attempt to read and interpret any of these possible meanings? My answer is
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that the storm is another image for the dizzying verge of an abyss where words abandon
Shelley, the place his thoughts on life led him in the eponymous fragment quoted earlier.
“Those who do not nominally, yet actually, submit to the same power” anticipates the
unveiling that “The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting
between the assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to
denote the different modifications of the one mind. […] The words I, and you, and they
are grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally devoid of the
intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them” (On Life, 508; my emphasis). The
words or “merely marks” that Shelley refers to, palpably real in the phenomenal world,
become for him upon skeptical examination placeholders describing the seemingly
homogenous, stable and uniform relationship between a text and its context.
The “I, you, they” are marks like the historical moment that prompts the plea of
the poem to become more than “merely marks” or a mere “invention,” a complicated
“grammatical device” determined by and always subjected to history. The poem directly
addresses this same force, the wind that moves everywhere but is nowhere in particular, a
history or ideology represented as a past that is past doing anything about. The very
impossibility of changing the nature of change, Shelley’s understanding of an eternal
mutability that is itself impervious to any representational context is at the center of the
poem’s internal figurations. Both “ashes” and “sparks” (67), refuse and fuel, are the
marks and signs of the poem’s acceptance that only in coming to terms with what it is
not, the double knowledge of both its own ignorance and that spring will break only in a
future “too like thee” because winterized in its own historical moment, can the poem
ignite any moral flame and be read in its own singular context. Because the speaker has
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learned that we can never know beforehand the path that leads in advance of it, like
Shelley’s fire balloons and “vessels of heavenly medicine” cast into the ocean, the only
chance for spring is the question that transports it from season to “sore need.” The chance
is the same, as I have argued, for true self-knowledge in the Shelleyan sense. Since the
past is a wintry death, freedom and renewal only occur through a selflessness grounded in
forgiveness. This self-forgiveness is to the individual what a history without context is for
the poem itself. The potential rebirth carried within each issues forth from the
spontaneous chance of abstracting meaning not from the irremediable past but the
promise of a yet to be imagined future.
As a concluding remark, I want to show how a passage in Shelley’s prose
fragment The Coliseum (1818), an aborted narrative written after the first act of
Prometheus Unbound that happens to offer us glimpses of Shelley’s most compelling
thoughts on ruins, death, love, and social communion, might carry forward the story of
how “Mont Blanc” and “Ode to the West Wind” teach a moral lesson founded in the
notion of power and love. The Coliseum tells the story of an old blind man and his
daughter, Helen, who visit the ruins of the Roman Coliseum during the feast of the
Passover. The Coliseum remains a neglected text in critical studies of Shelley’s work,
particular his mature work, although Timothy Clark published a detailed examination of
it.121
I want to conclude this chapter by briefly commenting on the fragment’s most
metaphysical and moral expression, articulated by the old blind man, sitting with his
daughter and a pagan stranger inside the ruins of the Coliseum. This is also the most
noteworthy passage of The Coliseum.
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The internal nature of each being is surrounded by a circle, not to be
surmounted by his fellows; and it is this repulsion which constitutes the
misfortune of the condition of life. But there is a circle which
comprehends, as well as one which mutually excludes, all things which
feel. And, with respect to man, his public and his private happiness consist
in diminishing the circumference which includes those resembling
himself, until they become one with him, and he with them. It is because
we enter into the meditations, designs and destinies of something beyond
ourselves, that the contemplation of the ruins of human power excites an
elevating sense of awfulness and beauty. It is therefore that the ocean, the
glacier, the cataract, the tempest, the volcano, have each a spirit which
animates the extremities of our frame with tingling joy. It is therefore that
the singing of birds, and the motion of leaves, the sensation of the odorous
earth beneath, and the freshness of the living wind around, is sweet. And
this is Love. This is the religion of eternity, whose votaries have been
exiled from among the multitude of mankind. O Power!” cried the old
man, lifting his sightless eyes towards the undazzling sun, “thou which
interpenetrates all things, and without which this glorious world were a
blind and formless chaos, Love, Author of Good, God, King, Father!”
(304).122
When read together, the dramatic action and movement of “Mont Blanc” and “Ode to the
West Wind” mirror the movements Shelley describes above. At first “Mont Blanc”
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excludes and repulses, expanding rather than diminishing the circumference of the self’s
moral circle. Whatever “tingling with joy” the powerful peak inspires is at first tinged
also with the dread and “awful doubt” that the joy is ours alone, excluded from other
human beings. But in moving through this “meditation” into “something beyond
ourselves,” something so distinctly beyond ourselves as the highest peak in Europe, by
“surmounting” the mountain, and coming to see that by virtue of “our fellows” the
circumference of the circle of self diminishes, “Ode to the West Wind” begins to take the
moral shape it does, a metaphor for inspiring the spirit that animates all living things. The
paradox is that the intense selfishness of the “Ode,” its radical subjectivity, must become
pitched to the highest possible tone until it can fall away, making many separate
individuals one. The self becomes an idol to be sacrificed in service of a greater
selflessness. The speaker of the “Ode” is a votary of the “religion of eternity,” and must
be exiled and extinguished as a sacrifice in the service of the ashy remains that will spark
into eternity with each incantation of the poem. Finally, the fact that “Love” is
apostrophized in the above speech right alongside “God, King, [and] Father” is not
without its irony and oddity. But then these marks and signs become “totally devoid of
the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them” (On Life, 508; my emphasis)
when they collapse from the outer repulsive circumference of Shelley’s moral circle. It
appears that Shelleyan Love diminishes them all, the self most of all. Love, like virtue, is
its own reward for Shelley, and “animates” the self beyond its private and protected
sphere of consciousness into something that it is not, as well as something that it is not
yet. The evolution of this kind of self-transportation into the Shelleyan values of the true,
good, and beautiful is earned through struggle and suffering, as I will attempt to show in
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the next chapter. Further, Shelley is particularly invested in exploring how closely related
are idolatrous self-contempt and Promethean self-knowledge, since the mind’s
commitment to either does not presuppose freedom from either.
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CHAPTER THREE
Self and Love in The Cenci and Prometheus Unbound
I have written a wicked book, and feel spotless as the lamb.
—Herman Melville (To Hawthorne, 17 Nov. 1851)
As myths, of course, both Satan and Prometheus are torch-bearers for the human
race; they reveal knowledge and help make humankind more like the gods they
worship.123 For an antinomian poet like Shelley, the self-suffering caused by each
figure’s rebelliousness against authority offers an enticing subject for poetry. But as
Shelley makes known, Satan falls short of Prometheus’s high perfection as moral hero
and representative of redemptive history because he “engenders in the mind a pernicious
casuistry.” Shelley conceives this idea as an insidious dissection of one’s subconscious
thoughts, calling it in preface to The Cenci the “anatomizing casuistry” that Beatrice
elicits from us when we sympathize with her feelings and actions. Pernicious casuistry
entails a kind of psychic exploration that leads to alienation, isolation, and separation
from others. By bridging the abyss between what is possible and what is justifiable, it
connects reason and motivation to the darkest thoughts of the mind. For Shelley it makes
evil not only potentially pervasive, since the thoughts and instincts revealed by “selfanatomy” are available to anyone who goes looking for them, but also difficult to
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distinguish from rationally derived moral conduct.124 Earl Wasserman remarks that
“because reasoning is a critical examination of the processes of the intellect, its byproduct is to lay bare the mind’s defects and the potentialities of the ‘error’ of evil.”125 He
goes on to quote an early letter of Shelley’s in which he explains to Elizabeth Hitchener
how reason can “sanction an aberration from reason.”126
I would argue that The Cenci and Prometheus Unbound play out the consequence
of Shelley’s paradoxical statement “Reason sanctions an aberration from reason,” not in
terms of any restricted sense of logic or rationalism, but in the more extended sense of
ethics and selfhood. The poetry that most closely follows from Shelley’s understanding
of “self-anatomy,” and its opposite self-love or self-knowledge, makes accessible to us
Beatrice’s tragedy and Prometheus’s liberatory rhetoric. The centrality to Shelley’s work
of the distinction between self-contempt and self-love is such that it inevitably takes into
account and influences temporal concerns, as well as aesthetic and political
consequences. For this reason The Cenci and Prometheus Unbound offer readers of
Shelley’s poetry a glimpse into the poet’s idea of a Heaven and Hell.
Romanticism as a whole frequently explores methods of self-interiority that seek
to integrate the individual with nature and society, or explores those methods that make
impossible such integration. The Romantic poet at the very least attempts to understand,
as well as problematize, these relationships, frequently from the perspective of an
individual self-consciousness. The healthy mind, according to Shelley, engenders an
expansive and inclusive model of selfhood, yet pernicious casuistry is a solipsistic model
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of self-idolatry. The potential for self-delusion and self-hatred, which mark the beginning
of social and political orders justified and perpetuated by inequality, is omnipresent. I
contend that this fact explains how Prometheus Unbound ends with both the fear and
promise of the future, as well as how the trauma The Cenci expresses (and fails to
express) is more disturbing than its tragic narrative. In their suggestion of original sin, the
Furies of Prometheus are emblematic of how Shelley understands the psycho-ethical
challenge of humankind:
Thou think’st we will live through thee, one by one,
Like animal life, and though we can obscure not
The soul which burns within, that we will dwell
Beside it, like a vain loud multitude
Vexing the self-content of wisest men—
That we will be dread thought beneath thy brain
And foul desire round thine astonished heart
And blood within thy labyrinthine veins
Crawling like agony. (1.483-90)
Prometheus’s response makes all the difference between the two plays: “Why, ye
are thus now; / Yet am I king over myself, and rule / The torturing and conflicting
throngs within / As Jove rules you when Hell grows mutinous” (491-94). I will later on in
this chapter discuss how one reader of The Cenci, Sean Dempsey, understands Beatrice’s
failure to act as “king over herself” as the result of her failure to sever what he calls
“passionate attachments,” which, as I see it, correspond to the “dread thought” and “foul
desire” the Furies describe. In this way the two plays are riven by a moral dialectic in
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which, on one hand, desire is fulfilled, while on the other it is repressed. This is not what
one would expect from an author whose poetry frequently celebrates the excess of
imaginative inspiration, but even the most extreme transports of poetic fancy are always
measured against the precepts of his ethical system.

Shelley composed The Cenci (1819) for a mass audience and had high hopes it
would sell well, even imagining that its “presentation at Covent Garden” would garner
him fame: “After it had been acted & successfully (could I hope such a thing) I would
own it if I pleased, & use the celebrity it might acquire to my own purposes.—” (Letters
II; 102). That Shelley wished to remain anonymous in relation to The Cenci (up until its
possible success, of course) is telling. Not only does it speak to his understanding of how
his reputation for political and religious radicalism might overshadow and devalue his
work, but it speaks also to the nature of the play’s controversial themes, the dark picture
it reveals of society and human nature, psyche and history. Shelley explored incest as a
theme in Laon and Cythna also, where it was likewise subjected to a censor’s rebuke, yet
there it functioned as an ideal representation of pure love rather than the basest
expression of paternal hate. The world Shelley imagines in The Cenci is no place for
“beautiful idealisms of moral excellence.”127 Justice and morality are presented as
arbitrary placeholders capable of easy manipulation in the hands of self-serving men and
women who serve perverse notions of God, state, and father. This is not only because
Shelley’s tragedy lacks classical catharsis, or that its central and unspoken act is
incestuous rape (and Beatrice’s response to it), but also because it reflects a strain in
Shelley’s thought that is deeply committed both to progressive and radical political
127
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change. Such a notion of change, I hope to demonstrate, is bound to the ideas of
imagination and poetry that Shelley outlines in A Defence of Poetry.
Shelley makes perfectly clear in the drama’s preface why Beatrice Cenci is a
tragic figure. He writes that the highest aim of drama “is the teaching of the human heart
[…] knowledge of itself” (Norton 142). Beatrice’s heart is unreceptive to this knowledge,
that “[r]evenge, retaliation, atonement are pernicious mistakes,” in part because her
father, by raping her, rips out her heart (142). Count Cenci’s rape of Beatrice and her
retaliatory parricide challenge the audience’s expectation of cathartic experience, as
neither character learns the cause of their desires or sufferings. Those who rule The
Cenci’s social, political, and religious institutions are perverse figures of the principles
and laws they represent and profess. “[T]his black guilty world […] where none are true”
enunciates the problem. Insofar as the oppressed continue to seek in the conventional
avenues of justice their deliverance, the world remains too great a prison (5.3.102 and
68). Escaping its immurement, justifying a coherently just system of order and truth
within it, and adopting a well-armed defensive posture against it, are the principal themes
the play dramatizes, yet the tragedy is that Satanic impulses triumph over Promethean
ones.
As several critics have noted, the drama ends in paralytic stasis because Beatrice
maintains her innocence in spite of her guilt and Count Cenci descends into a rapacious
parody of a psychotic god. 128 This irresolution resists the anagnorisis of classical tragedy,
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Sean Dempsey argues that the play presents the audience with an “impossible ordeal” in order to show
them a new path toward liberal reform, one that is necessary in the political climate of 1819 where a
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the moment the hero discovers their true character, which leads to the greater recognition
that because freedom is illusory it must be subordinated to anterior or external systems of
power, such as those expressed by fate.129 Yet the exceptional status of The Cenci as
tragedy stems from the way it refuses the audience this debilitating knowledge because it
serves no radical political aim.
Shelley intended the work as a stage play, a self-evident but sometimes
unmentioned fact when it is read alongside Prometheus Unbound (1820), the fourth act of
which Shelley wrote immediately after The Cenci. In A Philosophical View of Reform
(1820), begun a few months after completing The Cenci, Shelley attacked the “most
fallacious” reasons nations cite for contracting and increasing public debts. He concludes
that the state’s usual argument of exigency never holds true because the “history of
nations presents us with a succession of extraordinary emergencies; their existence is
perpetually threatened by new and unexpected combinations and developments of foreign
or internal force” (Major Works 661).
In other words, The Cenci is an exceptional work for an exceptional time, a
period in which the deeper tragedy is that each moment of individual freedom exposes
itself to the risk of an “extraordinary emergency” and “perpetual threat,” rendering
freedom only a negative escape of “the necessity of circumstance and opinion” (Preface
141). For individuals living under a strict social hierarchy where authority achieves
legitimization from violence and fraud, where torture is the test of truth and knowledge of
the right becomes ignorance of the real, the struggle against suffering and despair,
matrix of a discredited social framework” (882). “The Cenci: Tragedy in a Secular Age.” ELH 79.4 (Winter
2012).
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fatalism and moral compromise, simultaneously proceeds from and moves toward the
“sad reality” that emanates from any ostensible source of love or order (Preface 140). 130
In other words, The Cenci’s reality is one in which, to quote James Rieger, “the
whole creation is a syphilitic chancre and the god of this world (Shelley argues from
design) a witty degenerate” (The Mutiny Within, 112). Indeed, there is an indefinite yet
grotesque quality to the way Shelley presents Count Cenci’s absolute evil that resists
interpretation; his character seems to lack conceivable human agency, desire or
motivation. Earl Wasserman explains Cenci’s overwhelming evil as the result of
Shelley’s Manichaean system: “Like God, he is the fatherless father, the uncaused cause,
the point behind which succession cannot be palpably traced” (Critical Reading, 87). But
just as Prometheus forgives and rejuvenates the world spirit, Cenci chooses vengeance
and casts the excruciating pain of his age and appetite into all that surrounds him: “I do
not feel as if I were a man, / But like a fiend appointed to chastise / The offenses of some
unremembered world” (4.1.160-62).
Perhaps the clear associations Shelley emphasizes of God with
Tyrant/Cenci/Father accounts for his evil, yet the Count remains in many ways a figure
both inside and outside the drama itself, very much like Shelley describes Italy’s
Catholicism: “interwoven with the whole fabric of life,” yet “never a [moral] check”
(Preface 143). The amalgamation of Catholicism (religion generally) with the forces of
ideology and superstition into the sensual and intellectual fabric of life prevents an
imaginative overcoming of them through love. I contend that if Prometheus Unbound
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might alter, at the very least awaken, the imaginative and moral perceptibility of an elite
class of readers, then The Cenci might clear a path for an elite class of citizen-subjects to
politically and morally navigate, by mimetically demonstrating hope in hell (or England
in 1819). The play offers to the audience a way to rebel against the seemingly
insurmountable power of God, state and the father, which is to say the drama might
inspire its audience to say ‘no’ to the pervasive ideological influences of a ruling order
that attempts to elicit a submissive ‘yes.’ It reduces reason to its reductio ad absurdum, in
an attempt to show that the Enlightenment dream of reason, when abandoned by the
imagination and absorbed into a “calculating principle” isolated from Poetry, produces
monstrous nightmares. As Shelley says in the play’s dedication to Leigh Hunt:
Those writings which I have hitherto published, have been little else than
visions which impersonate my own apprehensions of the beautiful and the
just. I can also perceive in them the literary defects incidental to youth and
impatience; they are dreams of what ought to be, or may be. The drama
which I now present to you is a sad reality. I lay aside the presumptuous
attitude of an instructor, and am content to paint, with such colours as my
own heart furnishes, that which has been. (Norton 140).
The most significant of “[t]hose writings” to which Shelley refers, Queen Mab, Alastor,
and Laon and Cythna, are called “visions which impersonate.” Each not only imagines
the ideal society, poet, or politics, but also plays a part in the drama of what is described
in The Coliseum as a “circle which comprehends […] all things that feel” (Ingpen & Peck
304). The well-lived poetic life “consist[s] in diminishing the circumference which
includes those resembling himself, until they become one with him, and he with them”
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(304). This centripetal movement toward the annihilation of all difference between self
and other entails a paradoxical movement outside and beyond the self. The expansive
self, uninhibited by utilitarian desires, overleaps its own selfish horizon of consciousness
in order to sympathize with not only the feelings of others but also their very existence.
According to Shelley, we cannot love until we become estranged from ourselves;
we cannot become one with another until we have altered our perspective in such a way
that we perceive our own experience beyond what has passed. We cannot love until we
perceive our perspective and its perceptions, until we become who we are not. We cannot
have faith in worldly institutions until, as Shelley explains of Italian Catholicism, we
have a “check” on “passion,” “persuasion,” “excuse[s],” and “refuge[s],” or all those
methods of doctrinal and political control that contemporary ideological critiques seek to
expose. The tragedy lays bare the consequence of appealing to the torturer for relief from
the appeal, the consequence of intellectually and morally resigning oneself to historical
determinism, where effective and insidious enslavements often occur under the guise of
progress and reform. As Sean Dempsey argues in his study of The Cenci:
Such tautological assumptions [that the Law is the Law]131 can only be
supported by a passionate attachment to the truth of this proposition, an
attachment inculcated in subjects through the threat of violence as well as
through subtler forms of persuasion. The challenge political reform faces
is that such passionate attachments are largely subliminal and endure even
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after the particular arrangements of a given institutional order are
overthrown. (893)132
Dempsey makes a convincing argument for the affective bond that “passionate
attachments” play in Shelley’s claim that beliefs are not acts of volition. He argues that
The Cenci serves to warn the audience that passionate attachments prevent us from
thinking and acting as free individuals capable of rational judgment. Only “a skeptical
divestment from passionate attachment” will properly arm someone against the material
and moral oppression of an authoritative order grounded in violence and fraud (893). This
is because removing a blinding passion, reflected in and originating from the very corrupt
institutions under which it suffers and to which it petitions redress, strikes at the spirit
rather than merely the form of evil. As Shelley says in A Philosophical View of Reform:
The Revolution in France overthrew the hierarchy, the aristocracy, and the
monarchy, and the whole of that peculiarly insolent and oppressive system
on which they were based. But as it only partially extinguished those
passions which are the spirit of these forms a reaction took place which
has restored in a certain limited degree the old system—in a degree,
indeed, exceedingly limited, and stripped of all its ancient terrors. (645)
“Extinguishing” the passions, the essential props of oppressors as well as fuel for
the oppressed, marks the beginning of love. These are not simply the healthy passions of
an imaginative mind, however. Extinguishing love does not of course proliferate love.
But what requires suppression is the echo-chamber of historical grievance, no matter how
atrocious, as Shelley’s play tries to demonstrate. Beatrice’s fall entails succumbing to an
overwhelming passion, vengeance, which Shelley describes in Peter Bell the Third
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(1819) as “that weed / From which the worms that it doth feed / Squeeze less than they
before possessed” (3.239-41). The image evokes the snuffing out of the candle wick
which figures so prominently in Giacomo’s (Count Cenci’s son) third act monologue,
which likewise begins with man as worm: “What! can the everlasting elements / Feel
with a worm like man?” (3.2.2-3). Giacomo continues, ironically apostrophizing the
lamp in a scene which symbolizes moral darkness, in which he “still [doubts] if that deed
[murdering Cenci] / Be just which is most necessary” (3.2.7-8).133 The challenge of The
Cenci’s world and the one it reflects is overcoming the gap between justice and necessity,
the future and present, poetry and history which, as I will later discuss, must first begin
with the intentional opening of the gap between ourselves and community. At this point
in the play, however, when the first attempt on Cenci’s life is uncertain, Giacomo is
subsumed into a body and spirit completely out of his control. He is unable to abstract
himself from the source of his own history. He is unable to differentiate himself from it,
which is the desired aim of the system of authority that Cenci embodies:
O,
Thou unreplenished lamp! whose narrow fire
Is shaken by the wind, and on whose edge
Devouring darkness hovers! Thou small flame,
133

Shelley uses identical language when discussing the failed French Revolution in A Philosophical View
of Reform: “If a just and necessary revolution could have been accomplished with as little expense of
happiness and order in a country governed by despotic as [in] one governed by free laws, equal liberty and
justice would lose their chief recommendations, and tyranny be divested of its most revolting attributes.
Tyranny entrenches itself within the existing interests of that great mass of the most refined citizens of a
nation and says, ‘If you dare trample upon these, be free.’ Though this terrible condition shall not be
evaded, the world is no longer in a temper to decline the challenge” (Major Works 644). Tyranny
(ideology) conditions those who would best be served by its eradication, or those who would best govern in
its absence, to desire the good only at the expense of their “happiness and order.” Thus freedom becomes
not an ideal end but a means to end their “existing interests.” The world, in contrast to “the most refined
citizens of a nation,” is already trampled upon by the existing interests of its rulers, and will accept the
challenge. And more blood will spill, Shelley implies, and history attests.
145

Which, as a dying pulse rises and falls,
Still flickerest up and down, how very soon,
Did I not feed thee, wouldst thou fail and be
As thou hadst never been! So wastes and sinks
Even now, perhaps, the life that kindles mine:
But that no power can fill with vital oil
That broken lamp of flesh. Ha! ‘tis the blood
Which fed these veins that ebbs till all is cold:
It is the form that moulded mine that sinks
Into the white and yellow spasms of death:
It is the soul by which mine was arrayed
In God’s immortal likeness which now stands
Naked before Heaven’s judgement seat! (3.2.8-23)
Giacomo’s speech reveals several interrelated threads of repression operating in The
Cenci, those that are maintained by the powers that rule the individual’s life and beliefs.
While Shelley presents these forms of oppression as originating outside the individual, he
also suggests that they persist and expand by virtue of the individual’s erroneous
responses toward them, acts of rebellion which are themselves legitimized only by force
and passion. They are representations of how pernicious casuistry justifies moral error.
Oppressor and oppressed perform their roles in The Cenci within the boundaries
of a single enclosed system, which cannot lend itself to a love that might burst beyond its
own phenomenal sphere of reality into what it is not. Giacomo finally arrives at these
very terms: “We / Are now no more, as once, parent and child, / But man to man: the
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oppressor to the oppressed” (3.1.282-84). And as if to further awaken the audience to the
urgent social and political contest that Beatrice’s rebellion dramatizes, that not only her
and Giacomo’s liberty and dignity are at stake, but also their own, she universalizes the
opposing forces: “and what a tyrant thou art, / And what slaves these; and what a world
we make, / The oppressor and the oppressed” (5.3.73-75). 134 Giacomo’s paranoid
expression of grief for desiring and then conspiring to murder his father, and the
realization that the event might be occurring at this very moment, begins with his
apostrophe to light, morphs into a blurring of his father’s existence with his own, and
ends with God because he feels if not fully comprehends that even parricide will not free
him from the immanent “brokenness” of his existence and the cultural and political
institutions determining it. Giacomo drowns in a sea of ideological sensations, while
helplessly recognizing the absence of an alternative. “[N]o power can fill with vital oil /
That broken lamp of flesh,” he says, since the lamp of flesh furnishes the sole source of
illumination in this world, conceived as every category of existence in “blood,” “form”
and “soul.” Merging into an unholy trinity of nature, art and spirit, the image cluster
evokes its Promethean antithesis in Matthew: “Neither do men put new wine into old
bottles: else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they
put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved” (9:17). As I have argued, the free
individual within Shelley’s ethical system must reevaluate past traditions, customs,
beliefs, and behaviors in order to preserve the future and enter freely into the future, to
pre-serve that which has not yet arrived, to serve before that which will not requiring
serving after.
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Of course, accomplishing this radical renewal is not unlike effecting a reversal of
time itself, “making the earth grow young again.”135 Yet the weight of history and the
human passions it elicits torment Giacomo and Beatrice alike, embodied in the cruelly
old Cenci, who “Masked in grey hairs and wrinkles” haunts Beatrice even in death. And
the old pope himself, likewise repelled by the young, declares that
Parricide grows so rife
That soon, for some just cause no doubt, the young
Will strangle us all, dozing in our chairs,
Authority, and power, and hoary hair
Are grown crimes capital. (5.4.20-24)
It is, in fact, the age-old, Old Testament response of Giacomo and Beatrice to these aging
representations of an ancient world order that renders them unable to differentiate
themselves from the falsity of its claims to power. The response to illegitimate power and
dogma must originate from beyond the mental and emotional concepts determined by
them. For this reason and unable to differentiate his identity in the present from any
possible future identity, Giacomo cannot “[arrive] at the exercise of the highest powers to
be attained by man” (A Philosophical View of Reform, 644). On the one hand, Giacomo
clearly refers both to the lamp’s diminishing fuel and the body’s finitude when he
exclaims, “how very soon, / Did I not feed thee, wouldst thou fail and be / As thou hadst
never been!”; on the other, however, this admission becomes a self-directed charge of
sanctioning the terms of life which both his creators, Cenci and God, bequeathed to him.
The final three lines of Giacomo’s speech quoted above, “It is the soul by which mine
was arrayed / In God’s immortal likeness which now stands / Naked before Heaven’s
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judgement seat!” reveal the force with which he identifies his notion of self with external
causes.
The same confusion arrests Beatrice’s freedom of conscience to such a degree that
she never fully rejects God nor truly accepts that He permits evil. At the beginning of the
second act she bewails, “Thou, great God, / Whose image upon earth a father is, / Dost
thou indeed abandon me!” (2.1.16-18). And later Cardinal Camillo, in conversation with
Giacomo, remains hesitant that a petition to the papacy will succeed because, as he says,
the pope “holds it of most dangerous example / In aught to weaken the paternal power, /
Being, as ‘twere, the shadow of his own” (2.2.54-56). By the play’s end, however,
Beatrice feels the terrible consequence behind the absence of difference between God,
Father, and Church, and momentarily understands her fate as a whimsical and nihilistic
expression of the sadistic powers that rule the sublunary world, collapsing of course in
the image of her father. She wonders:
If there should be
No God, no Heaven, no Earth in the void world;
The wide, grey lampless, deep, unpeopled world!
If all things then should be…my father’s spirt […]. (5.4.57-60)
And she declares that “No difference has been made by God or man, / Or any power
moulding my wretched lot, / ‘Twixt good or evil, as regarded me” (5.4.82-84; my
emphasis). Beatrice’s words here tell the story of Promethean self-contempt; they are the
utterances of one who has lost all human agency. Shelley cites institutions of power as
the cause of this failure to think and act freely and beneficently. Explaining the cruelty
and vengeance of the oppressed French people during and after the French Revolution, he
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argues: “Their institutions made them what they were. Slavery and superstition,
contumely and the tame endurance of contumely, and the habits engendered from
generation to generation out of this transmitted inheritance of wrong, creating this thing
which has extinguished what has been called the likeness of God in man” (A
Philosophical View of Reform, 645; my emphasis). The statement evokes both the many
references to extinguished light in The Cenci (in clear opposition to Promethean fire) and
the last lines of Giacomo’s speech, “It is the soul by which mine was arrayed / In God’s
immortal likeness which now stands / Naked before Heaven’s judgement seat!” (3.2.2123). Shelley’s diagnosis of the evils of the Revolution and Reign of Terror does not
absolve the victims of oppressive authority from their retaliatory vengeance but identifies
its origin in a way that suggests genetic inheritance or blind acceptance of original sin.
If evil institutions make individuals evil, then simply casting out the institutions
will promote individual virtue and eventualize societal perfection. This idea is
reminiscent of Mary Shelley’s note to Prometheus Unbound in which she says of her
husband that “[t]he prominent feature of Shelley’s theory of the destiny of the human
species was, that evil is not inherent in the system of the creation, but an accident that
might be expelled […] Shelley believed that mankind had only to will that there should
be no evil, and there would be none” (Ingpen & Peck II; 269). Clearly The Cenci suggests
otherwise, that merely willing something to happen is not enough and can, moreover,
make the relationship between the person willing and the desired aim more destructive.
The imperial will of man, as Shelley once identified it, is just as capable of creating as
toppling empires. Thus, willing both that the government hold Cenci accountable for his
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crimes and that he should be murdered for them makes Beatrice only more tragic and
enmeshed in her own tortured attempts at justifying her condition.
Mark Canuel argues that the drama makes Beatrice into a “victim whose religious
temperament and moral integrity have been drained of all self-determining authority”
(256).136 Beatrice’s lack of agency is everywhere present in a play where all efforts at
self-directed will are reflected back in the mirror images of authority which originate
them and by which they are adjudicated. “Poetry is not like the reasoning, a power to be
exerted according to the determination of the will,” Shelley argues in A Defence. And
because, as Shelley insists, “A man cannot say, ‘I will compose poetry,”’ Beatrice will
never be able to elicit justice or love from a world that anatomizes what is right and
wrong, particularly since her own actions derive their legitimacy from the same
methodology (Norton 531; my emphasis). And for Shelley principles of good and evil,
right and wrong, are not so easily eradicated and instantiated, as Terence Hoagwood
reminds us: “As in his treatment of metaphysical systems, Shelley does not polarize right
from wrong, good from evil […] Shelley places political institutions, like metaphysical
systems, within their determining contexts, but he detects and celebrates a progressive
evolution” (Skepticism and Ideology, 180). Beatrice is likewise placed within her
“determining context” and partly what keeps her there as a tragic figure bound to it is her
“determination of will” combined with her reason, her belief that her actions are morally
and divinely sanctioned (Defence of Poetry, 531).
There is no “progressive evolution” in The Cenci from idolatrous will into
Promethean will because there is no room in its storehouse of “anatomizing casuistry” for
poetry to inhabit, for the imagination either to generate new mental contexts and fields of
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vision or absorb already existing ones into itself. Poetry increases the powers of the
imagination “by replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight, which have the power
of attracting and assimilating to their own nature all other thoughts, and which form new
intervals and interstices whose void forever craves fresh food” (Defence, 517). Poetry
creates the right kind of desire, a desire for desire rather than a desire for things, objects,
or mere representations of objects and things, and poetry therefore opens the door from
rational stagnancy and literalism into a space of both attraction, assimilation and
absorption, as well as “new intervals and interstices”; it opens the door into a space for
love, free from “anatomizing casuistry,” which in The Cenci translates into the cruel
prison of the body and mind dissecting itself. Shelley, in fact, employs both
“anatomizing” and “casuistry” in On the Devil, and Devils (1820), a piece which can be
read as a parodic critique of the moral principles dramatized in The Cenci.
If the Devil takes but half the pleasure in tormenting a sinner which God
does, who took the trouble to create him, and then to invent a system of
casuistry by which he might excuse himself for devoting him to external
torment, this reward must be considerable. (Ingpen & Peck 94; my
emphasis).
--------------------------------------------------------------------But to tempt mankind to incur everlasting damnation, must, on the part of
God, and even on the part of the Devil, arise from that very disinterested
love of tormenting and annoying, which is seldom observed on earth
except from the very old…The thing that comes nearest to it is a troop of
idle dirty boys baiting a cat; cooking, skinning eels, and boiling lobsters
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alive, and bleeding calves, and whipping pigs to death; naturalists
anatomizing dogs alive, (a dog has as good a right and a better excuse for
anatomizing a naturalist,) are nothing compared to God and the Devil
judging, damning, and then tormenting the soul of a miserable sinner.
(Ingpen & Peck 95; my emphasis).
Casuistry is the system which provides the excuse for dissecting dogs alive, and is itself a
system of dissection, an effective means for applying, transmitting and perpetuating evil.
In the first passage quoted above, God devotes man to “external torment,” which in the
context of The Cenci recalls the relationship of “anatomizing casuistry” to the sublunary
body, the letter of the law generally, and to what Shelley calls in the Defence the
“calculating faculty,” “process,” or “principle.”
This principle is skeletal in nature, stripped of any “vital alchemy” or “electric
life,” as the word “anatomies” is employed in Prometheus Unbound: “The anatomies of
unknown winged things” (4.303). In the Defence Shelley argues that the
cultivation of poetry is never more to be desired than at periods when,
from an excess of the selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of
the materials of external life exceed the quantity of the power of
assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature. The body has then
become too unwieldy for that which animates it. (531; my emphasis)
As a tragedy, The Cenci is animated by bodies that are impelled according to the
calculating principle. Tortured and abused, they continually operate as prisons “to the
internal laws of human nature,” everywhere representing the excess of a hoard, exceeding
“the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature,” for
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the law of the body is external and exists within the economy of reason where it is
possible, contrary to Shelley’s claim in the preface, for “one person to be truly
dishonoured by the act of another” (142). It is I think impossible for readers of the play to
deny that Beatrice has been truly dishonored by her father—this constitutes part of the
“sad reality” Shelley shows us—, yet it is much easier to deny that Beatrice is in any way
morally culpable either for her actions or the terrible results that befall others because of
them. She inherits the evil of her father’s casuistry, responding to it in the same mode,
justifying and excusing, believing in and adhering to the same theological system in
which that “very disinterested love of tormenting and annoying” absolves naturalists who
anatomize dogs alive. She responds, in other words, not according to the “internal laws of
human nature,” but according to those external ones invented and maintained by priests,
patriarchs, and politicians. Once again, she is representative of a model of selfhood
motivated only by what it has experienced, not by what it may experience by going
outside of itself.
According to Sean Dempsey, Shelley offers a middle option for navigating this
world of false claims to man and God’s laws in the figure of Orsino, the manipulative and
cosmopolitan prelate who pressures both Beatrice and Giacomo to commit murder.
Something of a manipulative con artist, one who has often been compared to Iago, Orsino
escapes capture and punishment, and after leaving Giacomo hapless and consciencestricken to be arrested by the authorities, vanishes from the play like a thief in the
night.137 In act two Orsino soliloquizes:
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It fortunately serves my close designs
That ‘tis a trick of this same family
To analyse their own and other minds.
Such self-anatomy shall teach the will
Dangerous secrets: for it tempts our powers,
Knowing what must be thought, and may be done,
Into the depths of darkest purpose […]. (2.2.107-13)
The intellectual and psychological process that Orsino describes is an inversion of the
imaginative Promethean process which begins with patience and endurance and ends
with forgiveness and love. Rather than awakening a vacancy within the self, a space for
natures not our own to inhabit and within which the self might unite with its perfect ideal
projection, “self-anatomy” is the trick which “tempts our powers.” It leads not only to
“depths of darkest purpose” but also to “the most dark and secret caverns of the human
heart” (Preface 141). In Shelley’s moral universe, no application of evil will ever redound
good, no amount of self-knowledge, when separated from selflessness, will ever inspire
benevolent power. Orsino escapes the tragedy of The Cenci to be forever followed by a
worse one, himself: “Oh, I fear / That what is past will never let me rest! […] But if I am
mistaken, where shall I / Find the disguise to hide me from myself” (5.2.93-94 and 102103). Orsino first manipulates, then invokes and laments, much like Jupiter does in
Prometheus Unbound, the very power which reminds him that human desire starves itself
when it hungers only for power. Even his name, Or/sin/O! evokes the fateful error of
availing oneself to reason’s endless justifications and alternatives.
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The outcome of Orsino’s middle way between tyranny and revenge, his clever
and cynical response to the very modern world with which he engages is self-contempt; it
is his eulogy for what could have been, but for the Demogorgon-like power he chastises:
I thought to act a solemn comedy
Upon the painted scene of this new world,
And to attain my own peculiar ends
By some such plot of mingled good and ill
As others weave; but there arose a Power
Which graspt and snapped the threads of my device
And turned it to a net of ruin…Ha! (5.2.77-83)138
In Shelley’s conception of virtue, Orsino’s flaw is that he is a perfect casuist, since he
“mingled good and ill” to “attain [his] own peculiar ends.” Orsino’s wish to “act a solemn
comedy / Upon the painted scene of this new world” reveals both his insincerity and the
world’s, that justice, law, tradition and culture are masks designed to hide motives of
oppression and cruelty. Yet what is not a mask is the power that breaks through Orsino’s
“solemn comedy” as tragedy, as an indifferent oppressor of oppression and human desire.
Earlier in the play he spelled out a method for success in a fallen world, which involved
the placation of this power, this “dark spirt”:
I have such foresight as assures success:
Some unbeheld divinity doth ever,
When dread events are near, stir up men’s minds
To black suggestions; and he prospers best,
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Not who becomes the instrument of ill,
But who can flatter the dark spirit, that makes
Its empire and its prey of other hearts
Till it become his slave…as I will do. (2.2.154-161)
The passage evokes evil incarnate, supplication to the devil, and, as “unbeheld divinity,”
both Shelley’s belief that God and the Devil represent a “personification of the struggle
which we experience within ourselves” and that there is a transcendent principle of evil
the cause of which, like the cause of mind or the cause of transcendent benevolence and
good, is unknowable to human understanding—as Demogorgon says in Prometheus
Unbound, “the deep truth is imageless” (2.4.116). 139 Orsino’s description for achieving
power in this “new world” relies on the moral perversions of “self-anatomy” rather than
the moral truths of “self-knowledge,” the aim of tragedy which Shelley expressed in the
preface: “the teaching of the human heart […] knowledge of itself” (Norton 142).
“Self-anatomy” generates self-deceit and eventual self-contempt since it appeals to
slavery rather than freedom; and it is self-contempt which opens the door for evil to enter.
As Orsino ironically soliloquizes, “I have such foresight,” the error of his
ignorance becomes clear, particularly since in the next line we read “unbeheld divinity.”
Orsino’s vision extends only as far as his own desires. He sees, like Beatrice but for
different reasons, unimaginatively. He and Beatrice likewise do not understand that, as
James Chandler argues is one of Shelley’s theatrical aims in The Cenci, they are “agents
largely determined by the historical situation in which each appears” (England in 1819,
310). Chandler argues that Shelley intends to extend this recognition to the audience, that
without it freedom from casuistry and self-anatomy remain a struggle. In the absence of
139
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such a recognition, “black suggestions” substitute more ideal and imaginative responses
to evil acts. These “black suggestions” constitute the ignorance and error of Beatrice’s
parricidal motives and manifest themselves in the imagery of the play.
One of The Cenci’s reoccurring images involves darkness overcoming light, the
extinguishing not of the passions but life itself, an overall sense of dimness, obfuscation
and blindness. And it is through the lucid lens of Beatrice’s relentless clarity of and
commitment to the justness of her parricidal act that we experience the drama unfold
under the perverse and illusory quality of a nightmare. At the beginning of the third act
(the rape occurs off stage in between the second and third act), Beatrice incarnates this
quality that permeates the world of The Cenci like a flesh-eating bacteria does its host:
There creeps
A clinging, black, contaminating mist
About me…’tis substantial, heavy, thick,
I cannot pluck it from me, for it glues
My fingers and my limbs to one another,
And eats into my sinews, and dissolves
My flesh to a pollution, poisoning
The subtle, pure, and inmost spirit of life! (3.1.16-23)
Beatrice most obviously refers to the inheritance of her father’s own pollution and
poison, the exact nature of which is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the “mist” is
seminal, and Beatrice finds in abstraction and metaphor the traumatic event that she
cannot distinctly name; on the other, this passage functions literally in order to name the
degradation and corruption of the body itself—the problem of flesh is that it is literal and
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can destroy the spirit. In Speculations on Morals Shelley condemns “[a] common
sophism, which, like many others, depends on the abuse of a metaphorical expression to a
literal purpose” (Ingpen & Peck; VII, 74). The sophism is that duty entails obligation
rather than disinterested value, and within the putrid picture Beatrice paints above an
unbreakable connection between herself and her father emerges, not of any voluntary
duty on her part but undoubtedly the consequence of obligation. And it is Beatrice’s
refusal to disavow and distinguish God as Father from Cenci as father that makes her
prolonged suffering more tragic.
The relationship between duty and obligation, which Shelley called the
philosophy of slavery and superstition, rests on the literal letter of the law, which is
where evil is located in The Cenci, and which is why it destroys Beatrice’s “inmost spirit
of life.” The metaphorical transfer of evil into Beatrice by her father, which Cenci hopes
will persist after his death if Beatrice conceives, so strongly influences Beatrice’s
thinking and behavior (“for it glues / her fingers and her limbs together”) that it
resembles and anticipates Giacomo’s self-described ideological imprisonment in the next
scene, where he laments, “[N]o power can fill with vital oil / That broken lamp of flesh”
(3.2.32-33) As such, the “contaminating mist” Beatrice describes should also be
understood as an ideological lens through which she must now understand herself and the
world. Raped by her father, she is now marked, and, in a way initiated, into a system of
political and moral principles based not upon freedom and self-knowledge but slavery
and self-anatomy, power and self-contempt. The same ideological lens alters the
perspective of the audience, who with “restless and anatomizing casuistry […] seek the
justification of Beatrice, yet feel that she has done what needs justification” (Preface
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142). The lifting of this lens, which grants to the human heart the possibility of
knowledge of itself (Preface), is the political and moral aim of the drama. Reaching this
aim requires passing through Cenci’s heart, whose restless and paranoid attempts at
conquering self and world, lie at the center of the play. In The Cenci moral freedom is
found not merely by flipping Beatrice’s response to her father’s immoral and overreaching appetites on its side to discover another Prometheus, but by accounting for the
nature and cause of those immoral and over-reaching appetites, which is to say by
examining an aesthetics without ethics.140
Cenci’s declaration of his self-destructive desire for his daughter, “The act I think
shall soon extinguish all / For me” (2.1.188-89), expresses his overall design to become a
black hole from which not even the future can escape the ruins he hopes to establish:
Beatrice shall, if there be skill in hate
Die in despair, blaspheming: to Bernardo [Cenci’s son],
He is so innocent, I will bequeath
The memory of these deeds, and make his youth
The sepulchre of hope, where evil thoughts
Shall grow like weeds on a neglected tomb.
When all is done, out in the wide Campagna,
I will pile up my silver and my gold;
My costly robes, paintings and tapestries;
My parchments and all records of my wealth,
And make a bonfire in my joy, and leave
Of my possessions nothing but my name;
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Which shall be an inheritance to strip
Its wearer bare as infamy. That done,
My soul, which is a scourge, will I resign
Into the hands of him who wielded it;
Be it for its own punishment or theirs,
He will not ask it of me till the lash
Be broken in its last and deepest wound;
Until its hate be all inflicted. (4.1.49-68)
Count Cenci is suicidal in the sense that his annihilation cannot be differentiated
from his apotheosis, because both are achieved at the extremes of a perverse regard for
self, the moral limits of which Shelley abhorred. Cenci comprises and is consonant with
excess, aesthetic and political. As Curran recognizes, “Cenci embodies the disease of the
Romantic spirit” and “[i]n Cenci Shelley explores the dangerous solipsism of Romantic
values, perverted if pursued to their extreme” (75).141 Like Stuart Curran, Marc Redfield
observes the close associations of Cenci to the Romantic poet. He notes how “[r]eaders
have often observed that Count Cenci is a dark parody of the artist. He tells stories,
manipulates the action, and fathers Beatrice’s parricidal plot [it is Cenci rather than
Beatrice who first fantasizes parricide]” (169).142
Certainly the deliriously precise yet sublimely absorptive above-quoted speech
echoes Prospero’s farewell to his powers and spells, to the extent of becoming its moral
obverse. Yet rather than breaking his staff and drowning his book in acts of humility;
rather than asking from the audience forgiveness, as Prospero finally does, Cenci aims
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not to please but petrify, not to indulge but inflict. In a perfectly enmeshed resemblance
to Shelley’s attack in Speculations on Morals of “the abuse of a metaphorical expression
to a literal purpose,” Cenci carries his soul as Prospero carries his staff, yet the spirit
becomes a literal “scourge” and “lash” that abuses the flesh, “broken in its last and
deepest wound.” The “broken lamp of flesh,” which earlier in the play sets Giacomo
despairing, is Cenci’s weapon against any threat to his simultaneous quest for plenitude
and vacancy.
Curran rightly argues that Cenci’s crime against his daughter, because it sets in
motion the total ruin of his family, becomes, as a symbol of his potency, “his greatest
work of art” (79). Beatrice responds to this perverse “work of art” with an understandable
passion for vengeance. She responds unimaginatively, in other words. She is guided by
her intense examination of the almost imperceptible line between what right and wrong,
virtue and vice; it is her intense examination and self-anatomy that, in part, creates the
imperceptible line between good and evil. The difference is very slight between how she
arrives at “Many might doubt there were a God above / Who sees and permits evil, and so
die: / That faith no agony shall obscure in me” immediately after she considers killing her
father, and “I have prayed/ To God, and I have talked with my own heart, / And have
unravelled my entangled will, / And have at length determined what is right” (3.1.100-02
and 218-21). The difference is slight but severe, since she does not know what is right,
she only determines it through the lens of her prayer to the same deity whose law she
confuses with her father’s. She feels her actions are justified, since she feels the
overwhelming reflex of vengeance, reasoning herself back to her first passionate
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response, an image of spilling her father’s blood, which she imaginatively suppressed.
She is fixated on the past, which, as Cythna revealed to the mariners, is death.
In our world outside this play and outside Shelley’s rigorous moral compass, I
hope that we would recoil at the suggestion that Beatrice should, in a sense, get over the
past. But I surmise the moral advice being offered is less reckless than that. I think it
involves the very difficult process of self-forgiveness combined with the faith that actions
motivated by past suffering seem often to mirror and multiply the source of this suffering.
It is not an easy faith to acquire, since every natural tendency we possess envisions the
future through the lens of the past. But then the pain and tragedy of this play attests to the
challenge. And, after all, the singular person who meets this challenge head on is no
person at all, but a Titan.
One lesson derived from this conclusion that I would argue Beatrice teaches the
audience is that we must learn how not to mimic the hatred that surrounds us in order to
claim our freedom, political or otherwise. This is a somewhat disturbing and
counterintuitive reading of Shelley’s radicalism, since it entails a suppression of feeling.
Yet it is just this sort of intentional self-repression, as well as regulation of the beliefs
guiding and inuring one’s “pernicious mistakes” that we see in Shelley’s conception of
love. As he says in the Defence of Poetry: “The great secret of morals is Love; or a going
out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists
in thought, action, or person, not our own” (Norton 517). Love becomes in its eponymous
fragment that moment “when we find within our thoughts the chasm of an insufficient
void and seek to awaken […]” (On Love, 503). Discovering access to this void is as
important as our point of departure from it, and usually much more painful.
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Prometheus Unbound and the Necessity of Hope’s Wreck
The problem was not an easy one. We are to start with the soul chained, aged, suffering;
and we are to end with the soul free, rejuvenated, and blessed. The selection of the
Prometheus story (a selection which seems obvious only because we did not have to
make it) is the first step to the solution. But nearly everything has still to be done.
—C. S. Lewis
Frequently regarded as one of the great long poems of the nineteenth century, as
well as Shelley’s most ardent articulation and representation of a radical politics based on
love, Prometheus Unbound presents the reader and critic with innumerable interpretive
problems. One might expect this Lyrical Drama in Four Acts to express Shelley’s moral
truth most clearly, his final vision and hope of the political and aesthetic heights
humanity might one day reach, the utopian wish fulfillment of both the Enlightenment
and, more specifically, Godwin’s Political Justice. 143 However, even though readers of
the poem witness in Prometheus’s liberation from Jupiter a change from vengeance to
forgiveness, “nearly everything has still to be done,” as Lewis observes. In one sense,
then, Shelley’s plea in Prometheus Unbound is not to offer an answer for the secrets of
human destiny, but rather to make the case for humanity’s ceaseless potential to elicit
change from an unknown future. The aim, then, would be the discovery and relentless
acquisition of self-knowledge, rather than the false freedom of idolizing another
ideological entrapment. In another sense, though, the poem calls for a more measured
response to the “sad realities” of the world. It solicits a moral calm that opens the
possibility of a political critique that does not end in violent revolution. In the final,
fourth act of the drama the two interdependent aims of love and law merge in a
cacophonous eruption of poetic transport, suggesting Shelley’s conception of self as the
infinitely unfinished power of poetry.
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Because Prometheus Unbound is Shelley’s most examined work, the poem
presents the problem of being at once too self-evident and too enigmatic. For such a
difficult poem, which allegorizes the operations of the human mind and dramatizes
political idealism rather than the “sad reality” of 1819 England, it nonetheless
communicates a very familiar Shelleyan message:
To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than Death or Night;
To defy Power which seems Omnipotent;
To love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change nor falter nor repent […]. (4.570-575)
These are the instructions, the “spell,” with which the poem ends, spoken not by
Prometheus but by Demogorgon, who represents that power which, once Prometheus
chooses to “forgive wrongs darker than Death or Night,” overthrows tyranny (Jupiter).
Demogorgon is both a personification of “The secret strength of things / Which governs
thought” (“Mont Blanc”) and the ultimate force behind a causality that governs human
events. He is the mystery of cause given a face.
Demogorgon’s incantation is meant to be cast at certain moments in history, when
the world and human mind suffer chaos and error—the times are few, therefore, when
Demogorgon’s words might not apply to contemporary social conditions. That Shelley
suggests the restoration enacted by Prometheus Unbound is not permanent reflects his
belief in constantly safeguarding the conditions for fighting against future systems of
oppression. “And If,” as Demogorgon says in the same speech as above, “with infirm
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hand, Eternity, Mother of many acts and hours, should free / The serpent that would clasp
her with his length,” which is to say if civilization should become once more misaligned
from the inherent benevolence of natural necessity, then “These are the spells by which to
reassume / An empire o’er the disentangled Doom” (4.565-569).144 Unlike Queen Mab,
Prometheus Unbound does not deliver an implicit utopia, where aligning one’s
perspective to benevolent necessity creates a new world. As many recent critics have
noted, the poem displays spatial and temporal simultaneities which unify and also disjoin
its four acts. It is much more of an apocalypse, in other words. Such representations of
simultaneous history and experience speak to the apocalyptic nature of the work. Indeed,
M. H. Abrams once argued that in Prometheus Unbound
Shelley renders the universal history of man in the dramatic form of
visualizing agents and their actions, and he represents man’s accession to
an earthly paradise not (in the usual eighteenth-century pattern) as the
terminus of a long and gradual progress but (by a reversion to the Biblical
design of history) as a sudden, right-angled breakthrough from misery to
felicity.145
Abrams’s reading of the poem highlights the distinction between historical
progress and apocalypse, or the end of history. He uses the phrase “earthly paradise” to
describe the end of history that the poem imagines. For Shelley, however, earthly
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paradise resides not in the actual world of social and political reality but in the human
mind. As long as humanity is subject to its own finitude, error and evil will remain as
threats against love and imagination. Prometheus Unbound is thus not a utopian vision of
hope or an instructional manual for its creation; the poem, like “Ode to the West Wind,”
which is in many ways its lyrical equivalent, tries to cast a spell against a commitment
only to hope. 146 Prometheus allegorizes the mind’s resistance to chance, mutability and
oppression by showing that the best hope against these realities is a mind committed to
the love and forgiveness exemplified by Prometheus. The journey of the expansive and
inclusive self, free and without self-reproach, occupy the first three acts of the poem,
which stand as a narrative totality. “Pinnacled dim in the intense inane,” the final line of
the third act, where Jupiter is overthrown and humanity is restored to its Promethean
birthright, seems a fine description of a perfectly transparent and disinterested model of
Godwinian moral agency. The image is oddly hollow, however, and the moral struggle
undergone to achieve it does not anticipate the simultaneous joy and chaos of the fourth
act.
How to account for the fourth act, then, has always been something of a critical
dilemma. For a long time scholars have debated whether the final act is an aesthetic
failure ruining the unity of the first three acts or an aesthetic necessity without which the
drama as a whole would remain incomplete. Recent criticism on the poem, however,
proceeds from an understanding that Shelley knew very well what he was about, and
disagreements surround his intentions and their effect rather than the competency of his
design. Earl Wasserman in his influential reading of the poem insists that it portrays
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Shelley’s conception of the “One Mind” as it realizes itself perfectly within all modes of
experience, thought and history.147 Prometheus and Asia disappear in the fourth act, he
argues, because Prometheus, as a perfected embodiment of the One Mind, now exists
outside of time and language, and the drama must move in the final act toward the human
mind.148 Undoubtedly this is in part what happens in the poem, yet Shelley’s
philosophical conception of the One Mind is often different than its aesthetic
representation in his poetry. He says in On Life:
The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting
between the assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks
employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind. Let it not
be supposed that this doctrine conducts to the monstrous presumption, that
I, the person who now write and think, are that one mind. I am but a
portion of it. (Norton 508)
According to Wasserman’s reading of Prometheus as the One Mind, Shelley’s
representation of it in language must always be partial and fragmented. Hence, as
Wasserman argues, “when Prometheus enters his cave with Asia [in Act 3] the possibility
of narrative has ended because he has passed beyond the limits of imagery and language”
(360). Yet clearly Act 4 tells a story, even if it demonstrates the limits of imagery and
language. Many readers have commented that the plot of the poem end after Act 1, that
the moment Prometheus recalls his curse on Jupiter, the political and moral revolution
Shelley dramatizes becomes a causal necessity. Indeed, the first three acts of Prometheus
Unbound, under the guise of an individual’s subjection to and subsequent overcoming of
147
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history, tell the story of history’s subjection to and subsequent overcoming of an
individual. This story arc largely progresses along a linear temporal axis. Prometheus, as
self-determining agent, is pitted against Jupiter, as history and fate.
Yet in Shelley’s poetry, figures kindle both their opposites and their similarities,
so that Prometheus and Jupiter capture in one another an identical pressure that
eventually is released as a formal synthesis of the two. The poem’s unbinding happens
the moment Prometheus overhears his curse on Jupiter: “It doth repent me: words are
quick and vain; / Grief for awhile is blind, and so was mine. / I wish no living thing to
suffer pain” (1.303-305). Prometheus, however, will not and cannot speak it himself; he
does not remember what he said, he cannot “recall” the words—“The Curse / Once
breathed on thee I would recall” (1.58-59). Instead, with the help of his mother Earth,
Prometheus calls on the Phantasm of Jupiter, which is nothing other than an image of
Prometheus himself, to speak the vengeance that both grants and removes Jupiter’s
power. “Tremendous Image” (1.246; my emphasis) is how Prometheus addresses the
Phantasm of Jupiter, who emerges through the rent veil that separates life from death, and
the curse appears to Prometheus on a face with disfigured smiles, “[w]ritten as on a
scroll” (1.263). The path toward future deliverance is here conceived in the two dueling
narratives of time, sudden revelation and rigorous record, spirit and letter. Image here
refers to a crisis in the gradualist narrative of political reform by naming the contradiction
of its power. Just as Prometheus’s liberation consists of identification with his captor
Jupiter, image’s transformative strength is present in the weakness of narrative; and as the
first three acts comprise a narrative, so the last forms an ever-evolving image from
disjunction and continuity.
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The source from which Prometheus and image claim authority is not
transcendental or permanent, so the proleptic leap that inheres in apocalypse permits both
radical restorative change and tyranny. As Wasserman succinctly observes of
Demogorgon, “[h]e is eternity because he is the infinitude of all the events that occur in
time; but he also has ‘direr’ and forbidden names because, depending upon how Power is
admitted by mind into actuality, potentiality can be released as a Jupiter or a revolution or
any other disturbance” (372). The players in the drama are thus all subject to a Power
beyond their reckoning or control. It is their response to this necessity that determines
their fate. When we hear Prometheus describe to Asia the cave to which they will
ultimately retire—“A simple dwelling, which shall be our own / Where we will sit and
talk of time and change / As the world ebbs and flows, ourselves unchanged—/ What can
hide man from Mutability?”—our first impression might be along the lines of
Wasserman’s assertion that Prometheus and Asia have left the drama for the perfection
and permanence of the One Mind (3.3.22-25). But of course nothing hides man from
mutability, and, as more of Prometheus’s speech to Asia reveals, neither does anything
hide Prometheus from it. He says that he and Asia will “Weave harmonies divine, yet
ever new, / From difference sweet where discord cannot be” (3.3.38-9).
Within this endless generation of cognitive and aesthetic difference, new meanings and
thoughts emerge, and with them the possibility of newer combinations and arrangements,
evolving and disappearing all the time. The temporal design and flow of the work
likewise moves from linear to circular, telic to atelic, sequential to simultaneous.
The fourth act of the lyrical drama helps to explain why these two modes of
temporality and the methods for presenting them poetically constitute a mutual
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embroilment between gradualist and apocalyptic expectations. If in the first three acts we
are shown how each mind “contain[s] within itself the principle of its own integrity”
(674),149 which is also the principle of its disintegration (love and vengeance, truth and
error), in the fourth we hear the music of the spheres and experience Shelley’s orphic
dance of language. “This far goal of time” becomes in act four an apocalyptic desire to
“bear Time to his tomb in eternity” (4.14).
I argue that this desire taps into more than merely an evasion of historical tyranny,
violence and contingency into a realm Shelleyan vacancy, an “intense inane” (3.4.204) or
“shape all light” (353),150 which nevertheless must be overcome or at least ethically
informed. It also names a self-conscious confrontation between the record of history and
the image of futurity, stabilization and annihilation.151 The bearing of time to his tomb in
eternity involves a simultaneous and inescapable application of the poetic method in
which this act is expressed, the bearing of time to his tome in eternity. It is the attempt to
disseminate and record the unwritable image of a continually dissolving (past) history
that produces the effect of failure, which in turn necessitates the aesthetic and mystical
excess of poetry in the fourth act of Prometheus Unbound and in much of The Triumph of
Life also.
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I have mentioned the disjunction between the first three acts and the last, how a
teleological temporality suddenly is subordinated to and subsumed under an atelic one.
That Shelley accords high value never to settle upon one single perspective is evidenced
by critical attention paid to the “difference sweet” of Prometheus Unbound. This is
exactly what he criticizes Wordsworth for in Peter Bell the Third: “He had as much
imagination / As a pint pot:—he never could / Fancy another situation / From which to
dart his contemplation, / Than that wherein he stood” (4.298-302). Carol Jacobs notes
that “the danger in Shelley (which is as much the comfort) is taking any one statement on
language as the final word.”152 Indeed, the play of being and becoming, progress and
apocalypse, revolution and repetition that finds its highest pitch in Act 4 seems to be the
key to the work’s political and poetic message, its dialectical entanglement of reality and
representation, the relation of past to future. The always open possibility of the radical
dissolution of language’s semantic function, coupled with endless transformations of the
objects, forms and referents of Shelley’s representation of imaginative thought and
poetry, both of which attempt to resist aesthetic formalization and political ideology,
must lead to some ethical imperative or practical social program; otherwise, the fourth act
mystic dance of the cosmos remains separate from human concern. Prometheus informs
Asia that
lovely apparitions dim at first
Then radiant—as the mind, arising bright
From the embrace of beauty (whence the forms
Of which these are the phantoms) casts on them
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The gathered rays which are reality—
Shall visit us, the progeny immortal
Of painting, Sculpture and rapt Poesy
And arts, though unimagined, yet to be.
The wandering voices and the shadows these
Of all that man becomes, the mediators
Of that best worship, love, by him and us
Given and returned, swift shapes and sounds which grow
More fair and soft as man grows wise and kind,
And veil by veil evil and error fall…(3.3.49-62)
As beautifully rendered a consecration of the medley between art, love and justice
as this is, one cannot help but feel that it too might be just one more veil, another image
representing potential hope rather than real change. “Dim” or “radiant” apparitions never
cohere beyond the condition of a phantom. It is the mind that projects the “reality” which
constitutes the veil of deep truth and beauty. “The wandering voices and shadows” and
“swift shapes and sounds” are the “mediators / Of that best worship, love.” Mediation
cannot substitute for real presence. Prometheus adumbrates an aesthetics of love where
art is not art unless it serves love, which in the poem and in Shelley’s moral and
metaphysical universe is the only permanent force.
Forms rather than any specific contents, whether political or aesthetic, mark
Prometheus’s speech. In this work and all of Shelley’s poetry the most important
condition of language is that it remains elastic, fluid and dynamic, that it never calcifies
into one thought or one image, that after its communication into the world there remain
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something possible, open, “unimagined” and “yet to be.” In Act 4 language is defined by
its ability to wrangle the wilderness of thought: “Language is a perpetual Orphic song, /
Which rules with Daedal harmony a throng / Of thoughts and forms, which else senseless
and shapeless were” (4.415-17). Language is orphic at the end of Prometheus Unbound
because that which it rules, rebels; the perpetual ordering of its formal powers to shape
and, like love, make “shiver / Thought’s stagnant chaos” will always “revolve, subside,
and swell” (4.379-380 and “Mont Blanc” 95).
Unsurprisingly, then, the poem’s celebration and critique of language has lent
itself to many deconstructionist readings. Chief among these is Carol Jacobs’s. She
concludes, correctly in my view, that the “eternity” the poem so vividly insists upon,
imagines and strives toward, and which is the name Demogorgon adopts,
[I]mplies anything but a state of permanence, for it operates rather as the
perpetual disruption of temporal and spatial stasis, a disruption already at
play, in a sense, in Prometheus’s first monologue. As in “The Necessity of
Atheism,” eternity (or necessity) is the questioning of the concept of
origin; it is the pronounced incomprehensibility of first cause and, it goes
without saying, then, of telos. This is why Prometheus Unbound is not
“about” a restoration to his proper place and proper authority of
Prometheus as the origin of speech and thought, a movement toward
apocalypse or utopia, a millennium or redemption, but rather the
performance of perpetual if unpredictable revolution. (57)153
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Impermanent, endlessly disruptive, dynamic, questioning, lacking a beginning or
end, the “performance of perpetual if unpredictable revolution,” are all frequent
descriptors of Shelley’s aesthetics and politics. Jacobs’s unsurpassed deconstruction of
the crisis of representation and speech in Prometheus Unbound is by now almost taken
for granted. What I think is often lacking in readings that privilege Shelley’s temporal
disjunctions, spatial simultaneities, revolutionary and Promethean (as in literally
“foresighted”) rhetoric, even as they are regarded as both ahead of our own moment and
capable of shattering ideological thinking, is the long range political goals of his poetry,
the real reverberating effects on the world of a work as masterful and mystifying as
Prometheus Unbound. Are there any?
The point has long been made of Shelley’s influence in the nineteenth century on
working-class radicals and Chartists, that Queen Mab had a direct political impact, that
Engels once said “we all knew Shelley by heart.”154 With its lengthy notations appended
at the end and the strong Godwinian influence on its philosophical themes, Queen Mab:
A Philosophical Poem is more explicitly political than Prometheus Unbound and clearly
more accessible to the reading public. Yet Prometheus has higher and more far-sighted
political pretentions. The rhetorical apogee of such political ambitions is of course the
famous proclamation that poets are the “unacknowledged legislators of the world,” which
is at the same time the highest claim for Shelley’s aesthetic program. The recent
reception of the effect of Shelley’s politics among literary critics, which might be
characterized by an unbridled celebration of its ostensible radicalism, skepticism, and
revolutionism, is still colored by a tendency to defend charges of rhetorical bluster and
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aesthetic embellishment. Such is the conclusion Maureen McLane draws, yet she offers
her own defense also.
Certainly the claims Shelley made for poetry and poets tended toward the
histrionic, unacknowledged legislators and all. There is something
pathetic, something almost already obsolete, in Shelley’s declaration.
Perhaps he was, as he himself suspected, whistling in the dark. […]
Shelley whistles through the dark toward yet another dark. Transvaluing
the obliterating dark of history such that it becomes the potentially
welcoming dark of futurity: this is, in one instance, what poetry has to do
with history. (147)155
It might go without saying that “transvaluing” is also what poetry has to do with
politics, in one instance. If, as McLane says, “history commits itself to what happened,”
then politics regards what is happening; poetry, then, Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound,
regards what might happen when we commit ourselves differently to what is happening
(147). However, it is light rather than dark, no matter how welcomingly dark beckons
from the future, which reigns and restores in Prometheus. The tension in the fourth act
lies in the contest between “the powers of a world of perfect light” and “a mighty Power,
which is as darkness” (4.168 and 510), the attempt to reconcile simultaneously
Promethean transgressions and transcendences with the lapses and limits that Necessity
(Fate and Causation) impose. What is felt is the awakening from self-idolatry and
contempt into a new consciousness that has yet to discover its meaning. To wrest
freedom from the given world, where both positive—“a marble form / A rite, a law, a
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custom”—and natural—“and man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a
slave”—forces moil against human efforts to reconstitute imaginative consciousness
might seem utopian and politically evasive (Cenci 5.4.4-5 and Defence 530 ). Yet
Prometheus Unbound envisions and tries to present the reader a perspective from which
to wrest hope from the despair of the reality of the human condition, the “sad realities” of
chance, mutability, and suffering. It is in a way a political “negative capability,” the
psycho-ethico condition Keats outlined in the 21 December 1817 letter to George and
Thomas Keats, the moments “when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries,
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason” (109).156 In fact, as I
demonstrated in my discussion of self-anatomy, “reaching after fact & reason” can be
more destructive than healthy.
Prometheus Unbound is thus not about human perfection or the end of history, or
even universal equality and peace—Shelley would hardly need to drudge up and
revitalize an ancient myth with several thousand lines of poetry to do that—; it is about a
new way of looking at and responding to the “sad realities” of the actual world, which,
like death and change, never disappear. This new way, as I have argued, entails the
Promethean moment of reconciliation to the past, as well as the overcoming of a
restrictive mode of self-obsession. Hugh Roberts makes the point that the “reconciliation
of being and becoming” (2) reveals “a thoroughly new understanding of political process
[…], one that allows us to comprehend and accept, without excuses for ‘poetic license,’
Shelley’s claim that ‘poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World” (3).157
Though many have charged that Prometheus Unbound is too divorced from realism, too
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beautiful and ideal, Roberts’s claim for a political process that must necessarily be
married to this very ideality, or “poetic license,” is substantiated and laid out by Shelley
quite clearly in the preface. To acknowledge the legislation is also to risk attributing a
power to it that could stultify into tyranny. In their “unacknowledged” role, Shelley
suggests that poets pass on to the world the very power of which they are unconscious.
Less cited and remarked on than Shelley’s insistence in the preface that “it is a
mistake to suppose that I dedicate my poetical compositions solely to the direct
enforcement of reform, or that I consider them in any degree as containing a reasoning
system on the theory of human life. Didactic poetry is my abhorrence” are the following
political outcomes he insists are effected by great literature (Norton 209):
We owe the great writers of the golden age of our literature to that fervid
awakening of the public mind which shook to dust the oldest and most
oppressive form of the Christian Religion. We owe Milton to the progress
and development of the same spirit; the sacred Milton was, let it ever be
remembered, a Republican and a bold enquirer into morals and religion.
The great writers of our own age are, we have reason to suppose, the
companions and forerunners of some unimagined change in our social
condition or the opinions which cement it. The cloud of mind is
discharging its collected lighting, and the equilibrium between institutions
and opinions is now restoring, or is about to be restored. (Norton 208)
Shelley’s diction and imagery within this prophetic genealogy of literary greatness
demonstrates the dual demands of Act 4: to be and become, the individual’s recognition
of a present self absorbed in a future community, which , paradoxically, imparts to the
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present self the imaginative possibility of an unknown yet shared community. The
otherness of the “dark” future as it presents itself to the single individual is ethically
transferred to the others of the human community in the imaginative sensation and
reconstitution of the fragment, the “shook dust,” which is not only shook from oppressive
institutions and forms but from the “public mind” itself. The cycle of “dust” and
“cement” is the same as the cycle of “institutions” and “opinions”; each pair might
inform and dissolve one another, each is composed and determined by one another.
“Companions” and “forerunners” are the bolts of lightning “now restoring” and “about
to be restored.” Yet the curious feature of Shelley’s language in this passage is that the
direction, prospective or retrospective, the “unimagined social change” will take is
ambiguous; it is cloudy, so to speak. Likewise, does “cloud of mind” entail a direct
comparison of mind to a cloud, or does it mean that the mind is cloudy, unclear, and
therefore what must be “discharged” is the lightning, as in Jovian “lightning bolts”? Even
“discharging” is ambiguous. Does it signal freedom from an untenable or unstable
condition or does it mark the dispossession and deprivation from a condition of freedom?
Finally, is “equilibrium” here a positive state, a privileged value?
In reading this passage, we almost uncritically take for granted a creative and
“restorative” revolutionary spirit and future, but the language does not assure us of this,
only that an “equilibrium between institutions and opinions” will be restored, not
paradise or progress. The ambiguity is indicative of the spell cast by the poem, which can
only be understood as a spell simultaneously broken, the words with which Demogorgon
closes the curtain—themselves necessary because of Demogorgon’s previously spoken
words in Act 2:
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—If the Abysm
Could vomit forth its secrets:—but a voice
Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless;
For what would it avail to bid thee to gaze
On the revolving world? what to bid speak
Fate, Time, Chance, Occasion and Change?—To these
All things are subject but eternal Love. (2.4.114-20)
In Queen Mab Shelley gazed on the revolving world and witnessed the fundamental axis
of the universe, yet by 1819 the deep truth is silent and unrepresentable, and love alone
allows him to imagine the imageless and silent truth. In these, perhaps the most
meaningful and revealing lines of poetry (which of course refer to the impossibility of
final meaning and revelation) in Prometheus Unbound, a practical moral lesson can be
gleaned, which the final lines of the poem determine. It is because the “deep truth is
imageless” that Love “makes all it gazes on paradise” (4.128). Love might turn even the
imageless deep truth into an image of paradise. Love fills Act 4, “from beneath, around,
within, above, / Filling thy [Moon] void annihilation, Love / Bursts in like light on caves
cloven by the thunderball” (353-55). “Tis Love, all Love!” shouts the Moon, to which the
Earth replies, “It interpenetrates my granite mass” (369-70). “Familiar acts are beautiful
through love” (403), says the Earth, and Demogorgon more mysteriously unleashes
“Love from its awful throne of patient power” until it “springs / And folds over the world
its healing wings” (557 and 560-61).
It is easy to dismiss the almost superhuman power Shelley attributes to love (and
to the imagination), the way in which it operates as a panacea and placeholder for, some
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might insist, the complicated and perhaps irremediable social, moral and psychological
impasses that have always obstructed human progress.158 But when Demogorgon locates
Love in “its awful throne of patient power,” he comes close to identifying directly with it.
Love gives life to Necessity, the law of which knows neither good nor evil, progress nor
collapse. For Shelley Love alone stands as the wreck of hope, because it alone can wreck
the prison of the Self and through its gaze reimagine and create the “thing it
contemplates,” which is its own absence, what it is not.
Panthea’s long Act 4 speech of the creation and annihilation of past histories and
anterior futures, of ancient cities and the broken relics and bones of their inhabitants, of
primordial Earth and its skeletons, reads as a discordant mistake of composition
compared with the passages of joy and mad exuberance that precede and follow. Yet
Shelley’s meaning in showing “the melancholy ruins / Of cancelled cycles,” and then
finally imagining the erasure of Earth itself, is to insist on a kind of creative harmony in
chaos and even suffering.
And weed-overgrown continents of Earth
Increased and multiplied like summer worms
On an abandoned corpse, till the blue globe
Wrapt Deluge round it like a cloak, and they
Yelled, gaspt and were abolished; or some God
Whose throne was in a comet, past, and cried—
“Be Not!”—and like my words they were no more. (4.312-18)
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The irony of these lines is that the powerful speech act “Be Not!” validates rather than
parodies genesis. The destructive imperative orders a passage riven with heaped images
of chaos and death. The self-reflexivity of “no more” connects the natural world with the
language that simultaneously ends and generates it. This is the antithesis of the function
of Act 4 in relation to the previous three acts. Panthea describes a wreck from which hope
creates the thing it contemplates, the dance between the Earth and Moon. It is an instance
of a mind that suffers suffering, which makes suffering suffer, a Promethean victory.
Attesting to the difficult prospect of Promethean change and the Promethean future, this
ruinous scene mitigates the emotions it elicits in the same self-reflexive way Prometheus
remains king over himself—by turning away from the rancor of history and his curse, and
“like [his] words they were no more.”
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CHAPTER FOUR
As Yet to Come: Beginning Again at The Triumph of Life
Is not all history but the coming of that conscious art which first makes articulate and
then destroys the old wild energy?
—Yeats
Shelley’s final poem The Triumph of Life (1822) is at once a radical departure
from and clearer formulation of the political and aesthetic ideals he professed throughout
his life and career. For many readers and critics, it is difficult to distinguish the
inescapable note of bleakness and suffering the poem sounds from the innovative
approach of representing through the poet-speaker’s vision the weal and woe of
prominent figures in Western culture from Classical Greece through the
Enlightenment.159 The result is that the poem is often read as a rebuke of the very
Enlightenment ideals of progress to which Shelley had so long been committed. At times
this sound of fury is so great that both poetry and love seem guilty of participating in and
causing the mad pageantry the poem depicts, that the greatest sin of the artist is to suffer
the objects of art’s creation and “temper” one’s spirit to the material forces that shape it.
For Shelley, whom we consider Romantic poet par excellence, this is a surprisingly antiRomantic position to hold, one nearer Classical notions of ideal aesthetic experience. So
the poem’s overall feeling of despair, heavily contributed to and expressed by the
confusion, ignorance, restlessness and helplessness of its voices, the poet-speaker and
Rousseau, overpowers the moral lessons it tries to communicate. 160 Because the poem is
about life in the most general sense, the tragedy of being born into an alien world and
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unsure about which light illuminates and which blinds, such ambiguities among the
competing claims of the poem’s voices are inevitable.
Compounding this separation of the poem’s emotional residue from its intellectual
argument is Shelley’s death at the time of The Triumph of Life’s composition, which
hangs over the poem like an inexhaustible ironic veil. 161 The “triumph of life” thus
conquered Shelley, and therefore we shore up the fragmentary remains of The Triumph of
Life as both suicide note and the spells with which to resurrect him. Attributing such
auras of mystery to the poem has its critical charms, yet the reality is that The Triumph of
Life is as finished and complete a work as any Shelley published while living.162 Rather
than offering us a key to Shelley’s life and work, one that would reveal and somehow
reconcile the many “what ifs” for which we mourn and grieve a great poet’s truncated life
and untimely end, The Triumph of Life appears to caution against the natural human
tendency toward all-encompassing perspectives or ultimate answers.163 The compelling
and impenetrable blank caesura on which the poem ends, and beyond which swims the
infinite openness of what it has to say about Shelley’s own moment and our own, both
frustrates and satisfies our desire to read it as a moral parable that teaches the sane health
of adopting a skeptical stance toward the “Conqueror Life.” It frustrates because its
unfinishedness solicits our completion of it. It satisfies because we recognize in the
reality of leaving things unfinished our own approaching death. The poem suggests that
any answer to the final question “Then, what is Life?” (544) must remain incomplete
until the moment when our own lives are complete and life achieves its final victory.
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In this concluding chapter I want to argue that The Triumph of Life is a poem full
of self-contradictions and unmanageable scissions from Shelley’s previously more
unified principle of the self. The Promethean injunction of being king over what is
identified in The Triumph as the “mutiny within” seems now to resist both urgency and
possibility. The very relationship of Love to self-knowledge expresses itself in the poem
as an impasse to self-understanding: “And Life […] / Conquered that heart by love which
gold or pain / Or age or sloth or slavery could subdue not” (257-59). Shelley’s conception
of “self-anatomy” has evolved from a form of self-analysis that might motivate the
dangerous justification of unjust acts into the possibility that poetry (understood in the
general Shelleyan sense) might constitute “self-anatomy” on a collective historical
scale—Shelley’s Rousseau admits, “I / have suffered what I wrote, or viler pain!— / And
so my words were the seeds of misery” (278-80). Through his uniquely personal art,
Rousseau infected others with the suffering that it expressed, Shelley included, of course.
In this last poem of Shelley’s, I suggest that what accounts for the self-contradictions and
irreconcilable oppositions is the intensity with which Shelley interrogates and blurs the
relationship of the principle of Self to the principle of Poetry.
In so doing Shelley begs from us his readers the question of whether The Triumph
of Life is an ironic metaphor for the triumph of Life. Is the poem an exemplary thought
and action of one who refuses to kneel before the conqueror Life, or is it the languid letter
of resignation from one who fought well but now realizes the battle was rigged from the
beginning? I think that neither question will do well to advance a better understanding of
Shelley’s commitment to moral and political progress. The Triumph is certainly
emblematic of a strong rebuke but not one that dismisses, much less denigrates, all that
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Shelley previously believed. Rather in the poem Shelley attempts to reshuffle the deck he
had been playing with for some time. He asks very old questions through the more
expansive horizon of futurity. If the answers are unsettling in their resistance to be
revealed, then that was characteristic of the moment in which he wrote the poem, and the
one in which we read it.

Stuart Curran has surmised that The Triumph of Life can “be construed as a
cynical trap […] to see if we as its readers will convert the living metaphor into the static
ideological counter and enact the very triumph of life whose enactment we are
vicariously witnessing.”164 This is worth considering, though it might say as much about
our own current reading practices as about Shelley’s intentions. I think it is more accurate
to say that Shelley’s work shows that we as its readers have no choice in this conversion
process, that such is the end of all aesthetic experience that is measured against our
consciousness of eternity. This is not unique to The Triumph of Life, however; it is
emblematic of Shelley’s lifelong concern of how language and poetry can help humanity
achieve its Promethean birthright. Apart from the view that the poem is Shelley’s
palinode made more critically suggestive because of its “in the midst of life we are in
death” ironies, the unique status conferred upon The Triumph of Life in recent decades
can be attributed to the emphasis the poem places on the relation of the past to the
present, which is a fundamental relation of both Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry and our
own interpretation of Romanticism.
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Whether we accept that the poem allegorizes, as Paul de Man insisted, that
“nothing, whether deed, word, thought, or text, ever happens in relation, positive or
negative, to anything that precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a random
event whose power, like the power of death, is due to the randomness of its occurrence”
(122), the desire to construct, impose, reveal, and direct this relation is the poem’s hope
and despair. 165 What cannot be surmised but must be acknowledged is that the selfreflexivity of The Triumph of Life reveals the insufficiency of Romanticism to account
for the historical forces that drive it. In the same way, the poet-narrator at the beginning
of the poem is kept awake by “thoughts which must remain untold”; and Rousseau,
whose thoughts are “blotted” by gazing on the “shape all light” (21 and 383). Thought as
a mental faculty becomes insufficient to account for its unintended impacts and
consequences in the world and poem, and it is thought as a mental process and figure of
the imagination that most dominants poem’s structure. As singularly focused as the work
is on the collective multitude, and representative men, The Triumph of Life is obsessed
with the individual “mutiny within,” which ought, according to Rousseau, be
“repress[ed].” (213). Once again self-analysis is represented as a possible perversion of
the poetic process and inhibitor of imaginative love. A repression of both thought and
emotion, or thoughts and emotions that are driven by social forces, occupies a great deal
of the poem’s critique of ideology. Our modern connotations of repression, shadowed by
Freudian psychoanalysis, suggest the potential for neurosis and pathology. Repression
creates problems and should be avoided. And it is surprising that Shelley names the
object of repression “mutiny,” or an open rebellion of authority, since a fevered
overhauling of the power centers of the world would seem a welcome development to a
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committed political radical. The closed circuit of corruption between will and power
begins within the individual, the poem suggests. Its interruption begins when individuals
identify not with their own free thinking but with thoughts as such.
Custom, religion, inequality, all such institutions which privilege obedience, duty,
and subservience, are less likely to lay waste to conscience and free thinking than the
inevitability of thought’s reification. As Kenneth Neil Cameron succinctly addresses this
issue in his intellectual biography of Shelley, “[p]eople have innate noble characteristics
that they can develop, or they can substitute for them evil ones supplied by society”
(459).166 Simply put, the individual must stand “Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed—but
man” (PU; 3.4.194). In The Triumph of Life, “but man” is the problem, since the best of
them fall victim to “the mutiny within.” Curran asserts that
Even if those strictures [of ideology] may here be acknowledged not as the
snares of tyrants and priests, but as the potentiality in all of us to become
tyrants and priests, first imposing on ourselves the temptations by which
we would betray others, still the poem resolutely refuses the despair that
haunts its margins. (607)
Pure thought becomes subsumed into a larger social discourse of power, where it
functions as a substitute for thought and imagination. In earlier works, notably in Queen
Mab, liberation seemed a matter of coherence between human desire and the inner
necessity that determines natural law. Following the “benignant power” brings the self
into contact with benignant will. In Shelley’s final vision, however, there is an
unbridgeable distance between the very notion of possible coherence between inner
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necessity and individual will. Coherence itself is read as a trick of language, desire, and
thought. The poem articulates this great impasse for human destiny, according to Shelley:
And much I grieved to think how power & will
In opposition rule our mortal day—

And why God made irreconcilable
Good and the means of good; (228-31)
The antagonism between the selfless humanitarian ideal and the forces that draw the self
toward power is forecasted both in Prometheus Unbound and A Defence of Poetry. In the
former work a Fury declares that
[The Loftiest] dare not devise good for man’s estate
And yet they know not that they do not dare.
The good want power, but to weep barren tears.
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
The wise want love, and those who love want wisdom;
And all best things are thus confined to ill. (1.623-28)
In the latter Shelley laments that
There is no want of knowledge respecting what is wisest and best in
morals, government, and political economy, or at least, what is wiser and
better than what men now practice and endure. But we let “I dare not wait
upon I would, like the poor cat i’ the adage.” We want the creative faculty
to imagine that which we know; we want the generous impulse to act that
which we imagine; we want the poetry of life: our calculations have
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outrun our conception; we have eaten more than we can digest. (Norton
530)
In the passages from both Prometheus Unbound and Defence, individuals and society
suffer from the stultifying moral effects of “wanting.” One must wonder whether the true
monster of the human psyche the Fury describes is human desire, not the relative
necessity or merit of its objects. The obstacles nature imposes on human potential
combines with the seductive enticements of society, which promises to eliminate or
ameliorate them, to present a world of contradictory promises and chaotic pleasures.
Shelley suggests that we already know the best answers to life’s questions. If we do not
have access to the existential purpose of life itself, then our moral knowledge makes us
well-equipped for being alive in this world.
We possess an excess of knowledge, technology, and science to successfully
combat and overcome nature and broaden the bounds of our human finitude. It is not
knowledge of the “Good” that is wanting but the method and “means” of achieving it.
Life gets in the way of our living it well and purposefully, yet even the greatest
individuals cannot but help accommodate life’s “getting.” In no uncertain terms, Shelley
drives the point home in the Defence: “and man, having enslaved the elements, remains
himself a slave” (Norton 530). And so the very desire to create beauty or live virtuously
becomes the gap into which competing desires pour ugliness, suffering, and evil.
Prometheus avoids this entanglement of desire through an act of Christ-like forgiveness,
when he remembers the curse he uttered against Jupiter. Rousseau, though identified by
Shelley in Essay on Christianity as the closest inheritor of Christ’s influence on human
potential, is given no such chance, because in The Triumph of Life the Promethean ideal
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is shattered. 167 The poem ends where Prometheus Unbound begins, with a forgetting. If
there is a restoration in The Triumph of Life, and I argue that there is, the rebirth and
regeneration starts with Rousseau’s encounter with the “shape all light,” which I later
analyze in greater detail.
Whether the poem is a fitting end to Shelley’s career as an increasingly
disillusioned artist or a mysterious, promising new beginning (as T. S. Eliot speculated),
the poem’s subject—the individual’s ceaseless struggle to distinguish life’s substance
from its shadows and to “repress the mutiny within” (213) that renders shadows
indistinguishable from substance—is caught up in its central question: What is life? The
obviousness of asking, and then trying to answer, so comprehensive and existential a
question receives little attention by commentators and readers of the poem. The question
seems to betray the fundamental lesson of the poem, not to seek after or desire “delusive
flames” or false suns that illuminate each and every hidden corner of human
consciousness and natural law. 168 It is as if in reading the poem the very question to life’s
extraordinary riddle is answered (albeit answered with the unequivocal capaciousness of
a question mark), so great is the moiling of Shelley’s art with the world it tries to make
sense of. In other words, the poem becomes yet another “delusive flame,” another spell
which enchants those who blindly participate in its pageantry and dance.
But this experience of experience, which constitutes the gift that the poet-narrator
receives from his encounter with the figure of Rousseau (“But follow thou, & from
spectator turn / Actor or victim in this wretchedness / And what thou woudst be taught I
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then may learn from thee”), and that constitutes the curse Rousseau recounts of his life as
an artist (“I have suffered what I wrote, or viler pain!”), remains a irrepressible and also
unending concern of our inheritance of Romantic poetry (305-8 and 278-9). The
persistent narrative of Romantic poetry and Romantic poets, indelibly inscribed into
critiques and defenses of Romanticism by Jerome McGann,169 tells a story of an inward
and idealized turn toward the self, an escape from the world and its primary and
pragmatic political concerns and pressures. Language, or rather figurative language, is the
principle feature of this interiorized psychological landscape which Romantic poetry is
assumed to inhabit and cultivate. Recursive and elusive, self-referential and specular in
both semantic and grammatical terms, the poetry of The Triumph of Life represents
Romanticism at its most comfortable and disturbing mode. It is a work that aims outside
the scope of itself as poetry; for which reason it maintains the obstinate narrative of
Romanticism and further reveals its commitments as ideal rather than material.
Shelley’s ideality, however, is never very far from his rigorous and prophetic
moral sentiments. The two cannot exist without each other. And these moral sentiments
are grounded in the basest material conditions of society: poverty, hunger, blood, gold,
and inequality, generally. Behind each model of moral perfection he describes in his
political writings is an image of ideal perfection he represents in his poetry. And toward
the end of his life, Shelley made the decision to alter his reform efforts. Nine days before
his death, in a letter to Horace Smith, he writes:
It seems to me that things have now arrived at such a crisis as requires
every man plainly to utter his sentiments on the inefficacy of the existing
religions no less than political systems for restraining & guiding mankind.
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Let us see the truth whatever that may be.—The destiny of man can
scarcely be so degraded that he was born only to die: and if such should be
the case, delusions, especially gross & preposterous ones of the existing
religion, can scarcely be supposed to exalt it.—if every man said what he
thought, it could not subsist a day. […] I once thought to study these
affairs [England’s “desperate condition”] & write or act in them—I’m glad
that my good genius said refrain. (Letters II; 442)
Shelley describes the state of England and the destiny of the human race in apocalyptic
and ideal terms. Things are at their very limits and he describes them as such: birth and
death, delusions and truth, stability and collapse. He is ready for an answer, any answer,
to the question, “Then, what is Life?” Significantly, he chooses to “refrain” from acting
in life’s triumphal pageant. He chooses otherwise than the poet-speaker whom Rousseau
advises, “But follow thou, & from spectator turn / Actor or victim in this wretchedness /
And what thou woudst be taught I then may learn from thee” (305-8).
At the very moment when Shelley seems intent to disengage from actively
addressing and redressing the problems of the world, he is composing a poem that makes
a strong case not only for the impossibility of doing so untouched by the world but also
for the impossibility of doing so, period. His “refrain,” then, read as a musical piece,
allows for a greater future engagement with the world’s suffering and progress, as a poem
intended for the as yet to come, when his words will spark a “thousand beacons” (207).
Timothy Morton remarks that
The meaning of a poem is its future: it will have been read five minutes
from now, next week, and more than this, its meaning is futurality, or as
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Shelley puts it, ‘the gigantic shadows that futurity casts upon the present.’
The past of the poem, its letters, its paper, its ink, its authors, its readers,
its readings, is the appearance of the poem, the poem’s form. A poem, a
hyperobject, is a message in a bottle from the future. An augury, a writing
in entrails or in the sky, without a stable or consistent system of meaning
to underwrite it. (235)170
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Shelley was fond of messages in bottles, the messages they
contained always a futurality, as Morton says, usually a political one. These early “time
machines” carried by the waves of the sea represented the immense temporal horizon
Shelley wanted to write across, as well as posthumously cross into the future. And as
sentimentally Romantic as sending out a message in a bottle might seem to us, as wishywashy, so to speak, the method of communication it contains, Shelley conceived the act
in absolute earnestness and saw it as a means of escaping not the world but the prisonhouse of intention and context. He wished to give his writings about the need for moral
and political change a new chance, a new destiny, or as Morton says, “An augury […]
without a stable or consistent system of meaning to underwrite it.” So the supposed
Romantic escape into ideality is here, as it is above in regards to Shelley’s letter and the
Triumph read as musical refrain, a turn from spectator to actor.
What is striking about The Triumph of Life’s progression from the poet-speaker’s
trance to Rousseau’s trials is its acceptance of the absence of moral perfection. The two
figures who might rescue the poem from its moral ruins, “they of Athens & Jerusalem,”
Socrates and Christ, are missing in action from the field of battle (134). Socrates and
Christ, memorably named by one commentator on the poem as “mere fictions in the
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writings of others,”171 are Shelley’s embodiments of the Promethean man. A depth of
moral feeling echoes within each the very immaterial attributes that make the material
suffering of the world so difficult to bear and turn away from. “Know thyself” and “Love
thy neighbor as thyself” are the two moral pillars on which Enlightenment ethics are
built. They also represent for Shelley the highest aim that aesthetic endeavors can
achieve, closing the vast gap between one individual and another:
But there is a circle which comprehends, as well as one which mutually
excludes, all things which feel. And, with respect to man, his public and
his private happiness consist in diminishing the circumference which
includes those resembling himself, until they become one with him, and he
has with them. (304).172
Another way of announcing Romanticism’s preoccupation with merging form and
content, object and subject, making transparent the line between appearance and
substance, this passage is unsurprising from a poet who believed that moral perfection
would eradicate all bodily disease. But the idea of oneness that cuts across Shelley’s
diminished circumference is nowhere present in The Triumph of Life, at least nowhere
positively presented. There does exist the provocative encounter with the “shape all light”
(352), understood and described as an extreme negation and forgetting. But I will speak
to this later.
Of importance here is that this same oneness inheres in the maxims of Socrates
and Christ, “know thyself” and “love thy neighbor as thyself,” or know thyself first, then
love thy neighbor as that knowledge. This opposition between interiorized will and
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externalized power (power directed toward the good, Christian charity) finds
reconciliation in the figures of Socrates and Christ, a reconciliation that The Triumph of
Life resists and both poet-speaker and Rousseau are desperate to realize. These two
figures, or “mere fictions in the writings of others,” become mere absent idealizations in
Shelley’s material and mechanized depiction of the human pageantry. Socrates and Christ
helm
[…] the sacred few who could not tame
Their spirits to the Conqueror, but as soon
As they had touched the world with living flame

Fled back like eagles to their native noon […]. (128-131)
The allusion to Prometheus is clear. Socrates and Christ give fire, freedom, to humanity
and then exit to the radiant source of all freedom, significantly not the sun, which Yeats
remarked is the “source of all tyrannies”173 in Shelley’s final work, but rather its position
in the sky at noon, when no delusive shadows are cast. Socrates and Christ do not
participate in the “fierce song and maniac dance” (110) of Shelley’s jubilee because they
are harbingers and suzerains of the Promethean deep and imageless truth.174 Their
presence would be an inviolable incursion into an unholy stronghold of transparent
quicksands and shifting perspectives.
Although each figure acts materially and “touches” the earthly realm of the poem
with “living flame,” the “deep truth” which they embody prevents them from taking part
in life’s pageant. Furthermore, Socrates and Christ are martyrs, and their “native noon” is
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a realm driven not only by transcendence but also thanatos; as Shelley commands—
longingly –in Adonais (1821), “Die, / If thou woudst be with that which thou dost seek! /
Follow where all is fled!” (52.464-66). The Triumph of Life does not expose the
otherworldly idealism of Shelley and Romanticism. Neither does it expose, as McGann
concludes, an ideology that is “time and place specific.”175 It takes the attempt to enact
and represent any kind of exposure, whether aesthetic or ideological, a step beyond
Prometheus Unbound, where the deep truth is a reality, though invisible and inaccessible.
The Triumph of Life cannot produce a clear image of life or reveal the depths of life’s
truth because Shelley is no longer interested in offering up or chasing after truth-content.
The veil does not drop to reveal the essence of reality but drapes itself over the journey to
drop it; vision of the truth is conceived not as an integration of collective history into
individual memory but as the erasure of a memory suffering from the weight and
influence of collective history.
The relation of past to present, in other words, dictates the fate of the future. But
the cliché is made more profound and complicated by the dramatic perspective of The
Triumph of Life. There is now no gospel of truth, no spell to break the conqueror’s
imprisoning veil, and the poem “works” by forgetting to answer its question, “Then, what
is Life?” (544). The question becomes the placeholder for the content that is left outside
of it, never to be inscribed within it. It excludes the possibility of exclusion. For all its
manic dance and mad yearnings, The Triumph of Life exhales an ataraxic breath which
Shelley described in an 1821 letter to Thomas Medwin: “My mind is at peace respecting
nothing so much as the constitution & mysteries of the great system of things—my
curiosity on this point never amounts to solicitude” (Letters II; 341). It seems as if
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Shelley is trying to join his “sacred few,” for poetry so fraught with the experience of
life’s contagion cannot be composed by its sufferer. The sad irony is that Shelley keeps
them company only by never completing the poem.
Enacting and representing the chaos of what appears to the consciousness of its
captives and participants, the poem celebrates a phenomenology that we as readers, and,
as the poem suggests, life’s captives, cannot pass beyond. By including itself in its own
devastating critique of thought, language, and art, the work is a central text in the history
of Romanticism. Rousseau, whom Shelley credits and blames for the revolutionary
upheaval of his historical epoch, is described by the poet-speaker as “one [who] with the
weight / Of his own words is staggered” (196-97). Following this description of selfgenerating suffering, of a closed system that is open only to the energy that ensures its
continued immurement, Rousseau directs the poet-speaker’s attention to the great figures
of the Enlightenment and diagnoses not only their failure but also the Enlightenment’s
and his own. Surprisingly, and what revealed to Shelley the degree of rot to which
Enlightenment progress had arrived, thought itself is presented as cancerous. Whereas in
Hellas (1821), the prophetic lyrical drama describing Greek independence, “Thought /
Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion, / Reason, Imagination, cannot die” (79597), Shelley’s last poem regards as the greatest threat to thought, thought itself:
‘If I have been extinguished, yet there rise
A thousand beacons from the spark I bore.’—
‘And who are those chained to the car?’ ‘The Wise,

‘The Great, the unforgotten: they who wore
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Mitres and helms and crowns, or wreaths of light,
Signs of thought’s empire over thought; their lore

‘Taught them not this—to know themselves; their might
Could not repress the mutiny within,
And for the morn of truth they feigned, deep night

‘Caught them ere evening.’ (206-215)
If Rousseau did not fully live according to the Socratic injunction, know thyself,
then at least he wrote from a source within himself of free consciousness and intention.
Hence, the “thousand beacons from the spark [he] bore.” As Paul de Man sees it,
“Rousseau has overcome the discrepancy of action and intention that tears apart the
historical world, and he has done so because his words have acquired the power of
actions as well as of the will” (103).176 The sparks that follow from Rousseau’s
admission, “If I have been extinguished […]” are more clearly explained in Shelley’s A
Defence of Poetry. There, Dante’s words lie paradoxically cold and extinguished: “His
very words are instinct with spirit: each is as a spark, a burning atom of inextinguishable
thought: and many yet lie covered in the ashes of their birth, and pregnant with a lighting
which has yet found no conductor” (Norton 528). But Rousseau’s use of “bore” is
problematic and suggests that he too is enslaved to “thought’s empire over thought.” He
gives birth to these sparks, he penetrates the darkness of custom and ideology, but he also
bores, as in he puts to sleep (the effect his Confessions had on Shelley), or, more relevant
still to The Triumph of Life, he “consigns to perpetual slavery,” generating his own
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ideology (OED). The accompanying Robert South quotation the OED provides for this
definition reads, “Can any man, that would be faithful to his Reason, yield his Ear to be
bored through by his domineering appetites.” In other words, who can escape the captive
multitude that cannot first “repress the mutiny within?”
Whereas in Prometheus Unbound the dropping of the veil is the clear historical
and cultural telos, the moment when lion lays down with lamb, in Shelley’s final work
the apocalypse is quickly discarded in favor of a distinct individual vision, yet veiled
twice over by two dramatic personas, the poet-narrator and Rousseau; Shelley “lifts not
the painted veil” but embraces it.177 And although the first line of the poem reveals a
“spirit,” a sign of the immaterial Romantic aesthetic, the spirit is “hastening to its task,” a
word that suggests exhaustion, boredom, and material duty (1; my emphasis). That the
task is one “Of glory & of good” makes the light at the beginning of the poem only more
ironic, since later the sun’s radiance is outshone by a light stronger than reason, the
blinding lights of desire and the passions which corrupt justice and prevent virtue.
Looking further back into the history of poetry, Rousseau identifies the antidote to the
“mutiny within,” these passions and desires. It is made up of a decidedly non-Romantic
aesthetic, what Schiller called naive poetry, where the poet is nature rather than seeking
after it.178
See the great bards of old who inly quelled

‘The passions which they sung, as by their strain
May well be known: their living melody
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Tempers its own contagion to the vein

‘Of those who are infected with it—I
Have suffered what I wrote, or viler pain!— (274-79)
It is Rousseau’s suffering that lights the “thousand beacons” into the future. The profound
shift in the relation of artist to art which Shelley refers to here entails a larger claim for an
equally profound shift in the relation of aesthetics to history. In the Defence when
Shelley argues that “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (Norton 535)
he has in mind the “living melody [that] / Tempers its own contagion to the vein / Of
those who are infected with it.” “[T]he trumpets which sing to battle and feel not what
they inspire” are the “great bards of old / who inly quelled / The passions which they
sung.”
The analogy to Schiller’s distinction between sentimental and naïve poets could
not be clearer. The aesthetic revolution that constitutes Rousseau’s writings, and which
were a contributing cause of The French Revolution, is the distance between living from
history and living at history. The “mutiny within” escapes the interior passions of the
individual and becomes the very political and ethical system which tries to quell the same
passions of which they are comprised. The “living melody” of the “great bards of old,”
though able to set the foundation for the possibility of The Triumph of Life, will not be
heard or heeded there, and is in direct opposition to the “vital alchemy” (402) that
initiates Rousseau’s new vision upon encountering the “shape all light.” History, along
with the aesthetic articulations that represent it and are produced by it, is now alchemical
from the perspective of the poem’s historical consciousness, yet there is no philosopher’s
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stone which will turn it into gold. In fact, the effect is quite the opposite, demonstrated
when Rousseau’s “brain became as sand” (405). The alchemical structure defines also the
“thousand beacons” born from Rousseau’s single spark, and in the poem their light
moves entropically. The spirit of the age from which Shelley tries to compose a poem
that constitutes its “living melody,” almost certainly not to change it but rather hear and
understand it, demands change. The reform efforts that Shelley has in mind at this point
in his life are more internalized and personal than social. Trying to put back the pieces of
broken social justice or shattered equalities between different classes of people is a fight
against a particular form of entropy, one that the poem attempts to turn into an aesthetic
program. If the world will not change, or cannot change, if it remains a purgatory, then
perhaps the solution is to undergo a purgation of perception on the individual level.
William Hazlitt, who understood the spirit of the age just as well as Shelley, wrote
of Shelley’s poetry, “Where we see the dazzling beacon-lights streaming over the
darkness of the abyss, we dread the quicksands and the rocks below.”179 His charge
against Shelley’s writings—he called The Triumph of Life Shelley’s “dance of death”—
was that it was too preoccupied with its author’s own scheme, that there was an
overabundance of individual “fancy” and a dearth of natural, universal experience.
Hazlitt’s commentary on Shelley is remarkable for its accuracy. If history has disabused
many literary critics from some of the biographical clichés and aesthetic judgments the
piece indulges, then the force and clarity of Hazlitt’s views on Shelley and his thought
remain relevant and instructive to this day. Ironically, and what might have surprised
Hazlitt had he been able to read more of Shelley’s political and moral prose, his
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commentary on Shelley offers its audience many of the same moral principles that form
the dizzying tensions in The Triumph of Life.
To be convinced of the existence of wrong, we should read history rather
than poetry: the levers with which we must work out our regeneration are
not the cobwebs of the brain, but the warm, palpitating fibres of the human
heart. It is the collision of passions and interests, the petulance of partyspirit, and the perversities of self-will and self-opinion that have been the
great obstacles to social improvement — not stupidity or ignorance; and
the caricaturing one side of the question and shocking the most pardonable
prejudices on the other, is not the way to allay heats or produce unanimity.
By flying to the extremes of skepticism, we make others shrink back, and
shut themselves up in the strongholds of bigotry and superstition — by
mixing up doubtful or offensive matters with salutary and demonstrable
truths, we bring the whole into question, flyblow the cause, risk the
principle, and give a handle and a pretext to the enemy to treat all
philosophy and all reform as a compost of crude, chaotic, and monstrous
absurdities.
To an extent both relentless and historical, Shelley’s poem explores the “levers with
which we must work out our regeneration.” He concludes, like Hazlitt, that “the cobwebs
of the brain,” prone to enslavement by “thought’s empire over thought” (TL; 211)
produce unreliable, and often insidious consequences; yet unlike Hazlitt, Shelley is more
skeptical of the regenerative effects of the “palpitating fibres of the human heart.” He
seeks first to understand the nature and motivations of those “fibres,” their vulnerabilities
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and strengths. He next wants to settle whether the human heart can overcome the
“cobwebs of the brain,” since The Triumph of Life manifests his suspicion that these same
cobwebs dust the heart also. Shelley understands in The Triumph of Life, in a way that
Hazlitt does not when writing about Shelley’s poetry, how even the best human heart
quickly succumbs to the “mutiny within” (213). The “collision of passions and interests”
might as well be Shelley’s opposition between “power & will” (228). When Hazlitt
argues that by “flying to the extremes skepticism, we make others shrink back, and shut
themselves up in the extremes of bigotry and superstition,” he does not know that Shelley
has already agreed with him. In what reads as a recantation of Shelley’s early
philosophical commitments, he writes in On Life that
The shocking absurdities of the popular philosophy of mind and matter,
and its fatal consequences in morals, their violent dogmatism concerning
the source of all things, had early conducted me to materialism. This
materialism is a seducing system to young and superficial minds. It allows
its disciples to talk and dispenses them from thinking (Norton 506).
Hazlitt’s “crude, chaotic, and monstrous absurdities” are no different from Shelley’s
“shocking” ones; each is the outcome of, and each can be attributed to, the idea that the
future is progressing along the visible and determinable laws of nature. There is an
implicit agreement that the world within and the world without cohere. But in his last
years, and in this last work, such an agreement is put to a test of both history and poetry.
The outcome shows that history is veiled and poetry veils it. Another veil, one which
must rise rather than drop is required to undermine the shocking absurdities of the
“popular philosophy of mind and matter.” Revealing not the meaning of suffering, but
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how suffering and meaning are the ingredients of a history that suffers what it means.
Each new spark that gives rise to new beacons of light are potential “delusive flames”
that will blind those who worship or derive inspiration from them. To see each flame as
delusive is to indulge a paralyzing skepticism, which the poem resists. Not the ignition of
the sparks of history but their extinguishment is the intention of The Triumph of Life.
Giving rise to a “thousand beacons” from a single spark is Shelley’s hope and fear
too, and The Triumph of Life articulates how that hope stultifies into fear. As many recent
commentators on the poem mention, the poem’s “signs of thought’s empire over thought”
names ideology, the way in which the imagination can turn against itself, the way in
which external power conditions consciousness under the guise of individual freedom
and will. Shelley’s poetry suggests that when the creative mind imagines only according
to the processes and structures of a collective and social light, such as the Enlightenment,
then light itself becomes blinding. “Their might / Could not repress the mutiny within, /
And for the morn of truth they feigned” is both difficult poetry to parse and yet intuitively
clear, much like the whole thematic effect of The Triumph of Life. The “mutiny within”
produced and corrupted the Enlightenment, according to Shelley, and the linguistic and
thematic forces of The Triumph of Life reflect this double bind. The “morn of truth”
appears in the poem’s opening as the sun, “the birth / Of light” (6-7). It is Enlightenment
hope, the spirit of reason, science, and progress. But soon enough its light becomes an
imposition and tyranny to the world that must “toil” (19) under its radiance:
And in succession due, did Continent,

Isle, ocean, and all things that in them wear
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The form and character of mortal mold
Rise as the Sun their father rose, to bear

Their portion of the toil which he of old
Took as his own and then imposed on them; (15-20)
“And in succession due, did […]” echoes the dullness and dreariness of the earlier “task.”
The hierarchical system into which Continent, Isle, and ocean are placed also reveals the
presence of an external force driving their purpose. Even the sun must “take,” or bear, the
very work he imposed on others. The power of an immense inner necessity darkens the
poem’s opening stanzas even as the darkness gives way to a light. “[T]he mask / Of
darkness [falls] from the awakened Earth” (3-4) at the beginning of the poem, yet the
poet-narrator does not benefit from this perceived apocalypse; instead he falls into a
“strange trance […] / which was not slumber,” seeing things through a transparent shade
that is like a “veil of light” (29-32).
It is this peculiar light that catches the attention of Forest Pyle, who understands it
in terms of Walter Benjamin’s conception of the “aura.” Pyle argues that the “illusory
phenomenon” of the poet-narrator’s trance is the auratic lens through which the vision of
the poem must be experienced (59).180 “If from a genuinely historical perspective the aura
of the work of art decays,” Pyle says, emphasizing Benjamin’s description of it in “The
Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility” (1936), “from the perspective of the
auratic experience itself, its vanishing is registered with the shock of something
shattered” (43). He continues, again according to Benjamin’s evolving conception of the
aura, “[t]he ‘mystified experience of the aura’ makes us believe that an object, namely the
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work of art, can return the gaze of the beholder” (43). What the reader of The Triumph of
Life confronts is a shattering of Shelleyan Eros and the redemptive hope that Prometheus
Unbound voiced. In its comprehensive presentation of figures of intellectual and
philosophical history, the history of the Poets, as Shelley would have it, it becomes clear
how difficult it is to construct a history that might become the basis for democratic hope
and progress. Since “utopia,” a word and idea frequently attributed to Shelley’s project as
an artist, means “no place,” The Triumph of Life could rightly be called his most utopian
work. Its landscape is both nonhuman and human, no place and the only place. The world
the poem describes is filled with shadows, shades, skeletons, and many different
competing lights that seem both to mock and affirm the limits of human knowledge and
hope. In order to enter this realm of disturbing defeat, where neither Shelleyan Love nor
imaginative participation in the eternal seems possible, the poet-narrator undergoes an
apocalyptic reversal in which his perception is veiled. Bryan Shelley observes that the
“promotion of self-knowledge181 indicates a general movement in the opposite direction
of biblical apocalyptic, for to know the self in the Shelleyan sense is to know the self as
divine” (390).182 Whereas in Prometheus Unbound Shelleyan divinity is present,
described, and positively directed, The Triumph of Life brings the self into the harsh
world of the historical present with veiled yet open eyes, not into a world transformed or
into a world beyond the need of transformation.
It is the veiling effect the poem produces and cascades forward into a negative
revelation with the “shape all light” that accounts for it as both historiography and living
history. The poet-narrator experiences a rift in the prelusory moments of the poem that
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grants him access to the reality of the poem’s vision and also to a rift in how we access
and understand reality itself. The poem’s exploration of the realities of the world, the
periods of conquest or liberty created by human pride or humility, is an exploration of
how history demands a futural response, redemption of its failed promise. This begins
with the peculiar nature of how and why the poet-narrator’s perception is veiled.
Along with many other commentators on the poem, Pyle is right to put special
emphasis on the “Vision on [the poet-narrator’s] brain was rolled” (40): I can think of no
better name for this illusory phenomenon than Benjamin’s “aura”; and it is in this state
that the triumphal “Vision” unfolds for the speaker. The auratic state or “spell,” quite
distinctly described as a veil produced from a trance, gives rise in the poem to a historical
pageant that is, ironically, the true image of history as Benjamin calls it, “das wahre Bild
der Vergangeheit,” flashing up at this “moment of danger,” a “Vision” that this speaker is
singled out to behold. (59)
To think of The Triumph of Life as the “true” image of Shelley’s conception of
history, life, or language is to avoid the skepticism that the poem insists on. It is too
reductive still if this idea is taken further, and understood as another version of Shelley’s
often-quoted “Nought may endure but Mutability”183 or in this last work “How all things
are transfigured, except Love,” so that the poem’s unanswered questions and opaque
images become a monument or lament to the impossibility of earthly revelation or
coherence between past, present, and future (476). Too reductive because I see a way in
which the poem narrates a traceable connection between the past and the present. The
Triumph of Life beholds its historical moment through this connection. Using Benjamin’s
aura to describe and explain it is one way to acknowledge it and achieve critical distance.
183
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But, like Benjamin’s aura, Shelley’s poem seems to have anticipated and overcome being
reducible to a historical document. It has its own set of “eyes,” in other words. We behold
them each time we try to trace a coherent connection between the past and present. The
veiling of the poet-narrator’s perception before he experiences his vision anticipates our
own experience reading the poem. And the poem reveals that this connection between
past and present exists and is formed in the very way in which we choose to trace it.
Orrin Wang insists that “what remains impossible for The Triumph of Life to
resolve is the final form of its narration; what remains—what, indeed, is poeticized—is
the limit of its historical and critical consciousness” (64).184 What I contend allows for
this impossible resolve is the veiling effect produced by the actual vision. The “strange
trance […] / which was not slumber” is actually history itself; the “veil of light” is the
negative truth that all history, individual and collective, is narrated in a trance and
experienced through a veil. The Triumph of Life, more so than other major works by
Shelley, places and conditions us within this trance, since we witness, along with the
poet-narrator, the pageantry of Enlightenment “progress,” which marks a traceable
lineage to our own present moment in history. The power of the poem is such that it does
not exclude us from this pageantry, but, on the contrary, through its tragic hero,
Rousseau, a figure whose beacons have yet to be extinguished, we suffer from our own
version of auto-referentiality, the disturbing (or hopeful) thought that the future will take
care of itself, that progress is assured either through a technological singularity, cloud
computing, artificial intelligence, or any number of other cosmopolitan Frankensteins.
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The fear Shelley’s poem tries to elicit from its readers is whether history possesses
intention, whether this mad pageantry is going anywhere in particular: “yet none seemed
to know / Whither he went, or whence he came, or why / He made one of the multitude”
(47-49). Rousseau’s encounter with the “shape all light” intends an answer to the
question of intention. It entails a promise which, according to the intentions of
Rousseau’s questions, is not kept:
“To move, as one between desire and shame
Suspended, I said—‘If, as it doth seem,
Thou comest from the realm without a name,

“‘Into this valley of perpetual dream,
Shew whence I came, and where I am, and why—
Pass not away upon the passing stream.’ (394-99)
This “realm without a name” from which it seems the “shape all light” comes is similar to
the “deep truth” of Prometheus Unbound. Indeed, Rousseau’s encounter with the “fair
shape” (412) and Asia’s encounter with Demogorgon proceed along the same intentional
lines, a coupling which to my knowledge has received no critical attention. Rousseau
wrote in Reveries of the Solitary Walker, “In all the ills that befall us, we think more
about the intention behind them than the effect of them” (87).185 The consequence of this
is that we blame fate or destiny when our misfortunes cannot be attributed to any other
cause. Rousseau continues in the “Eighth Walk”:
In this way, a gambler, angered by his losses, flies into a fury, but he does
not know against whom. He imagines a fate which is deliberately bent on
185
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tormenting him, and finding something on which to feed his anger, he
becomes incensed and enraged against the enemy he has created for
himself. The wise man, who sees in all the misfortunes that befall him
only the blows of blind necessity, has none of this mad agitation: he cries
out in pain, but without losing his temper or getting angry; he feels only
the physical effects of the evil to which he has fallen prey, and however
much the blows may injure his body, not one of them can reach his heart.
(87)
In light of Shelley’s characterization of Rousseau in the poem as one who
suffered what he wrote, the irony here of Rousseau’s description of two models of
victims, as he describes an individual who will not temper his soul to life’s rigged game
against him, reveals another realm without a name, “blind necessity.” Seeing “only the
blows of blind necessity” in life’s suffering wheel of fortune is seeing their origin in the
realm without a name, outside poetry, history, memory and, specifically, language. It is
both the “no place” of utopia and the everywhere of how Shelley’s poetry ultimate tends
toward and refers to silence. The “adverting mind” of “Mont Blanc,” which encounters a
reality that might only be a “vacancy” to the silent and solitary individual who suffers his
perception of it, returns in The Triumph of Life intending to gain reciprocity and
acknowledgement from historical suffering. The “realm without a name,” which excludes
language, which is to say it includes and drives the impasse between a coincident
relationship of word to thing, is the intercessor between “desire and shame,” the cause
and consequence of life’s suffering in the poem.
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That Shelley chooses to rhyme “shame” with “name” is essential for at least two
reasons: first, the men whom he identifies by name in the poem are figures of shame in
the larger discourse of Enlightenment history; and, second, the naming of things, human
and nonhuman, immediately places them within a historical structure and lineage, chains
them to the triumph of life. It eliminates the “vital alchemy” of Poetry, the way in which
the “shape all light” answers Rousseau. Demogorgon, itself often identified as blind
necessity, answers Asia’s inquiry into “who made terror, madness, crime, remorse, /
Which from the links of the great chain of things / To every thought within the mind of
man / Sway and drag heavily” with “He [God] reigns” (2.4.19-22 and 28). To which Asia
shouts back, “Utter his name—a world pining in pain / Asks but his name; curses shall
drag him down” (29-30). Again, Demogorgon responds, “He reigns” (31). Rousseau does
not ask the “shape all light” her name. He displays an acceptance and resignation, as all
the other figures do in The Triumph of Life, of, if not the precise definition and name of
the surrounding world, then that this is the world. It is not a question of curses or
blessings, revolutions or unbindings, but of the personal relational ties to the present
reality. Rousseau is not trying to escape; he is trying to understand. The “shape all light”
responds to him:
“‘Arise and quench thy thirst,’ was her reply.
And as a shut lily, stricken by the wand
Of dewy morning’s vital alchemy,

“I rose; and, bending at her sweet command,
Touched with faint lips the cup she raised,
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And suddenly my brain became as sand

“Where the first wave had more than half erased
The track of deer on desert Labrador,
Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed

“Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore
Until the second vision bursts—so on my sight
Burst a new Vision never seen before.— (400-11)
The Shape offers Rousseau satiety, a quenching not only of thirst but, more generally,
desire. The result, however, is not, like in the before mentioned passages from
Prometheus Unbound and the Defence, another endless string of “wants” but a rebirth
and new vision, a “bursting” of his perception. Not a new reality, since the figures,
shapes, and actions that Rousseau now comes to witness remain as grim and stultified as
the poet-narrator’s vision at the poem’s beginning, but rather a new vision.
The new vision is a new way of seeing the world before his eyes, a world that thirsts for,
as de Man put it, “origins,” “directions,” and “identity.”186 The effect of Asia’s dialogue
with Demogorgon was a guiding plenitude and teleological marking of what was
inevitably to come. Demogorgon offered the keys to a kingdom that Shelley represented
as a historical possibility. The future, unstable and open to reactionary turns, was
nevertheless imagined, represented and sealed. The Triumph of Life goes a step further, or
rather begins in an anterior realm within the seat of power itself, the human brain. “And
suddenly my brain became as sand” names the moment when the “realm without a name”
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approaches human sensory perception. It enjoins the buried body both to the dirt that
covers it and the soul that desires liberation from it. Rousses guide in his journey through
this hellish world, which is the world as Shelley understands it, purges ideology—for
lack of a better word—from his brain. He is lifted from the suffering of what he wrote
into the “thousand beacons” that arose from it. The regenerative and restorative center of
the poem is here, when Rousseau witnesses a dance of “savage music, stunning music”
(435). The experience is reminiscent of the imagery in Shelley’s sonnet “England in
1819”:

……………………………………………..
Religion Christless, Godless—a book sealed;
A senate, Time’s worst statute, unrepealed—
Are graves from which a glorious Phantom may
Burst, to illumine our tempestuous day. (11-14)
The bursting is not subjunctive in The Triumph of Life but known and actual. The
glorious Phantoms are all around but it is their lights that are tempestuous. There is
another instance of bursting and tempestuous life may help explain the effect Rousseau’s
drinking of the Shape’s cup has on his perception. An earlier dance in the poem is
described as
Maidens and youths fling their wild arms in air
As their feet twinkle; now recede and now
Bending within each other’s atmosphere
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Kindle invisibly; and as they glow
Like moths by light attracted and repelled,
Oft to new bright destruction come and go; (149-54)
The “bright destruction” which marks both youth, the dance, history, and the aesthetic
movements of the poem, is new destruction, growth. It is kept new by continually
destroying itself in its brightness. It relates both to the light of “severe excess” (424) in
which Rousseau attunes his vision after his brain becomes sand and also to “‘The thickest
billows of the living storm / [to which Rousseau] plunged, and bared [his] bosom to the
clime / Of that cold light, whose airs too soon deform.—(466-68).
By harnessing and reanimating this wild energy, which Yeats thought was
destroyed by “conscious art,” the poem prevents its overcoming by history. It “pass[es]
not away upon the passing stream” (399) of time. The poem’s contortions, deformations,
distortions, ghastly masks, skeletons and shadows, as bleak and grim as they feel, are the
relics of the cold glare of a historical awareness that understands history as progressing
toward one light of progress after another. The hope of The Triumph of Life is that it
knows what life looks like in the light, an implacable and indomitable conqueror. It emits
its own “living melody” by escaping the extremes of a world that might be too much with
us and one that might not be there at all. Its visionary figures anticipate the future in
which we read them, by existing in the very threads of history itself, veiled in the light of
ancient knowledge and progress. The Triumph of Life at once epitomizes Romanticism’s
obsession with the nonhuman, natural world and its indifference to thinking that does not
respond or take into account the moral and aesthetic effects this world produces. Far from
being an unfinished fragment on the meaninglessness of human existence, the work
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showcases that human existence is always already an unfinished fragment. For this very
reason, it should be read as both complete and, more importantly, a joyful expression of
ceaseless questionings, of its incompleteness.
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CONCLUSION
The Future of Shelley
This is the strife which stirs the liquid surface of man’s life.
—The Witch of Atlas
The questions that I have tried to raise in this study resist clear-cut answers.
Perhaps this is inevitable when interrogating subjects as capacious as history, the future,
ethics, love, poetry and the self. As the pressing concerns of Shelley’s poetry and
thought, one would expect that such notions would clearly reveal themselves in his
work—and they do, consistently and loudly. Yet Shelley’s poetry possesses a quality that
challenges the easily recognizable goals of his ethico-political rhetoric, his egalitarian and
progressive commitments. His poetry, particularly the work written for a select audience,
is veiled with the self-evidence of prophecy, which achieves the effect of both obscuring
and enabling interpretation. One thinks of T. S. Eliot’s famous remark that “genuine
poetry can communicate before it is understood,” an observation he makes talking about
Dante, a poet in whom he saw the future trajectory of Shelley’s work.187 Or Yeats comes
to mind, when he reminisces that after reading Prometheus Unbound he “went to a
learned scholar to ask about its deep meanings, which [he] felt more than understood.”188
Using a postmodern critical verbiage, the contemporary poet Michael Palmer describes a
similar attribute of Shelley’s poetry: “[He] represents a radical alterity […], a poetry that
risks speaking to the central human and social occasions of its time, yet speaks from a
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decentered and largely invisible space. It exploits the margins to speak as it will, out of
difference, rather than as it is always importuned and rewarded, out of sameness.”189
In trying to account for the precise quality Shelley’s poetry manifests, each author
identifies a boundary that marks the relationship of the concealed to the visible.190 This
relationship has the effect of paradox, in that it makes the latent seem to speak in
Shelley’s poetry, while seeming to suppress a great deal of literal content under the
shadow of myth and allegory. And so the reader begins to imagine the difference of the
work (in both form and content) by way of a sustained disruption in the work itself and
the social forms it critiques. The very ironic inarticulacy that accounts for this disruption
enables the possibility of the orphic dance of language that conceals the deep truth that it
sings. The poetry, then, addresses what is beneath, above, and ahead of us through the
unjust realities of its present; like the epigraph to the Prometheus Unbound volume, “Do
you hear this, Amphiarus, hidden away under the earth”?, Shelley’s defiant summons
against the ghosts of the past represents the embrace of, in Palmer’s words, a radical
future alterity. Thus, the force of his work, which is both hidden and visible, “more felt
than understood,” derives from its strong communicable bond with the future—that
allegory of chance, possibility and hope that is so difficult to represent in words that will
speak to and apprehend moments other than their own.
It is likewise, as I have tried to demonstrate, with Shelley’s understanding of
moral agency. The threat of Wordsworthian self-isolation or Romantic self-dissolution
begins when the mind makes other people mere instruments for its own desires, when
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there is no possibility for experiencing sympathy, beauty or love. But this gap between
the idolatrous and Promethean self is more complex than the difference between
narcissism and charity. The “sweet bondage” that characterizes a healthy moral will is
distinguished from the delusive autonomy of someone who shares neither sympathy nor
love with the larger social community. The difference entails, to use Shelley’s word, a
chasm of desire by which one is either enslaved or liberated. I have argued that Shelley’s
idea of imaginative love, the going out of ourselves, represents the transformative act of
Shelley’s moral order. It seems to me that so much of his poetry is eruptive and
incantatory because the rhetoric parallels the moral aim of expanding what he imagines
as the narrow circumference of self. In the Defence Francis Bacon is praised for his
supreme poetry, which accomplishes multiple ends, according to Shelley:
Lord Bacon was a poet. His language has a sweet and majestic rhythm,
which satisfies the sense, no less than the almost superhuman wisdom of
his philosophy satisfies the intellect; it is a strain which distends, and then
bursts the circumference of the hearer’s mind, and pours itself forth
together with it into the universal element with which it has perpetual
sympathy.191
Here Shelley conceives the perfect admixture of self, other, and Poetry. Transforming the
auditor into a participant of the eternally beautiful, good, and true, Bacon’s words cast a
wide moral net in their facilitation of sympathy. Such is the effect of poetry on the moral
and social order. Because poetry is a moral as well as historical fact in the world,
according to Shelley, it guides the progress of both individuals and cultures.
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As one reads deeper into the Defence of Poetry, which I think is best read as a
poem that addresses the future ends of poetry, a horizon of hope comes to dominate the
passages dedicated to imagination, morality, and love. Within the boundary of this
horizon is where Shelley’s concept of self fully emerges as future-oriented and chancedetermined. I do not mean chance in the sense of accident or contingency, but rather with
the idea in mind of the fantastic possibility of upending the bounds of the egotistic self.
At the beginning of this study I remarked how Shelley conceives a poet’s influence on
the future, that poets have the power of making the futures out of which contemporary
conditions arise by imagining appointments that can only be met by other poets. The
claim that poets are the “mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the
present” is a specular metaphor not only for a certain kind of cultural progress but also
for a kind of individual liberation.192 The works of poets, and the workings of the poetic
process, are telescopic lenses through which the individual sees himself at a distance. It is
this distancing effect that inheres in Shelley’s strongest poetry that allows the individual
to ethically address both the future and the human collective. Whether confronting the
cosmic awe that Mont Blanc inspires, addressing the West Wind that is everywhere and
nowhere, or speaking in the voice of “what was once Rousseau” to a triumphal pageant of
Enlightenment figures, the poetry makes available the difference between humanity at its
superficial and humane level, the “difference between social and individual man.”193
This difference equates to no less than the foundation of moral knowledge for
Shelley. Palmer’s remark that Shelley speaks out of difference rather than from sameness
echoes the kind of differences that so consumed Shelley’s moral attention, which are not
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the visible and superficial differences that belong to groups and masses, but the internal
differences that belong to individuals’ hopes and desires, fears and repulsions. The more
a person’s actions directly influence the happiness or misery of another, the nearer those
actions are to the essential character of the person: “these [actions] flow from a
profounder source than the series of our habitual conduct, which […] derives its origin
from without.”194 For Shelley individuals are most indistinguishable from one another
when they fail to take into account their differences, fail to see beyond the present
moment and those external circumstances that brought it into existence. This failure
marks an obsession with the past and a blindness to the future, the beginning of
vengeance and self-contempt.
In the Defence the two names that Shelley employs to describe his Manichean
view of reality, Self and Poetry, which he further translates twice over into Mammon and
God, Money and Love, have formed the basis for my examination of his theory of self.
Self is the great problem for Shelleyan ethics, and love, as I have argued, is the great
answer. The Promethean moment of escape from self-contempt, self-hatred, and selfobsession, recurs each time we make a decision that is selflessly future-oriented.
Forgiveness becomes an act of both recollection and erasure in that it conjures up the
demons of the past, the Phantasm of Jupiter, in order to slay them. But before assuming a
perspective that can change the present by summoning the chance that feeds on the
future, we must forgive ourselves, so to speak, since the Phantasm of Jupiter is the
embodied self-hatred that Prometheus feels for himself. Shelley conceives love as the
generative force that creates the chasm-vacancy from which the phantasms of self can
either be sealed or called forth into redemption. Shelley forever wrestled with the fact
194
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that every person, himself especially, is marked with a Jupiter and a Prometheus, as well
as Furies to torment each; this condition was the “mutiny within” he tried to quell, guide
and transform. Poetry became the ethical instrument of change in a world not yet ready to
hear it.
In a fragment consisting of three short observations on aesthetics posthumously
entitled Three Fragments on Beauty, Shelley writes in the last that
It is sweet to feel the beauties of nature in every pulsation, in every
nerve—but it is far sweeter to be able to express this feeling to one who
loves you. To feel all that is divine in the green-robed earth and the starry
sky is a penetrating yet vivid pleasure which, when it is over, presses like
the memory of misfortune; but if you can express those feelings—if,
secure of sympathy (for without sympathy it is worse than the taste of
those apples whose core is as bitter ashes), if thus secure you can pour
forth into another’s most attentive ear the feelings by which you are
entranced, there is an exultation of spirit in the utterance—a glory of
happiness which far transcends all human transports, and seems to invest
the soul as the saints are with light, with a halo untainted, holy, and
undying.195
This powerfully envisioned Edenic scene evokes as well as suppresses all the players:
Adam, Eve, an apple, and even the illumined saints recall Lucifer.196 Its subtle eroticism
only adds to the sensuousness of the description, further reinforcing Shelley’s likening of
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poetry to the oracular and enchanted. This brief account of the inspired effect of language
pitched into poetry is remarkable for its suggestion that it makes the secular sacred. But
what humanizes the familiar Shelleyan poetics here is a simple scene of love between two
people. Their sympathetic relationship makes available each other’s heart’s desire. The
poetry inspired by nature’s beauty expands the circumference of their sense of self. The
whole sublime “glory of happiness” seems limited only by imagination’s power to breath
fresh utterances, and the number of auditors to receive their inspired effect. And, like so
much of Shelley’s work, beneath the sublime hope and optimism lies something darker.
The bitter apple’s ash is always at the center of both the scene and the self, just as hope
must “create from its own wreck the thing it contemplates.”
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